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Abstract 
This study aims to demonstrate the different experiences in the Japanese domestic air 
transport market compared to those of the intra-EU market as a result of liberalisation 
along with the Slot allocations from 1997 to 2005 at Haneda (Tokyo international) 
airport and to identify the constraints for air transport liberalisation in Japan. The main 
contribution of this study is the identification of the structure of deregulated air 
transport market during the process of liberalisation using qualitative and quantitative 
techniques and the provision of an analytical approach to explain the constraints for 
liberalisation. Moreover, this research is considered original because the results of air 
transport liberalisation in Japan are verified and confirmed by Structural Equation 
Modelling, demonstrating the importance of each factor which affects the market.  
 
The Tokyo domestic routes were investigated as a major market in Japan in order to 
analyse the effects of liberalisation of air transport. The Tokyo routes market has seven 
prominent characteristics as follows: (1) high volume of demand, (2) influence of slots, 
(3) different features of each market category, (4) relatively low load factors, (5) 
significant market seasonality, (6) competition with high speed rail, and (7) high fares in 
the market. These characteristics particularly stand out when comparing to routes 
serving the UK, including UK domestics. 
Moreover, the outcomes of the analysis demonstrated the three significant different 
experiences compared to the intra-EU market serving the UK as a result of 
liberalisation: (1) decreased demand, (2) increased fares and (3) new entrants’ failures. 
Although competition among airlines seemed to be experienced in the beginning of the 
process of liberalisation, most of new entrants are governed by the control of network 
carriers, and this has affected the market, which resulted in fares to increase and 
demand to drop, particularly in the low demand markets. However, several markets on 
the Tokyo routes have been developed by low fares as a result of competition with high 
speed rail such as the Tokyo-Hiroshima and Okayama routes.  
Abstract 
 
The key objectives of the slot allocation policies were the promotion of competition and 
the improvement of consumer’s convenience with safety assured. They have not been 
accomplished yet because of several constraints. 
 
The constraints for liberalisation in Japan were discovered by comparing with the 
virtuous market flow circulation in the EU. The results of liberalisation in Japan have 
the opposite direction flow because airlines provide “high yield products”, which are 
caused by high cost structures of air transport in Japan, compared to the “high 
productivity products” of the EU.  
It is very difficult to promote a real basis for competition among airlines and HSR in 
Japan. Governments have been developing the transportation network of both rail and 
air in line with the growth of the Japanese economy under the name of competition 
policy since 1960s. The overestimated airport planning and demand by the government 
based on the bubble economy in Japan caused high cost structures as well. 
Furthermore, the Japanese Government has been reluctant to implement significant 
changes and face the impacts of deregulation in order to avoid the bankruptcies of 
airlines experienced in other liberalised markets. Therefore, the intensity of competition 
in the Japanese air transport has been interpreted and implemented differently from 
those of other areas as a result of this protective policy towards Japanese airlines. The 
standard of competition has not reached the level of other industries like manufacturing, 
which have been competing in the global market. It seems that Japanese government 
policy has accomplished its objective which forced two network carriers (JAL and 
ANA) to change the structure of organisations, labour cost and their companies’ 
hierarchical cultures, although the intensity of change is not enough compared with 
other airlines outside Japan as a result of liberalisation. 
 
Lower fares and reduced costs are crucial in order to develop demand and switch the 
direction of the market flow in Japan, as evidenced in the intra-EU market.  
A real basis for competition is expected when the number of slots will increase at 
Haneda airport in 2009. In order to prepare for the next step of liberalisation and 
international competition, fundamental changes and innovation should be implemented 
by removing constraints in the Japanese air transport system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Competition within the European market is intense and we anticipate further low 
cost competition on key routes in 2004. We are not afraid of the competition.” (Air 
Lingus former CEO Willie Walsh)1 
1.1 Research background 
Airlines are facing strongly competitive environments as a result of the significant 
changes in the economic regulation of the sector. The airline industry is moving steadily 
towards full Open Skies in order to achieve the borderless competition that exists in 
other industries. 
 
The US was the first country in the world to deregulate its domestic market in 1978. 
The deregulation of the US domestic market and the Canada-US Open Skies agreement 
significantly eased the regulatory restrictions on the development of airline networks in 
North America (Oum and Lee, 2002). Within three years of the Airline Deregulation 
Act nearly all US carriers were experiencing a substantial change in their financial 
performance (Williams, 1994). 
 
The Computer Reservation System (CRS) had a significant impact on the structure of 
the deregulated US airlines. Prior to deregulation around two thirds of bookings were 
made direct with airlines, but by the mid 1980s some 80% were being made via travel 
agencies (Williams, 1994). As for other significant results of deregulation in the US, 
hub and spoke networks were operated by large carriers and later point to point 
operations were developed by new low cost airlines. According to the US DOT, the 
average fares on the over 750 mile-distance routes decreased by 37% between 1978 and 
1990, while over 90% of US domestic passengers were using some type of discounted 
ticket by the mid-1990s (Yamauchi, 1996). 
 
                                                     
1 Airline Business, vol.20, No.5 and col.20, No.3 p.29 
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The European Union (EU) was the first region in the world to remove all economic 
restrictions. It was started with the Nouvelles Frontières case in 1986.2 The process of 
liberalisation was achieved gradually in three stages and took ten years, from 1987 to 
1997 (Chang and Williams, 2002). In 1987, the single European Act was passed by the 
European Council, which committed EU Member States to the establishment of a 
common European market by the end of 1992. 
 
The third package of aviation liberalisation was enforced in 1993, completing the single 
aviation market in Europe. The third package consisted of three regulations. First of all 
under Council Regulation 2407/92 any community carrier is permitted to operate its air 
services in the European Union as long as it has an AOC (Air Operator’s Certificate). 
The second part of the 3rd package, Council Regulation 2408/92, deals with access for 
community air carriers to intra-community air routes, while the third part, Council 
Regulation 2409/92, is concerned with fares and rates for air services. Overall, the 3rd 
Package permitted full open access to all EU routes with complete pricing freedom. 
 
Many studies and research papers have analysed the impact of liberalisation of air 
transport in the EU. One of the most significant outcomes of deregulation in Europe has 
been the emergence of low cost scheduled airlines. The low cost sector has been 
expanding rapidly and growing at between 20 and 25 % a year. Barrett (2004) points 
out the business relationship that exists between airports and low cost carriers. He 
argues that the combination of low cost carriers and secondary airports has been 
significant both in terms of LCCs gaining market share and expanding the size of the 
overall market, as a result of the willingness of passengers to use remote airports, which 
are typically more distant than the traditional hubs from the major cities. 
 
By contrast, the Northeast Asian markets have been evaluated as being very fragmented 
because of the inefficient and inconvenient air carrier networks in the region (Oum and 
Lee, 2002). However, the new waves of low cost carriers that have already affected 
                                                     
2 The Nouvelles Frontières case at European Court of Justice established that rules governing competition in the 
Treaty of Rome applied to air transport. 
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Europe and North America have now started to occur in Asia.3 Japanese airlines are 
being forced to cope with the new pressure by reducing costs. Although it has been said 
by Japanese officials that liberalisation in the domestic market has already been 
introduced into Japan, the market is not fully liberalised yet. The liberalisation process 
in Japan was started in 1985 and regarded as having been completed in 2000. It has 
been implemented in several stages as was the case in the EU. However, there are many 
incomplete issues concerning liberalisation as a result of the structural problems in 
Japanese aviation. The impact of new entrants resulting from liberalisation in Japan is 
therefore significantly different from that of the EU. 
 
The effect of the air law revision in Japan has been discussed in Japanese literature4 in 
comparison with US deregulation. Many authors have appreciated the effects of the 
domestic market liberalisation in Japan more or less, although they have reservations 
and have made suggestions for further reforms. However, external evaluations have 
been severe and more direct. For example, Feldhoff (2002) pointed out the lack of a 
clear strategy for air transport. The influence of prefecture and municipal actors, 
including corporations and interest groups, who are guided by regional policy interests, 
and increasing financial constraints, were all aspects of a system in need of reform. 
Oum and Lee (2002) highlighted the Japanese protective aviation policy for its carriers 
against external pressures. 
 
“Japan protects its carriers at an enormous expense to passengers, most being 
Japan’s own nationals. The Japanese government’s overriding concern is in 
protecting its flag carriers from competition. Unless consumer voices are louder than 
the carriers’, and policy priorities are changed, there will be little reason why the 
Japanese government will voluntarily agree with the US or any country”(Oum and 
Lee, 2002). 
 
                                                     
3 In Australia there is no nationality restriction on setting up a domestic airline. In China there is consolidation around 
three major carriers. Meanwhile, experiments with liberalization are moving ahead- Hainan Island is now a free 
market for air services. (Giovanni Bisignani’s speech at the International Aviation Club, Washington, DC, 20th April 
2004)  http:// iata.org/pressroom/speeches (accessed 6h May 2004). 
4 Chujyo.U, 2001. Endo. N., 2001.Shiomi.E,.2001 Transport & Economy ( Unyu to Keizai ). 2001 Aug, 61(8), 27-34 
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Given the EU aviation market is one integrated market, it is possible to compare it with 
the domestic in Japan. Moreover, there are some similarities between Japan and the EU 
on the timing and process of liberalisation, although they are proceeding differently. 
Low cost carriers have emerged in both markets. However, their segmentation and 
impact have been remarkably different. This outcome can be analysed by examining the 
different attributes of the air transport sectors in Japan and the EU. It is clear that the air 
transport market in Asia with its current size and future potential and possibilities 
resulting from liberalisation deserves a huge attention from the world (Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1: World population growth (thousands) 
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The LCC is today one of the key drivers for efficiencies in aviation. If allowed to 
operate in all of the Asia-Pacific region, it would open the door to spectacular growth 
in the intra-Asian market. (McDermott, 2004)5 
 
                                                     
5 McDermott. P, AVMARK Aviation Economist, October 2002. p.7-9 
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The domestic market in Japan was regarded by the Government as having been 
deregulated in 2000. However, the effects and results have been different from the 
experience in other liberalised air transport markets. These different effects and results 
are analysed, in this thesis focusing on the key characteristics and determinants, which 
have been studied in academic literature.  
 
Hence, first of all it is essential to know how the effects of air transport deregulation 
have been investigated and recognised. In order to study the impact of deregulation on 
air transport markets, an extensive literature search has been undertaken, part of which 
has been to examine the changes in passenger volumes, fares and other determinants, in 
the process examining the relationship between each determinant. A number of 
empirical studies have analysed the effects of liberalisation in various markets involving 
a variety of determinants (see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1: Selected studies estimating demand and fares involving various determinants 
Authors 
(Published year) 
Data period Areas 
Dresner and 
Tretheway (1992) 
1976-1981 North Atlantic routes 
Mallebiau and 
Hansen (1995) 
1969-1989 North Atlantic routes 
Jorge- Calderon 
(1997) 
1989 Intra European international routes 
Nero (1998) 1993 
Intra European city-pairs, operated 
by two carriers 
Clougherty et al 
(2001) 
1982-1994 Canadian international routes 
Schipper et al (2002) 1988-1992 34 European interstate city-pair routes 
Tam et al (2002) 1954-2002 North American network 
Bhadra (2002) 1999 -2000 North American regions 
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Variables in demand equation modelling for the selected studies are shown in Appendix 
A, while variables in fare equation modelling for the selected studies are shown in 
Appendix B. 
 
In the literature relating to the US market, Dresner and Tretheway (1992), using data 
from 1976 to 1982, found that liberalised US bilateral agreements lowered discount 
fares by 35% in the North Atlantic markets. Dresner and Oum (1998) showed that 
Canadian liberalisation increased international passenger traffic over the period 1975 to 
1994. The available literature supports the view that US liberalisation policy led to 
increasing traffic, lower prices and other consumer benefits. These outcomes have been 
recognised as the key effects of deregulation. Similar results are demonstrated in the 
case of the European market. 
 
In respect of the impact on airline fares, Dresner and Tretheway (1992) and Nero (1998) 
used two-stage least squares (2SLS) techniques to estimate fares. Nero (1998) used a 
model which estimated passenger volume on routes using the following variables: 
average population of the two end points, volume of trade, service frequency, and the 
ratio of train to flight journey times. This study found that European airlines in the late 
1980s discriminated price according to the journey origin, with lower fares persisting on 
routes which experienced liberal bilateral agreements. 
 
Jorge-Calderon (1997) showed that demand tends to be inelastic with respect to the 
unrestricted economy fare and that most discounted fares were found to generate traffic 
on shorter distance routes in the intra-European market in 1989. The estimated fare and 
frequency equations analysis in this study also showed that standard economy fares are 
lower and departure frequencies higher on fully liberalised routes than on routes without 
such liberalisation. 
 
Clougherty et al (2001) assessed the impact of Canada’s partial liberalisation policy on 
air traffic volumes in the international market using the results of modelling of air 
traffic determinants to formulate regression equations and found international passenger 
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traffic levels increased between 1982 and 1994. However, they were unable to measure 
the effect on airfares or consumer welfare because of the lack of average air fare data. 
 
Schipper et al (2002) measured the impact of liberalisation on European interstate 
routes in terms of changes in consumer welfare, which was calculated using a demand 
equation with data from 1988 to 1992. Demand was assumed to depend on exogenous 
variables, including income and the number of potential passengers on the one hand, 
and an endogenous ticket fare variable on the other. The estimated fare and frequency 
equation6 showed standard economy fares were lower and frequencies were higher on 
fully liberalised routes than on routes without such liberalisation.  
 
Demand is also influenced by macro-economic determinants. Tam et al (2002) 
identified key relationships between the economy and the air transportation system by 
focusing on the close relationship between airlines and the supply/demand of air 
transportation in the North Atlantic network over 48 years from 1954 to 2002. This 
study indicated that airlines control prices, networks and schedules, which in turn have a 
major impact on the demand for air transportation services, and there was a close 
correlation between annual economic growth and air travel after deregulation. Bhadra 
(2002), using data for 1999 and 2000, identified the determinants of air transport 
demand at the local level in the North American regions to estimate demand on routes, 
using variables including local economic activities, demographics and industry 
characteristics. 
 
It is clear that the effects of air transport deregulation have been investigated and 
analysed using several key determinants. The term “Competition” represents one of the 
prominent characteristics of deregulation and liberalisation. Clougherty et al (2001) 
produced a fare equation using the variable “Market Competition”, where market 
competition reflects the competitive forces in a market, in order to estimate traffic 
volume. The number of competing airlines in a market is used as a variable to determine 
the degree of competition. Williams (2002) revealed the effects of deregulation on a 
                                                     
6 In this study, the fare and frequency variables in the passenger demand equation are treated as endogenous 
variables. 
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market by measuring market concentration using the Hirschman Herfindal Index (HHI)7 
demonstrating the competitive changes on routes. Changes in the level of competition 
resulting from liberalisation can be demonstrated by various methods. “Competition” is 
not only the result of deregulation but is also the driving force to innovate the market 
and is the objective of deregulation itself. Hansjochen (2001) explained that the 
objective of liberalisation is to maintain sustainable competition and the competition 
concept is useful as the means to be achieved with an increasing influence of market 
forces and a decreasing influence of regulatory interventions. Hence, the effects of air 
transport deregulation have been investigated and analysed using several demand 
determinants. These determinants and the relationships between them demonstrate 
clearly the characteristics and effects of deregulation.  
 
Slot allocation policy is also one of the important factors and issues for deregulation and 
liberalisation. Slot utilisation is one of the comprehensive measurements used to assess 
the efficient use of an airport. Slots are the most important assets for the public and 
airlines alike (Madas, et al, 2006). Traditionally, the allocation of slots is based on the 
principle of histric precedence and is organised through airline acheduling committees 
established at designated airports world wide. 
 
In the US, slot allocation policy was changed from 1985 as part of the deregulation 
process. The US Department of Transportation terminated slot allocation policy and 
introduced a “Buy and sell” method for allocating limited slots. Starkie (1998) analysed 
the problem of allocating landing slots at congested airports from an economic 
perspective and concluded that a secondary market in slots would encourage a more 
efficient use of these scarce resources. In his study, slot utilisation was measured in 
three ways: (1) the average rate at which slots were used; (2) whether leased slots were 
used more intensively than owned or operated slots; and (3) the average daily seat 
capacity per slot. 
                                                     
7 The Hirschman Herfindal Index (HHI): A commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by 
squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. The HHI 
value can range from close to zero to 10,000. The HHI is expressed as: HHI = s1^2 + s2^2 + s3^2 + ... + si^2 (where 
si is the market share of the ith firm).  
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Abeyratne (2000) studied the management of airport congestion from the point of view 
of slot allocation. He mentioned that most of the busiest airports in the world are denied 
monetary trading or similar slot allocation mechanisms. Moreover, he explained the 
situation in Europe where they have established scheduling and coordinating 
organisations or Governmental administrators have been established in order to follow 
the IATA guidelines or the EU Regulation 95/93. The European Union introduced 
Regulation 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at community airports on 
18 January 1993 (European Economic Community, 1993). The aim of this Regulation 
was to ensure that where airport capacity is scarce, the available capacity is used 
efficiently and distributed in a fair, non-discriminatory and transparent way 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001). In the Article 6 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of January 1993, airport capacity is descrived in Appendix 
C (1). 
 
This regulation incorporated the grandfather right principle and allowed slots to be 
freely exchanged or transferred in a strict and transparent manner without monetary 
exchanges under the coordination of a slot coordinator (Abeyratne, 2000). This is 
mentioned in detail in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of January 1993 Article 8 
(Appendix C [2]). Furthermore, the slot allocastion for new entrants is regulated in 
Article 8 and “New entrant” is defined as airlines which has less than four slots per day 
at the designated airport unless they don’t have more than 3% of the total slots per day 
at a particular airport or more than 2% of the total slots per day in an airport system in 
Article 2 (Appendix C [3]). 
 
The European Commission amended Regulation 95/93 in 2001 with the objective of 
ensuring scarce capacity at Europe’s congested airports is managed efficiently but 
without risking radical changes to the administrative system of slot allocation built 
around grandfather rights. Under this regulation, airlines can no longer consider slots as 
their property, but as a permission to use airport facilities. In 2003, the European 
Commission reformed slot allocation to make it easier for new entrants to access the 
market and make better use of airport capacities. 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
- 10 - 
In an Australian context, Forsyth (1997) examined several issues about the price 
regulation of privately owned airports. He argued that efficient handling of congestion 
can be reconciled with price caps if the regulator determines the appropriate congestion 
and capacity trade off, and supervises slot allocation. 
1.2 Research aim and objectives  
The domestic market in Japan was deregulated in 2000. However, the effects and results 
have been different from the experience of other liberalised air transport markets. 
Explaining the different effects and results is the key aim of this research. The study 
identifies the structure of deregulated air transport markets during the process of air 
transport liberalisation using qualitative and quantitative methods. The characteristics 
and effects of liberalisation of air transport in Japan’s domestic market serving Haneda 
airport are analysed and compared with those of intra-European routes. Using the results 
of these analyses, this study seeks to address important issues about the process of 
deregulation in order to contribute to future policy making. In addition, this research 
attempts to identify the best direction for policy with regard to air transport in Japan to 
enable a common aviation market in Asia to be achieved. 
 
The specific objectives of this research are: 
 
• To examine in which ways air transport liberalisation in Japan has been different 
from the experience in other regions of the world. 
• To analyse the characteristics and effects of air transport liberalisation in the 
Tokyo domestic market in comparison with the effects of liberalisation in the 
EU. 
• To identify the structure of the deregulated air transport market during the 
process of air transport liberalisation in Japan using qualitative and quantitative 
methods. 
• To address important issues about the process of deregulation in Japan and 
identify constraints for further liberalisation.  
• To identify the best direction for policy with regard to air transport in Japan to 
enable a common aviation market in Asia to be achieved 
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1.3 Research questions 
With respect to fulfilling the main objectives of this research, the study focuses on the 
Tokyo domestic market for analysis. 
 
There are two international airports that serve the Tokyo Metropolitan city: (1) Narita 
International Airport (55kms away from the centre of Tokyo) which is recognised as 
one of the international hub airports in Japan, which handled more than 31 million 
passengers including 1 million domestic passengers connecting to eight Japanese 
airports in 2006, (2) Haneda airport (Tokyo International Airport) which was opened in 
1931 has been developed as the main interntional and domestic airport in the centre of 
Tokyo. Since Narita airport opened in 1988, most of international flight operations were 
moved to Narita airport except Air China and a few general aviation flights. Haneda 
airport has been extended as a main domestic airport in Japan, which handled 64 million 
passengers including 1 million international passengers in 2007. Therefore, in order to 
analyse the domestic market in Japan, the Tokyo domestic market serving Haneda 
airport is analysed.  
 
The Tokyo routes are used to estimate the model used in this research for the following 
two reasons: firstly, the Tokyo routes are Japan’s major domestic markets, their scale is 
extremely large and they have maintained their share of the domestic market in Japan, 
and secondly, the effects of the slot allocation system at Haneda airport (Haneda) have 
had a profound impact on the air transport market after deregulation. As the slot 
allocation system at Haneda airport has been implemented during the liberalisation 
process, the effects of this system on the market will be demonstrated and analysed. The 
results reveal the determinants which have contributed to the effects of liberalisation. 
Using the results of these empirical analyses, the factors influencing the Tokyo market 
are examined.  
 
In line with the process of liberalisation in the air transport market in Japan, the new slot 
allocation policy has been in place since 1997 at Haneda airport in order to promote 
competition and the formation of a diverse air transport network for the improvement of 
consumers’ convenience and interest (both passengers and cargo). New entrants have 
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emerged in Japan and the competitive environment has been discussed more and more 
under the pressure of globalisation with deregulation. Arguments are raised here 
whether the aims of the slot allocation policy have been achieved and how they have 
been implemented and affected the domestic air transport market as a result of 
liberalisation.  
 
In order to fulfill the main objectives of this research, the following research questions 
are posed and answered in this study. 
 
1. How has the air transport domestic market in Japan been developed and how has 
deregulation policy been decided and implemented? 
2. What are the features and characteristics of the Tokyo market?  
3. How significant is the competition between air transport and high speed railways 
serving Haneda? 
4. What are the key determinants of this competition and are they representative of 
the effects of liberalisation in the rest of the domestic market in Japan? 
5. How has the slot allocation policy at Haneda airport been decided and provided 
historically, especially pre and post liberalisation? 
6. How has the market been affected by the slot allocation policy and system? 
7. How have airlines reacted to the slot allocation system? 
8. How has the Tokyo routes market been transformed as a result of deregulation 
over the past decade? 
9. What is the difference in the effects of liberalisation between the Tokyo routes 
market and the intra-European market?  
10. What are the reasons for the different experience in Japan? 
 
 
The following schematic provides a framework in order to discuss the aforementioned 
questions (see Figure 1.1). 
 
As a result of the liberalisation of the domestic air transport market in Japan from 1997 
to 2005, along with the slot allocation system at Haneda Airport, the Tokyo routes 
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market has been transformed and affected by several key factors. Moreover, the result 
of the effects demonstrates and explains the contrasts from other deregulated markets. 
 
Figure 1.2: Relationship between influencing factors in the analysis of the Tokyo routes market 
 
1.4 Methodology and research structure 
In order to answer the aforementioned questions and pursue the main objectives of this 
study, the following methodology has been adopted. 
 
1. Analysis of the development of the domestic air transport market in Japan 
 
In order to understand the historical background of the domestic air transport 
market in Japan and provide a comprehensive overview of aviation 
development in Japan, an exploratory study is undertaken. This focuses mainly 
on the domestic market and the evolution of Japanese government policy after 
World War II. The key elements of this exploratory study are as follows: 
 
a. Historical review of aviation in Japan 
b. Historical review of airlines in Japan 
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c. Overview of Civil Aviation Bureau of Japan (JCAB) policy 
d. Influence of the airport system in Japan 
 
2. Analysis of the impact of liberalisation on the domestic air transport 
market serving Tokyo 
 
The Tokyo routes are analysed using qualitative and quantitative methods in order 
to identify the key characteristics and features of the domestic air transport market 
in Japan. To conduct this analysis, the market has been segmented into six groups 
according to the level of demand. As the slot allocation system at Haneda airport 
has been implemented during the deregulation process, the effects of this on the 
market are demonstrated. The results reveal the determinants which have 
contributed to the effects of liberalisation. Econometric analyses and multivariate 
statistical methods are used to discover the factors which influence or control the 
effects of deregulation on the market. The main determinants (supply, demand, 
fares, service frequency, demography, the existence of new entrants, economic 
activities, load factor, etc), identified in previous literature are used to demonstrate 
the effects of deregulation and liberalisation, with each market category being 
analysed in detail each year from 2000 to 2005. Fares on all the routes are 
analysed to investigate how they have changed during the process of deregulation. 
Not only how each determinant affected the market but also its relationship will be 
analysed in order to demonstrate the structure of the Tokyo domestic market in 
Japan. Moreover, the results of these empirical analyses are examined using 
Structural Equation Modelling. The relationships between factors, which were 
revealed as the key determinants of the structure of the deregulated air transport 
market in Japan, are thus analysed and demonstrated. Both inductive and 
deductive approaches are undertaken. The various elements of this analysis are as 
follows: 
 
a. The attributes of the Tokyo domestic market in Japan are investigated 
using several indices, such as the number of passengers carried, the 
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number of seats supplied, the number of flights, aircraft type, average 
load factors, and HHI (from 2000 to 2004). 
b. The policy and process of the slot allocation system at Haneda airport are 
investigated focusing on the policy making procedures and 
implementation process. 
c. The relationship and differentiation of services between the high speed 
railway and airlines are analysed, as are the effects on the market as a 
result of the competition between them. 
d. The effects of the slot allocation system on individual routes and market 
categories of the Tokyo routes as a result of liberalisation are analysed in 
detail using several factors, including demand, supply, frequencies, fares, 
load factors, and HHI, using data from 1997 to 2005 in line with the 
process of liberalisation and the slot allocation system in 1997, 2000, 
2001 and 2003. The focus is on investigating how these factors have been 
transformed and have affected the market. 
e. The relationship between airline strategies and the characteristics of 
destinations (local economic activity, demographics, and industry 
characteristics) and the impact of deregulation on each route category are 
investigated. 
 
3. Comparative analysis of the effects of liberalisation in the Tokyo domestic 
markets and selected intra-EU routes  
 
In order to conduct comparative analyses of the effects of liberalisation in the 
Tokyo domestic markets and the intra-EU markets, the same logic and 
methodology is adopted. Several intra-EU and domestic routes from the UK are 
selected and analysed using data from 1997 to 2005. Four country pairs are 
mainly considered: UK-France, UK-Germany, UK-Spain and UK-Italy for the 
following two reasons: (1) the routes serving the UK are considered as the most 
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mature LCC markets, (2) each pair of countries combined had much the same size 
of population and GDP as that of Japan in 2003.8  
The selected factors for analysis are as follows: the number of passengers carried, 
the number of seats supplied, frequencies, average capacity per departure, average 
load factors, the number of low cost carriers, the number of carriers, market share, 
the number of airports, economic activities (GDP, local regional GDP per capita), 
and demographic factors (population, working population). Fares are excluded in 
this comparative analysis because of the lack of availability of actual fare data in 
the intra-EU market. The results of the analysis are compared with the outcomes 
of the Tokyo routes analysis in order to demonstrate the characteristics of the 
intra-EU market after liberalisation and the different experiences of the Tokyo 
routes market. The period from 1997 to 2005 has been chosen for this 
comparative analysis in order to have variation in the liberalisation status between 
Japan and selected EU countries, enabling the situation between the partly 
deregulated and the fully liberalised market to be contrasted. The main elements 
of this analysis are as follows:  
 
a. The characteristics and features of the selected routes in the intra-EU 
market are examined using UK CAA data from 1997 to 2005. The 
market is categorised based on UK CAA data in 2000 adopting the same 
scale used for the Tokyo routes market analysis. 
b. The analysis investigates and compares with the results of the Tokyo 
routes analysis focusing on the examination of how the market has been 
changed and affected by the impact of liberalisation using several factors 
including the number of passengers carried, the number of seats supplied, 
frequencies, average capacity per departure, average load factors, the 
number of low cost carriers, the number of carriers, market share, the 
number of airports, economic activities (GDP, local regional GDP per 
                                                     
8 GDP (US$, Purchasing Power Parity Method in 2002) and Population (2003) Japan (3.55 trillion, 127 
million), France (1.54 trillion, 60 million), UK (1.52 trillion, 60 million), Germany (2.2 trillion, 83 million), Spain 
(1.07 trillion, 40 million) and Italy (1.4 trillion, 58 million) Source: CIA World Fact Book in 2000 and UN the 
2002 revision population database. 
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capita), and demographic factors (population, working population) in 
order to discover the different experiences between them on the 
individual routes and market categories. 
c. The mechanism of LCCs success in the intra-EU market is investigated 
and analysed by focusing on their products in comparison with Japanese 
airlines in order to find the key influencing determinants that differentiate 
the effects on each market and to explain the reasons for the different 
experiences by identifying the constraints for liberalisation of the 
domestic air transport market in Japan. 
 
 
1.5 Research structure and thesis layout 
 
Given the aforementioned objectives and methodology of this research, the thesis is 
structured as is shown in Figure 1.3. The layout of the thesis in terms of individual 
chapters follows. 
 
1.5.1 Research structure 
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Figure 1.3: Research structure 
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1.5.2 Thesis layout 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides the research background and literature review relating to the 
subject of this dissertation. The aim and objectives of this study are stated, with the 
key research questions that are addressed. The research methodology adopted in 
order to achieve the main objectives is then explained. In addition, the research 
structure and thesis layout is given. 
 
2. An historical review of aviation and overview of the domestic market in 
Japan 
Chapter 2 explores the historical background and provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the domestic air transport market in Japan giving details of the 
regulatory reforms in the liberalisation process and policies adopted in Japan and the 
EU. 
 
3. The Tokyo routes market 
Chapter 3 investigates the Tokyo routes market in order to identify the 
characteristics and features of the major domestic air transport market in Japan.  
 
4. Competition between air transport and high speed rail 
Chapter 4 aims to identify the key determinants of competition between air transport 
and high speed railways in the Tokyo routes market, where networks of both air 
transport and high speed railways have expanded. 
 
5. The Slot allocation system at Tokyo International airport 
Chapter 5 investigates the policy and process of the slot allocation system at Haneda 
airport. 
 
6. Analysis of the impacts of deregulation and effects of the slot allocation 
system on the Tokyo routes market 
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Chapter 6 investigates the effects of deregulation and the slot allocation policy on 
the Tokyo routes market.  
 
7. Comparative analysis between the Tokyo routes and a selection of routes in 
the intra-European markets 
In chapter 7, a comparative analysis is conducted between the Tokyo domestic 
routes and the intra-EU and domestic routes serving the UK in order to identify 
the different experiences between them as a result of liberalisation and to explain 
the reason for these differences. 
 
8. Structural Equation Modelling analysis of the Tokyo routes Market 
Chapter 8 seeks to model the results of chapters 4 and 6, using Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) in order to assess the results and validate them statistically. It 
provides an evaluation of the importance of each determinant in the model and 
tests the overall fit of the model to the data. 
 
9. Constraints for liberalisation of the air transport market in Japan 
Chapter 9 highlights the constraints for liberalisation of the air transport market in 
Japan based on the results of the comparative analysis of chapter 7, which enables 
the case of partly liberalised and fully liberalised markets to be contrasted. 
 
10. Conclusions 
Chapter 10 provides a summary of the thesis conclusions and the 
recommendations for future policy, in addition to formulating recommendations 
for further academic research. The limitations of this research are also made clear. 
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Chapter 2: Historical review of air transport in Japan 
and an overview of the domestic market 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
domestic transport market in Japan and the evolution of Japanese government policy in 
order to discover how the domestic air transport market has been developed and 
deregulation policy has been put into practice by means of an exploratory study mainly 
based on available literature and official Government documents such as advisory 
circulars. 
2.1 The incunabula 
 Civil Aviation in Japan started in 1951 after World War II, when the former Japan 
Airlines started its first commercial flight service on Martin 202 Mokusei aircraft by 
entrusting Northwest Airlines. The General Headquarters of the occupation army of the 
United States (GHQ) allowed Japan to operate a domestic air service by an operator 
with Japanese capital in July 1952. The Air law in Japan was promulgated and Haneda 
airfield was returned to Japan by the occupation army and renamed Tokyo International 
Airport. The former Japan Airlines started its domestic operation by themselves on a 
DC-4 as the first private airline in Japan, when the US-Japan bilateral agreement was 
signed in August, 1952. 
 
Later, the Government decided to restructure the former Japan Airlines as a half-
government-owned public corporation. The purpose of this reform was to establish the 
airline company as a national flag carrier (Yamauchi and Ito, 1996). “The law of Japan 
Airlines” was issued in August, 1953 and Japan Airlines was officially established as a 
flag carrier and participated in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 
October, 1953. They started the first international operation from Japan to San 
Francisco in 1954. 
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In the initial phases of civil aviation in Japan, approximately nine airlines were founded 
around 1953. After these small private airlines engaged in significant merger activities, 
the present air transport structure was established at the beginning of 1970s (see Figure  
2.1). In 1956, two private carriers, which were “Kyokutou Kouku (Kyokutou Airline) 
and Nipperi Kouku (Nipperi Airline), were merged to form “All Nippon Airways”, 
which was the first fully private carrier after the law of Japan Airlines was issued to set 
up that company as a flag carrier. Later, All Nippon Airways merged with several 
companies and became the second largest airline in Japan.9 Three carriers, which were 
Nitou, Fuji and Kitanihon, were merged into Kokunai Kouku (Japan Domestic Airline) 
in 1964 and later this was merged with Toa Kouku (Toa Airways) to form Toa 
Domestic Airlines in 1971. It was renamed later as Japan Air System in 1988.10 
                                                     
9 ANA merged with Fujita Airlines in1963 and the scheduled operation of Nakanihon in 1965 and Nagasaki Airlines in 
1967. 
10 Japan Airlines and Japan Air System were merged in 2002. 
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Figure 2.1: The history of airlines in Japan (1953 -2002) 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2005) 
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2.2 Regulation of air transport in Japan 
 
2.2.1 The 45 and 47 aviation system 
In line with the rapidly growing economy in Japan in the late 1960s, demand for air 
services increased significantly (see Figure 2.2). At the same time, many aircraft 
accidents occurred in this period (Table 2.1). As a result, the Government issued policy 
directives for future air transport and issued two laws, which were “the Cabinet Meeting 
resolution concerning Airline Operations” in November, 1970 and “the Notice of the 
Ministry of Transport” in July 1972.  
 
Figure 2.2: The number of passengers carried in the Japanese domestic market 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, land and Transport, Aviation Statistics (1962-2005) 
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Table 2.1： Main airline accidents in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s 
Date  
Airline/ Aircraft type 
Flight Routes 
Accident place 
Casualties 
04, Feb, 1966  
 ANA / B727 
From Sapporo to Tokyo 
Tokyo bay 
Fatalities 133 
 (Crew: 7 Passengers: 126) 
04, Mar, 1966  
 CPA / DC-8 
From Hong Kong to Vancouver 
via Tokyo 
Haneda Airport 
Fatalities 64 (Crew: 10 Passengers: 54) 
Serious injury (Passengers: 8) 
05, Mar, 1966  
 BOAC / B707 
From San Francisco  to Hong 
Kong via Honolulu and Tokyo 
Mt. Fuji 
Fatalities 124 (Crew: 11 Passengers: 113) 
13, Nov, 1966  
 ANA / YS11 
From Osaka to Matsuyama 
Iyo nada( the sea area around 
Matsuyama airport) 
Fatalities 50 (Crew: 5 Passengers: 45) 
20, Oct, 1969  
ANA / YS11 
From Kagoshima to Miyazaki 
Miyazaki Airport 
Seriously injury 23 (Crew : 3 Passengers:20)  
Injury 19 (Crew: 1 Passengers: 18) 
03, July,  1971  
TDA / YS 11 
From Okadama to Hakodate 
Mt. Yokozu 
Fatalities 68 (Crew: 4 Passengers: 64) 
30, July, 1971  
ANA and Defence force/ 
B727, F86 
From Sapporo to Tokyo 
Air field around Shizukuishi 
Fatalities 162 (Crew: 7 Passengers: 155) 
 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation Statistics (2005) 
 
The fundamental principle of this policy was aimed at achieving: (1) the promotion of 
consumers’ convenience and (2) the assurance of safety, while coping with the rapid 
development of air transportation in the early 1970s. 
 
Furthermore, in this Cabinet Meeting Resolution, the Government policy demonstrated 
the directions not only for the field of airline business activity but also airline 
management itself regarding mergers, finance and engineering matters. 
 
In Article 1 of the Cabinet Meeting Resolution, (1) the large sized jet airplane’s 
operation (2) the establishment of Toa Domestic Airlines (TDA) and (3) the double 
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designation on the high demand local routes11, were promoted in the domestic market. 
Regarding the international routes, (1) the monopoly operation by Japan Airlines (JAL) 
on the scheduled international routes, (2) the international charter flights by JAL and 
All Nippon Airways (ANA), (3) the prospect of international cargo airlines and 
handling were stated in Article 2 (see Appendix C [4]). 
 
In “The Cabinet Meeting Resolution of 1970”, the structural change from an air 
transport industry with a two companies (JAL and ANA) structure to a three companies 
structure (JAL, ANA and TDA) in Japan was approved. The main policy of “the 
Cabinet Meeting Resolution of 1970” was embodied in the following “Cabinet 
Notification of 1972”. It defined the business fields of the three airlines in order to 
eliminate excessive competition among them and promote co-existence and their co-
prosperity, and control the market share of supply (see Appendix C [5). 
 
This structural policy for the aviation industry in Japan was established in 1970 and 
1972 by the so-called “Aviation Constitution “, which is widely referred to as the “45 
and 47 system” (youngo-yon nana taisei). Kawaguchi (2000) explained the background 
of this policy establishment as follows. All Nippon Airways (ANA) had been desiring 
to take part in the international scheduled market in Asia since the 1950s, especially to 
Mainland China, because the then ANA CEO Mr. Kiheita Okazaki had a strong 
leadership in the China-Japan Friendship Association. During the 1950s, JAL’s market 
share in the Japanese international market stood at 40%, with non-Japanese accounting 
for the rest. ANA claimed that this market share imbalance was caused by the lack of 
Japanese airline’s supply in the market and ANA’s market entry should increase to a 
combined Japanese market share of 50%. However, JAL was strongly against ANA’s 
claim, arguing that ANA would not be able to compete against non-Japanese airlines in 
the international market because of their inexperience and inability. It would cause 
market cannibalisation between JAL and ANA because ANA depended only on the 
Japanese passenger market (Kawaguchi, 2000). As a result, ANA was only allowed to 
                                                     
11 “The domestic trunk routes” are defined as all domestic flights from Sapporo, Tokyo, Osaka, Fukuoka and 
Okinawa (Naha) and “the domestic local routes” as all routes except the trunk routes. 
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operate on short-haul international charter flights as JAL’s claim was supported by the 
Government. 
 
As for the domestic market allocation by the Government, TDA had sought high-
demand trunk routes (routes between Tokyo, Sapporo, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Okinawa) 
because TDA only operated non-profitable local routes. On the other hand, the two 
incumbent airlines on trunk routes, JAL and ANA were strongly against TDA’s 
entrance on the trunk routes. Again, the two incumbent airlines’ opinions were 
supported by the Government and the fundamental policy of the 45 and 47 system was 
established.  
 
Table 2.2: The 45 and 47 system; Market shared out by the Government 
Route type Airlines 
International scheduled routes Japan Airlines 
International charter routes Japan Airlines, All Nippon airways 
Domestic trunk routes 
Japan Airlines 
All Nippon Airways 
Domestic local routes 
All Nippon Airways 
Toa Domestic Airlines 
 
Under this 45/47 system, the market was divided by the Government, with all scheduled 
international routes and domestic trunk routes given to Japan Airlines, domestic trunk 
and local routes to All Nippon Airways, and local routes to Toa Domestic Airlines (later 
renamed Japan Air System). This policy was adopted in order to enable cross-
subsidisation to occur in the Japanese market and to maintain the growth and stability of 
Japanese airlines in balance with economic growth in Japan. The present air transport 
structure in Japan has been determined by this constitution (Shiomi, 2001). 
 
2.2.2 The start of the promotion of competition 
In the 45/47 system, excess competition was avoided in order to promote co-existence 
and co-prosperity of airlines and the market was controlled by the Government. Ten 
years after the introduction of the 45/47 system, the air transport market in Japan had 
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grown vastly as the Japanese economy prospered (see Figure 2.3). Under pressure of 
liberalisation in the US and Europe, the liberalisation process in Japan was started in 
1985 and is regarded as having been completed in 2000. It was implemented in several 
stages as in the EU. In 1985, the 45/47 system was repealed and government policy was 
changed to allow greater market access. This new policy allowed airlines to enter routes 
according to the size of the market, which was defined by the total number of 
passengers carried the previous year. These double and triple designation rules were 
enforced in 1986 as “the transport policy meeting report of June 1986”. 
Figure 2.3: GDP deflator, the number of passengers and RPK in the Japanese domestic market (1990= 
100) 
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Source: Author based on data from Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office (2005) and Ministry of Infrastructure and transport, Aviation Statistics (1970 – 1998) 
 
In Article 4 of “the discussion of the management structure of the airline industry 
in the future” (The transport policy meeting report of June, 1986), the competition 
promotion policy in the domestic market was presented as follows: 
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(1) The promotion of double and triple designations routes according to the level of 
demand. 
(2) The appropriate competition considering a company’s scale 
(3) The business planning by airlines according to this policy 
(4) The securing of non-profitable routes which are regarded as an important air 
transport service to local citizens. 
 
See Appendix C (6) 
 
Under the 45 and 47 system rules, all trunk routes (all the routes from Tokyo, Sapporo, 
Osaka, Fukuoka and Okinawa) and several local routes from Tokyo to Kagoshima, 
Nagasaki, Oita and Hakodate were operated by JAL and ANA as double designation 
routes. The competition promotion policy was enforced in 1986; it allowed double 
designation to the market on routes with annual passenger demand of more than 
300,000 and triple designation on routes with annual passenger demand of more than 
600,000, for all routes connecting Tokyo, Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka, 
Kagoshima and Okinawa. On other routes, it allocated double designation to markets 
with annual passenger demand of more than 700,000 and triple designation to markets 
with annual passenger demand of more than 1 million (see Table 2.3). 
 These double and triple designation rules were gradually extended in 1992 and 1996. 
As a result, the number of double and triple routes rose from 33 in the early 1990s to 51 
by the late 1990s. The policy was repealed in 1997 and after this the market was not 
shared out by the Government. 
 
The chronology of the process of liberalisation and an overview of airports in Japan are 
summarised in the following appendices. 
 
Appendix D: Transition of liberalisation process in Japan and the EU 
Appendix E: Main airports in Japan 
Appendix F: Main airports in Japan (map) 
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Table 2.3: The double and triple designation rules 
Year Routes Double designation Triple designation 
1970 
1972 
 
All trunk routes 
(All the routes from Tokyo to 
Sapporo, Osaka, Fukuoka, 
and Okinawa) 
Several local routes From 
Kagoshima, Nagasaki, Oita 
and Hakodate 
 
1986 
The routes connecting Tokyo, Sapporo, 
Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka , Kagoshima 
and Okinawa  
Annual passenger demand 
more than 300,000  
Annual passenger demand 
more than 600,000 
1986 Other routes 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 700,000 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 
 1 million 
1992 
The routes connecting Tokyo, Sapporo, 
Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka , Kagoshima, 
Okinawa, Hiroshima and Sendai 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 300,000 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 600,000 
1992 Other routes 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 400,000 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 700,000 
1996 All routes 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 200,000 
Annual passenger demand 
more than 350,000 
 
 
For fare setting, airlines were required to obtain government approval even after 
deregulation. In 1995, the fare regulation was partly revised, with airlines allowed to set 
discount fares (up to 50%) after reporting them to the JCAB (Civil Aviation Bureau in 
Japan), but normal fares still needed government approval. In 1996, “the rule of the 
normal fare setting range” was enforced. This rule regulated the range of the normal 
fares on each route (see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.4). Standard costs are caluculated by the 
sum of average overating costs and “appropriate business profit” on the routes 
according to the airlines’ information.  
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Table 2.4: The rules of the normal fare setting range 
The fare setting range 
 Normal fares ( fully flexible fares) Discount fares 
1996 
Between Standard cost and 25% discount off 
the standard cost 
> 50% discount off the standard cost 
1998 Restriction of lower limit was abolished 
2000 Restriction of upper limit was abolished 
 
Under this registration, airlines were able to set fares in the fare setting range in order to 
promote competition. Each airline set discount fares (up to 50%) on several routes. 
However, the standard cost system enabled higher fare setting as an upper limit fare as 
it was computed by the average operating costs and “appropriate business profit” based 
on the airlines’ information. 
 
Kawaguchi (2000) analysed that fares were relatively more expensive on monopoly 
routes rather than on double and triple designation routes. As a result, all fares were 
raised after the enforcement of this fare setting range rule.  
During the process of liberalisation from 1997, two new entrants, Skymark Airlines and 
Hokkaido International Airlines (Air Do) acquired an AOC (Airline Operating 
Certificate) and started operation in 1998. The lower limit of the fare setting range was 
abolished just before these new entrants started up.  Skymark airlines set a 50% 
discount fare on the Tokyo-Fukuoka route when they started operation. In 2000, the 
upper limit of fare setting was abolished. 
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Figure 2.4: Example of the fare setting range in 1996 
 
Notes: Standard costs = Average operating costs (on the double and triple designation routes) + “appropriate” 
business profit 
 
2.2.3  Liberalisation in Japan 
The Air Law was vastly revised in 2000, when the approval rule for each route was 
repealed. Airlines now have the obligation to obtain approval for only their business 
activity, with freedom to set fares by themselves, the only requirement being to provide 
advance notice to the JCAB. This revision has enabled each airline to operate any route 
it desires legally and to set its fares freely subject to advance notice being given. 
 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport reported that deregulation had 
resulted in the average fare paid dropping dramatically on all the domestic routes and to 
have increased public interest in air travel (White Paper, 2003). Endo (2001) estimates 
that on average fares decreased by 30 % between 1985 and 1999 as a result of 
deregulation, the drastic drop being caused by new entrants and the extension of slot 
allocations at Haneda airport. Average yield dropped by 24% between 1989 and 1999 
(see Figure.2.5). 
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Figure 2.5: Yield/ RPK in the Japanese domestic market 
Yield(JYE)/ RPK from 1989 to 2004
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2004) 
 
However, the average yield in the domestic market rose by 4% after liberalisation 
between 2002 and 2004. Moreover, availability of special discount fares in the whole 
domestic market has not increased. Figure 2.6 shows that special discount tickets were 
not available on more than 60% of flights on the monopoly routes after liberalisation. 
 
Although new entrants such as Skymark and Air Do have had some effect on the 
market through heavy discounting, their financial impact on the incumbents has been 
limited. This is due to Japan’s perennial slot shortages, which have prevented them 
from growing rapidly. Domestic deregulation therefore existed in theory, but not in 
practice. While international yields remain weak, domestic yields are improving, in 
part because the larger JAL group is able to attract more individual passengers than 
group travellers, which is a much more higher-yielding type of passenger.” 
(Japan Airlines Former CEO Isao Kaneko)12 
 
                                                     
12 Airline Business, vol.20, no.4 
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Figure 2.6: Availability of special discount fares in the Japanese domestic market 
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Source: Ministry of General Affairs (2004) 
 
The domestic air transport market in Japan was strictly regulated and protected by 
Government since its start in 1951 after World War II. When the 45/47 system was 
repealed in 1985 at the start of deregulation, the process of liberalisation in the domestic 
market in Japan was introduced gradually between 1986 and 2000 in several stages. 
Fare setting rules were eased from 1996 to 2000 and several new entrants entered the 
high demand markets from 1998 (see Figure 2.7). Although some Japanese literature 
appreciated the effects of deregulation on on the market (supra, chapter 1) compared to 
the results of 1985 and 2000, evidence in this chapter demonstrates the different effects 
of liberalisation in the domestic market in Japan compared to those of other regions. 
 
The results of liberalisation are analysed in the following chapters to compare with the 
situation before liberalisation in 2000. 
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Figure 2.7: The process of liberalisation in the domestic market in Japan 
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Chapter 3: The Tokyo routes market  
3.1 Overview 
The domestic air transport market in Japan has expanded in line with the development 
of the Japanese economy, which is concentrated and consolidated in Tokyo at the centre 
of Japan. Tokyo International airport (Haneda) is well known as being highly congested 
and some of the routes are ranked among the top 10 busiest routes in the world (see 
Table 3.1). Also of significance is that there is no secondary airport for the domestic 
routes serving this metropolitan city, which results in the operation of very large aircraft 
on short domestic sectors with a departure every thirty minutes. 
 
Table 3.1: Top ten passenger traffic airports and main Asian airports in the world in 2003 
Airport 
Airport 
Code 
Total passengers 
In 2003 
Peak movements 
(hourly) 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  ATL 79,086,792 223 
Chicago O'Hare International  ORD 69,508,672 186 
London Heathrow  LHR 63,487,136 89 
Tokyo International  TYO 62,876,269 65 
Los Angeles International  LAX 54,982,838 112 
Dallas/Fort Worth International  DFW 53,253,607 133 
Frankfurt  FRA 48,351,664 89 
Paris Charles de Gaulle  CDG 48,220,436 104 
Amsterdam Schiphol  AMS 39,960,400 104 
Denver International  DEN 37,505,138 153 
    
Hong Kong International  HKG 27,092,290 56 
Tokyo Narita International  NRT 26,537,406 46 
Sydney Kingsford Smith International  SYD 25,333,508 68 
Singapore Changi  SIN 24,664,137 43 
Beijing Capital International  PEK 24,363,860 82 
 
Source: Author based on the data from Air Transport Intelligence (2007) 
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However, the Tokyo market does not only consist of these very dense sectors, but also 
is composed of low demand routes. Thus the Tokyo routes cannot be described simply 
as there is a diversity of routes with many different features and issues. This chapter 
aims to identify these characteristics of the Tokyo routes market.  
3.2 Market segmentation of the Tokyo routes 
The market has been segmented into six groups according to the level of demand. 
Table 3.2: Market segmentation of the Tokyo routes 
Category Annual number of passengers 
 
Average Number of departures 
per day 
1 More than 3,000,000 More than 50 
2 2,000,000< 3,000,000 20 – 30 
3 1,000,000 < 2,000,000 14 – 19 
4 Less than 1,000,000 9 – 13 
5  4 - 8 
6  Less than 4 
 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation Statistics (2000) 
 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show that there is an extensive range of demand and supply 
levels in the Tokyo routes. The categories 4, 5 and 6 form the majority of Tokyo routes, 
accounting for more than 65% of the total number of Tokyo flights serving local 
markets and remote islands. However, the total number of passengers flying these 
routes is less than half of the total on category 1 routes. There are seven prominent 
characteristics of the Tokyo routes market. These are: 
 Volume of demand 
 Influence of slots 
 Different features of each category market 
 The relatively low load factors 
 The market seasonality 
 Competition with high speed railway service 
 High fare 
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Detailed information is found in appendix G: Market segmentations of the Tokyo routes 
and key characteristics in 2000. 
 
Figure 3.1: The number of passengers carried annually on Tokyo domestic routes in 2000 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation Statistics (2000) 
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Figure 3.2: Passengers carried and distance in Categories 4, 5 and 6 in 2000 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation Statistics (2000) 
3.3 Characteristics of the Tokyo routes 
3.3.1 Volume of demand 
In 2002, the total number of passengers on Tokyo domestic routes was 59,462,156 and 
the number of daily flights was 392, comprising 61.5% of all domestic air transport 
activity in Japan. The number of passengers on Tokyo routes has been increasing 
constantly despite a prolonged recession of the Japanese economy. 
According to the statistical records, in 2001 the 10 busiest domestic routes were all 
Tokyo sectors (see Table 3.3). The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
expects total passenger demand at Haneda airport will exceed over 73 million 
passengers per year by 2013, compared to the 57 million passengers that used the 
airport in 2004 (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Passenger growth at Haneda airport 
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Table 3.3: Ten busiest domestic Japanese routes in 2001 
Passengers Route HHI Market share by Carrier (%) 
9,367,334 Tokyo-Sapporo 0.31 JL(35), JD(19), NH(38), HD(9) 
8,264,938 Tokyo-Fukuoka 0.29 JL(30), JD(20), NH(39), BC(11) 
4,964,395 Tokyo-Osaka 0.35 JL(36), JD(23), NH(41) 
3,913,802 Tokyo-Naha (Okinawa) 0.36 JL(42), JD(14), NH(41), NU(3) 
2,382,913 Tokyo Kansai 0.43 JL(42), JD(8.3), NH(49.6), EL(0.1) 
2,317,884 Tokyo- Hiroshima 0.42 JL(19), JD(24), NH(57) 
2,111,348 Tokyo- Kagoshima 0.36 JL(26), JD(28), NH(47) 
2,042,866 Tokyo-Komatsu 0.34 JL(30), JD(29), NH(41) 
1,616,606 Tokyo- Kumamoto 0.35 JL(24), JD(37), NH(39) 
1,496,330 Tokyo-Hakodate 0.51 JL(45), NH(55) 
 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2001) 
Notes: One way trips, JL: Japan Airlines, JD: Japan Air System, NH: All Nippon Airways, HD: Hokkaido International 
Airlines, BC: Skymark Airlines, NU: Nippon Trans-ocean Airlines, EL: Air Nippon 
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3.3.2 Influence of slots 
It is generally acknowledged that the lack of slots has been a bottleneck for air transport 
and has produced unusual particularities in this market. Haneda airport is well known 
for the 528 seats Boeing 747SR jets that are operating on the short sectors every ten 
minutes in peak periods. It has been argued by the airlines and aircraft manufacturers 
that this has resulted from the lack of slots. 
 
The average number of available seats per flight on Tokyo routes in 2002 was 330. The 
equivalent figure for Heathrow was 140, Gatwick 94 and Frankfurt 124. The majority of 
Tokyo routes have between 100 and 250 passengers per flight, although the average 
numbers of passengers carried varied between routes. Larger aircraft are operated on the  
Tokyo routes compared to similar routes in other countries. However, the gap between 
supply and demand on the routes can not be explained only because of the lack of slots. 
Another question raised here is why the average load factor is relatively very low in 
these highly congested markets and yet the airlines achieve good profits, which can 
cover for the low yields on the international flights even after deregulation. The key to 
this question can be found in the characteristics of the Tokyo routes. The slot allocation 
system at Haneda airport will be discussed in detail in the following chapters 5 and 6. 
 
3.3.3 Different features of each market category 
There are also other prominent features of this market apart from the differences in 
market size (see Table 3.4 and Appendix G). They are the “relatively low load factors” 
compared with other countries, even on the high demand routes, and the “market 
seasonality”. Besides, “Competition with the high speed railway service” is also one of 
the outstanding features of this market. 
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Table 3.4: Market segmentation of the Tokyo routes and key characteristics in 2000 
Category Characteristics 
Average 
Load factor 
(%) 
Average 
Number of 
passengers  per flight 
Number of airlines 
1 High demand market 68.0 289 4 
2 Competitive market 65.1 231 3 
3 Local centre and strong VFR market 63.4 200 2 
4 Local city market 62.4 169 2 
5 
Secondary and newly opened airport 
market 
58.6 133 1 
6 Remote islands market 66.5 83 1 
 
3.3.4 The relatively low load factors 
Table 3.4 shows the key characteristics of each route category. Categories 1 and 2 are 
mainly operated twice every hour by B747-SR, which has more than 520 seats. 
However, the average load factor is less than 70 % in category 1 routes. The average 
load factor of the Tokyo domestic market is 61% which is low compared with the EU 
market (see Figure 3.4). It is generally recognised that airlines have been operating 
larger aircraft to provide enough supply to cover the high demand experienced during 
seasonal and periodic peak times. During peak periods, high profits result from the 
expensive fares charged without any discounts available.  
Figure 3.4: Average passenger load factors in 2003 
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Source: Composed by the author based on the data of Market Analysis of Europe’s Low Cost Airlines (2004) and 
Aviation statistics in Japan (2003) 
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3.3.5 The market seasonality 
Seasonality is another outstanding characteristic of the domestic market in Japan. There 
are several peak demand seasons in a year, which are during the New Year, mid–
summer and so-called golden week holidays (from the end of April to the beginning of 
May). Each is only for 7 to 10 days. During these periods, massive numbers of people 
are moving from the big cities to their home towns or sightseeing places at the same 
time by all modes of transportation. At these times, people take their holidays, which 
have come from conventional Japanese customs. It still remains among the business 
customs and life styles in Japanese culture even though this trend has changed slightly 
over time. 
 
The number of passengers carried increases in January, August and December, because 
of the summer and New Year vacation seasons (mainly during 7-17 August and 27 
December-10 January). Figure 3.5 shows that load factors in December and January are 
moderately low. However, almost 100 % load factors are achieved during these peak 
periods with extra services operated to cover the demand for these two weeks. Figures 
3.6 and 3.7 show that local route markets show these patterns are inclined to as well. 
Figure 3.5: The seasonality of the total domestic market in 2003 
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Figure 3.6: The seasonality of the domestic trunk routes in 2003 
The seasonality of the domestic trunk routes market in 2003 
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Figure 3.7: The seasonality of the domestic local routes market in 2003 
The seasonality of the domestic market in 2003 ( local)
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3.3.6 Competition with high speed rail 
Competition with high speed rail is another prominent characteristic of the domestic 
market in Japan. Therefore, this is such an important characteristic of the Tokyo routes 
that it is dealt with in great detail in the ensuring chaper 4. 
 
3.3.7 High fares 
Fares have been decided and fixed according to the distance in the Japanese domestic 
market. This has not changed even after liberalisation. The difference between the 
highest and lowest fares is also constant among most routes. Figure 3.9 shows Japan 
Airlines’ fares in June 2003 after liberalisation. Only on several routes which have 
competition with HSR or new entrants were discount fares set a little lower than 
average discount fares. On the other hand, peak fares were raised more on these routes. 
 
Generally, fare types have been segmented into four kinds, which are (1) the fully 
flexible fare (called the “normal fare” in Japanese), (2) the advanced booking discount 
fare, called “Maeuri” or “Tokuteibin”, (3) the ticket book fares and (4) other special 
promotion fares. The advanced booking discount fares restrict the booking periods, 
which vary from 47 days to 1 day before departure. The majority of these advanced 
booking discount tickets are available from 21 days, 7 days and 1 day before departure. 
The difference between the peak and lowest discount fares is not so significant on most 
of the routes. These attributes are one of the prominent characteristics of the Tokyo 
routes market. How fares have been changed pre-and post-liberalisation will be 
analysed in section 6 of chapter 6. 
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Figure 3.8: Japan Airlines’ fares in June 2003 
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Source: Author based on the data from Japan Airlines’ timetable and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 
Aviation statistics (2003) 
Note: Remote islands routes are not included.  Three letter code refers the airport, SPK( Sapporo), FUK(Fukuoka) 
and OSA(Osaka). 
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Chapter 4: Competition between air transport and high 
speed rail 
4.1 Introduction  
Competition does not only exist between airlines but also between airlines and other 
modes of transport, especially high speed rail (HSR). In Japan the high-speed railway 
service “Shinkansen” has been operating since 1964. The network has been developed 
and expanded in much the same way as air transport in response to the economic 
development of Japan. Some flight routes from Haneda airport overlap with the high 
speed railway network, and now more than 30% of Tokyo air routes compete with high 
speed rail (see Figure 3.8). 
 
Air services on the Tokyo-Nagoya (366 kms) and Tokyo-Sendai (352 kms) routes have 
been reduced as a result of the effects of the high speed railway service. Kroes (1998) 
and Park and Ha (2006) mentioned difficulties for air services to compete with HSR in 
Japan. However, some Tokyo air routes have experienced increasing demand as a result 
of the positive effects of competition following deregulation of air transport, excluding 
routes serving remote islands. 
 
How much have these positive effects of competition affected the market and what are 
the key determinants that can stimulate travel if there are modal options for passengers?  
In the Tokyo routes market, which has experienced expanded networks of both HSR 
and air transport, this chapter attempts to investigate the key determinants of 
competition. 
 
An extensive literature search has been undertaken into competition between HSR and 
air transport. Many studies involve behavioural choice analysis using discreet choice 
models. These studies provide valuation of travel attributes; relative valuations include  
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money values of time and fare equivalents; price and cross price elasticity, which 
indicate the sensitivity of demand to change in a single attribute (Eurocontrol, 2004). It 
is clear that three hours journey time is generally recognised as the threshold point for 
competition.   
 
Among the studies of the European market, Blayac and Causse (2001) analysed the long 
distance market in France and Mandel et al (1994) studied medium range routes in the 
German domestic market. Gonzalez-Savignat (2001) evaluated the potential of the HSR 
on the Madrid-Barcelona route in Spain. In Japanese literature, Terao et al (2001) used a 
modal choice model to analyse competition between HSR and air transport on medium 
range routes (450 kms) and estimated that a 12% fare discount on HSR increases rail 
demand by 3% and a 43% discount of the HSR fare increases rail demand by 10%. Yao 
et al (2005) revealed that business travel is more sensitive to changes in travel time, 
access time and service frequency than non-business trips. Most studies demonstrate the 
importance of the relationship between the features of a market and passengers’ modal 
choice using time and fare as the key variables. Markets are segmented generally by 
distance, with HSR dominating up to 350 kms, and air transport dominating over 1,000 
kms (Eurocontrol report, 2004). 
 
Competition between HSR and air transport has been analysed on the basis of journey 
time and fare. However, because of the limitations of fare data, many studies have 
estimated average fares for modelling purposes. This study attempts to show the 
relationship in greater detail between these factors using indices computed from actual 
fare data. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: firstly an outline of high-speed rail services in 
Japan is given followed by some examples in several regions; and secondly, the 
characteristics of the domestic air routes serving Tokyo are outlined. The relationship 
and differentiation of services between HSR and air transport using indices (demand, 
supply, frequency, fares, speed and access time) are then analysed in comparison with 
several domestic routes in France. A summary of the study forms the final section of 
this chapter 4. 
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4.2 High speed railways in several regions 
High-speed trains have been operating for many years in Western Europe, the US and 
eastern Asia. In France the Sociéte Nationale des Chemins de Fer français (SNCF) 
started high speed operations between Paris and Lyon in 1981, which has been followed 
by a further six TGV lines.13  
In Western Europe, competition between high-speed rail services and low cost air 
carriers has been evident. On the Paris-Marseille route, the air modal share dropped 
from 45-55% to 35-45 % as a result of the introduction of high speed rail services (Park 
and Ha, 2006). Table 4.1 shows that relatively low fares existed on European rail 
services compared with other regions. This is the effect of competition with air 
transport. On TGV sectors, the average speed is more than 250km/h, which is the same 
as the Japanese Shinkansen. However, the fare is only between 5.5 and 10 US cents per 
km in France, while it costs more than 22 to 36 US cents in Japan. The latter are almost 
the same as the Eurostar lines, which are operating through the Channel tunnel. 
 
Appendix H: High speed rail and fares in several regions 
4.3 High speed railway network in Japan 
In Japan, the birth place of high-speed trains, the first HSR operation was started 
between Tokyo and Osaka in 1964. In 1975 the HSR was extended to Fukuoka and 
since then the high speed rail network has been increased to 2,418 kms comprising eight 
bullet train (Shinkansen) lines of the Japan Railways Group in 2005. 
 
Table 4.2 compares the length and density of high speed rail networks in selected 
countries of the EU and Japan in 2003. It can be seen that the high-speed rail network 
density in Japan is more than three times that of the French network.  
 
                                                     
13 They are TGV Atlantique (opened 1989-90), TGV Rhône Alpes(1992-94), TGV Nord Europe (1993), TGV Jonction 
(1994-96) and TGV Méditerranée (2001). 
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Table 4.1: Examples of high speed rail services and fares 
 
From To 
Cheapest 
fare 
(USD) 
Standard 
fare(USD) 
Cheapest 
fare(USD)/km 
Standard 
Fare(USD)/km 
Lyon Aix-en-Provence 23.0 47.8 7.9 16.5 
Lyon Avignon 53.2 82.3 8.1 12.5 France 
Lyon Aix-en-Provence 57.5 82.3 7.9 11.3 
Nagoya Tokyo 91.8 91.8 25.1 25.1 
HIroshima Kokura 65.8 65.8 34.3 34.3 
Shin-Kobe Okayama 51.6 51.6 36.0 36.0 
Omiya Sendai 46.5 46.5 14.5 14.5 
Shin-
Yokohama 
Nagoya 86.5 86.5 25.6 25.6 
Japan 
Shin-Kobe Tokyo 125.0 125.0 21.2 21.2 
Brussels Valence 90.8 110.1 10.9 13.2 
Brussels Paris 66.6 66.6 21.2 21.2 European 
Ashford Paris 180.3 180.3 44.9 44.9 
Seoul Daejeon 20.0 20.0 12.9 12.9 
Korea 
Seol Busan 45.9 45.9 11.2 11.2 
 
Source: Author, Fares are acquired from the companies websites in April 2006. 
Notes: The exchange rates used were the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, as reported in the 
exchange rate archives of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Table 4.2: High speed railway networks 
 
 UK Germany Spain France Italy Japan 
Length (km) 140 645 377 1,400 237 2,275 
Lines Density (m/sq km) 0.58 1.85 0.76 1.47 0.13 6.04 
 
Source: Author based on the data from Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer and United Nations Statistics 
Division.  
Notes: Length of lines where the maximum speed of the train can exceed 250km/h (km). Line density = length of 
lines/area square km. 
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Figure 4.1: High speed railway (Shinkansen) networks in Japan 
 
Source: japan-guide.com http://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2018.html 
 
Not only the length and density of lines but also frequency is very high in Japan. In the 
case of the busiest line, Tokaido Shinkansen, the total number of departures operated 
between Tokyo and Osaka became 295 per day including 149 Nozomi (only 3 stops 
operation) trains and 65 Hikari (5 stops operation) trains in 2005.  
 
Nozomi departures increased to 137 from 75 in October 2003 to increase capacity and 
improve the flexibility of the timetable to compete with air transport (See Figure 4.2). 
At peak operating periods, seven Nozomi, two Hikari and three Kodama trains depart 
per hour in each direction from Osaka and Tokyo. The Tokaido high speed railways’ 
revenue accounted for 84 % (JYE 914 billion) of the total Central Japan Railways 
revenue in 2004, according to their financial report. 
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Figure 4.2: Total number of departures per day from Tokyo to Osaka (Tokaido high speed railway) 
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Source: Central Japan Railway Company, Annual Report 2003 and the website data in 2006 
Note: Nozomi, Hikari and Kodama are the types of services. Nozomi service’s maximum speed is 285km/h by the 
Series 700 train. Hikari service is operated by the Series 300 train (maximum speed : 270km/h).The Series 
100 (the maximum speed : 220km/h) is mainly used for Kodama service. The acceleration force of the 
Series 700 has increased compare with the Series 100 and 300 by 16%. 
4.4 Customer value chain analysis 
4.4.1 Mechanism of customer value chain 
In order to examine competition between air transport and HSR, a Customer value chain 
analysis approach is followed. This study attempts to explain the mechanism of 
Customer Value Chain analysis (CVCA) in order to find key determinants of 
competition using both marketing and a system engineering approach. As such, 
Customer Value Chain Analysis extends the functionality and utility of the Customer 
Chain by requiring designers to investigate the value relationships, or value propositions 
between the various customers (Donaldson et al, 2006, Takahashi, 2003). Figure 4.3 
shows an example of the Customer value chain in air transport and illustrates the air 
transport service system diagram, which inputs “Human”, and transforms and adds 
values to the Human throughout several stages of service delivery process. 
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Figure 4.3: Customer value chain of the air transport service system 
 
 
Table 4.3: Terms in Customer Value Chain Analysis 
Customer value chain The series of functions to produce values for customer 
Service system The system to transform “Human” to “Human who experienced values”. 
Support system The system to support service system 
Unit Structural element to compose service system 
Catalyst Element to operate the function of system 
Agent Element to operate the function of system by human 
Objective Aim of the system 
Function 
Core and supplementary function relate to “Aim” of the system. The choice of core 
function becomes a mission and the reasons of choice and methodology are the strategy 
of the system. 
 
Source: Composed by author based on the study by Nadler (1991), Porter (1999, 2001 and 2002) and Takahashi 
(1993, 2003 and 2004) 
 
Human Egress Access Flight Boarding Arrival 
INPUT OUTPUT 
Human who 
experienced 
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In the case of manufacturing, the inputted materials are transformed to products. This 
value chain is composed of each unit that provides different functions. Each unit is 
supported by other support systems to provide catalysts or agents in each unit. For 
example, “Flight” unit is supported by the “Flight crew providing system” and “Aircraft 
providing system” in order to operate functions of this unit. All of the units have the 
same objectives of the system so reinforce each other. This system should be designed 
in order to pursue these objectives. Moreover, all of the elements of this system such as 
units, agents and catalysts should share the Value of this system in order to pursue the 
objectives of the system.  
 
This system is designed for “Human” valuation. Value is therefore not value for the 
system but for the “Human”. Value is experienced and evaluated by customers during 
the process of the system. Heskett et al (1997) explained that customers make decisions 
about purchasing goods and services based on their own evaluations. In order to sustain 
and keep this system, it is important to keep customer’s loyalty (Albrecht et al, 2003) by 
improving “Customer Value”. Hence, the maximisation of customer value drives 
competitive power for sustainability of the system.  
It is represented by the so-called “Customer value equation” (Heskett et al, 1997), as 
follows: 
Equation : Customer value equation 
“CV = S / C”                                                                                                            (4.1) 
where CV  is Customer’s value,  
S    is the sum of utilities that the customers gained  
C    is the total cost to acquire the service or good (for example, Fare + the 
cost of access including the transportation cost between airport 
and departure and destination point, and the cost for reservation 
or purchasing like a phone call and credit card charge) 
 
In addition, the sum of utilities is represented as follows. 
     S  ∈   F = F0 + F1 + F1 + F2 + ……. + Fn                                                            (4.2) 
             F = F0 + F1 + F1 + F2 + ……. + Fn                                                              (4.3) 
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         Q  F0, F1, F2,…  Fn  are each functions expressing the utilities that each service 
or good provides. 
                   (For example, safety, comfort, speed, food, drinks, punctuality, etc) 
These functions are provided tangibly and intangibly in the case of transportation 
service and represent attributes of service important to customers (see Table 4.4). In 
these functions, speed is a tangible and observable factor both for customers and service 
providers, as well as being a key element of transportation. Price and speed are the most 
crucial factors of transportation service and represent the core parts of Customer Value, 
which indicate the strength of competition. In addition, these factors are crucial in the 
“Customer Value Equation” with Speed in the numerator and price in the denominator. 
Hence, in this study, competition with high speed railway services is analysed focusing  
on these tangible factors, Journey Time (speed) and Fare (price) as key level of services 
(LOS) variables. 
 
Table 4.4: Tangible and intangible services provided in the customer value chain in the air transport 
service system categorised on SERVQAL. 
SERVQAL SERVQAL indices for air transport service 
Reliability Reliability 
Assurance Assurance 
Tangibles Facilities, Employees, Flight patterns, Speed, Fare 
Empathy Customisation, Responsive 
Source: Composed by the author based on the study by Parasuraman et al (1985, 1988) and Gilbert and Wong 
(2003). 
4.5 Competition between air transport and high-speed rail 
In this section, competition between air transport and high speed rail serving Tokyo 
routes is analysed by using important tangible factors Time (speed) and Fare (price), 
which were discussed in the previous section. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the modal shares on each sector for Tokyo routes. With several modes 
of transportation competing, service attributes become an important factor in the choice 
of transportation. Japan is one of the countries, where the high speed railway network 
Chapter 4: Competition between air transport and high speed rail  
- 58 - 
has been expanded. It is also demonstrated that many air routes from Haneda airport 
overlap with this high speed rail (HSR) network and that the markets which have a route 
distance of less than 500 km from Tokyo are already dominated by HSR. 
 
Figure 4.4: Competition with Japan railway services (JR) 
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Source: Composed by auther based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation 
statistics (2003) and Central Japan railways (2003) 
Note: The distance is the train distance between Tokyo station and the main station of each local city. The three 
letter codes are the names of airports located at each local city; NGO(Nagoya), SDJ(Sendai), KIJ(Niigata), 
GAJ(Yamagata), OSA(Osaka), AXT(Akita), AOJ(Aomori), OKA(Okayama), HIJ(Hiroshima), YGJ(Yonago), 
KKJ(Kitakyushu) and FUK(Fukuoka) 
 
Air transport accounts for 87% of demand on the Tokyo–Fukuoka route and 50% on the 
Tokyo – Hiroshima route. The former is because of the much shorter overall journey 
time by air. Trip duration on Tokyo-Fukuoka is almost the same as for the Tokyo–
Osaka route. Journey distances of between 550 km and 1,000 km are a critical point of 
competition between JR and air transport, as flight journey times are almost the same as 
the train ( see Appendix I : Modal share in the total domestic transportation in Japan). 
In order to compare the degree of competition between air services and JR on each 
route, “Time indices” and “Fare indices” were calculated. Table 4.5 gives examples of 
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these Time and Fare indices, which have been computed using data for June 2005. Each 
index shows the ratio of air transport to that of JR. They are computed by comparing the  
total required travel time and costs, including the access process. All air fares and 
access fares were acquired from timetables. The cheapest public transportation has been  
adopted for these calculations. To compute the time index, in the case of air transport 
thirteen minutes was added to the average flight and access time to cover the additional 
time caused by check-in and allowing for some delay (see Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.5: Time indices and fare indices comparing air and JR in June 2005 
 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005). The 
access times and fares are collected from the following website (http://transit.yahoo.co.jp/) and airlines’ 
timetables. 
Notes: Normal (the fully flexible fare), Peak (the fully flexible fare during peak season), Discount highest (the most 
expensive discount fare) and Lowest (the cheapest discount fare) on each route. Every air fare includes 
special fuel charge (JYE300), special security charge (JYE300) and airport charge (JYE100). 
Fare index 
Name of stations and 
Airports(destination) from Tokyo  
Category 
time 
index Normal Peak 
Discount 
highest 
Lowest 
Sapporo/ Sapporo(SPK) 1 0.29 1.14 1.32 1.19 0.96 
Hakata/ Fukuoka(FUK) 1 0.48 1.09 1.48 1.11 0.80 
Shin-Osaka/ Osaka(OSA) 1 0.93 1.37 1.46 1.50 1.36 
Hiroshima/ Hiroshima(HIJ) 2 0.73 1.44 1.51 0.99 0.83 
Akita/ Akita(AXT) 4 0.74 1.26 1.34 1.01 0.80 
Aomori/ Aomori(AOJ) 4 0.67 1.55 1.63 1.34 1.14 
Okayama/ Okayama(OKJ) 4 0.80 1.55 1.63 0.88 0.73 
Yamagata/ Yamagata(GAJ) 5 0.86 1.42 1.54 1.66 1.66 
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Table 4.6: Examples of transportation costs to selected destinations in Japan 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005). The 
access times and fares are collected from the following website (http://transit.yahoo.co.jp/) and airlines’ 
timetables. 
Notes: All times and costs are computed from Tokyo station to the main station of each city. For example, in case of 
air transportation, the access time and fares are calculated from Tokyo station to Haneda airport and from 
the airport to the main station of the destination. Every air fare includes special fuel charge (JYE300), 
special security charge (JYE300) and airport charge (JYE100). 
 
The time index of 0.73 on the Tokyo-Hiroshima route means that a passenger can arrive 
by air in Hiroshima from Tokyo about 100 minutes earlier (27%) than by train, 
assuming the flight was not seriously delayed. The fare index of Hiroshima shows that 
the lowest discount air fare (0.83) is fixed at almost 57% of the normal fare (1.44) and 
55% of the peak fare (1.51). The lowest air fare (0.83) is 17% cheaper than the HSR 
train (1.00) from Tokyo (refer to Table 4.5). 
This means that fully flexible air fares are about 50 % more expensive than JR. 
However some of the discount fares are cheaper than JR from Tokyo. The discount air 
fare index is lower than JR on Hiroshima routes. The highest discount fare index is 
0.99. This fare is available the day before departure during the off peak season on this 
route.  
This relationship between the fare index and the time index affects passengers’ choice 
of mode. Those routes, such as the ones to Hiroshima and Okayama, which provide a 
Train Flight 
Total journey time 
Total cost of flight including direct cost for 
transportation to each airpot or station (USD) 
Destination 
From Tokyo 
Category Train 
Time 
(min) 
Train 
Fare 
(USD) 
Flight 
time 
(min) 
Access 
& 
Egress 
time 
(min) 
time 
(min) 
Fully 
flexible fare 
Access 
cost 
(direct) 
Egress 
Cost 
(direct) 
Total cost 
Sapporo(SPK) 1 658 210 90 68 158 216 5.7 9.6 231 
Fukuoka(FUK) 1 328 206 90 37 127 225 5.7 2.3 233 
Osaka(OSA) 1 158 141 60 57 117 177 5.7 4.5 187 
Hiroshima(HIJ) 2 254 171 80 75 155 246 5.7 12 264 
Akita(AXT) 4 234 155 60 82 142 196 5.7 8.2 210 
Aomori(AOJ) 4 248 156 70 67 137 242 5.7 5.2 253 
Okayama(OKJ) 4 222 164 75 72 147 237 5.7 6.8 250 
Yamagata(GAJ) 5 189 102 55 78 133 145 5.7 6.5 157 
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better discount fare index, have experienced an increase in passengers and load factors. 
The market has been more responsive to the discount fares where the air time index is 
less than 1 to the train. 
Table 4.7: Examples of Time and Fare indices of the domestic routes departing from Tokyo 
Category Fare (USD) Fare index  
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Tokyo-Fukuoka 
(1174.9km) 
1 
22,632 
Air 
Train 
101.5 
205.5 
217.7 
288,7 
205.5 
0.48 0.8 1.09 1.48 
Tokyo-Osaka 
(552.6km) 
1 
16,475 
Air 
Train 
88.6 
129.6 
134.7 
176.2 
129.6 
0.93 1.36 1.50 1.37 
Tokyo-
Hiroshima 
(894.2km) 
2 
6,927 
Air 
Train 
120.8 
171.1 
153.1 
245.4 
171.1 
0.73 0.83 1.44 1.55 
Tokyo-Okayama 
(732,9km) 
4 
3,068 
Air 
Train 
97.8 
164.1 
125.5 
240.8 
164.1 
0.85 0.73 0.88 1.55 
Tokyo- Nagoya 
(366km) 
 Train 84.5  84.5 Not available because of lack of air services 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005). The 
access times and fares are collected from the following website (http://transit.yahoo.co.jp/) and airlines’ 
timetables. 
Notes: All times and costs are computed from Tokyo station to the main station of each city. For example, in case of 
air transportation, the access time and fares are calculated from Tokyo station to Haneda airport and from 
the airport to the main station of the destination. Every air fare includes special fuel charge (JYE300), 
special security charge (JYE300) and airport charge (JYE100). This exchange rate adopted the 
Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, which was reported in the exchange rate archives by month 
of the International Monetary Fund in June, 2005; USD 1 = JYE 108.4  
 
Figure 4.5 shows that overcapacity exists on the Tokyo–Hiroshima route. This is caused 
by airlines’ reactions to the runway extension at Hiroshima airport and the relaxation of 
the double / triple designation rules in 1996 and 1997. In addition, after deregulation in 
2000, the average passenger load factor dropped significantly because of further 
oversupply. However, demand in this Tokyo-Hiroshima market is slightly but steadily 
increasing. The Tokyo-Hiroshima route has been one of the strongest air transport 
markets in Japan when compared with other transport modes. Airlines have used large-
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scale aircraft on all the flights in order to fulfil the specific demands of business 
travellers, even though it has resulted in relatively low load factors. 
Figure 4.5: Supply and Demand on the Tokyo-Hiroshima route (1980 - 2003) 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1980-2003) 
 
The same situation is found on the category 4 Tokyo-Okayama route (733 kms, Time 
index: 0.8, Lowest fare index: 0.73).  Passenger volume has been increasing by about 
17.3% per year since 2000.  
Several category 4 air routes however have been diminished by HSR. Traffic on the 
Tokyo-Akita route (663 kms, Time index: 0.74, Lowest fare index: 0.8) increased by 8-
9% in 2000 and 2001. However, it dropped by 3% in 2003 because the lowest discount 
fare was increased by 15.7%. 
The Tokyo-Yamagata route (360 kms) experienced a decrease in traffic of 37.4% in 
2000 and 22.7% in 2001 because the Tohoku Shinkansen line opened. Traffic recovered 
in 2003 because of the low discount air fare, but the lowest fare index was raised again 
in 2005. The difference between the non-restricted air fare and the discount air fare 
became very small or non-existent, when airlines recognised and decided to stop 
competing on these routes even after deregulation.  
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The most competitive route is Tokyo-Osaka (553 kms, Time index: 0.93, fare index: 
1.37, Category 1), which has experienced increased demand of 14.4% per year on 
average since 1997. Air Transport demand is still increasing even though the air fare 
index is not so low as the result of the strong economic activity of the two cities. In this 
important business market, the airlines and JR have focused on speed and frequency. 
The Tokyo- Osaka route is an important revenue generator for both the airlines and JR. 
For example, the revenue of Tokaido Shinkansen services (JYE 914 billions) accounted 
for 84 % of total rail revenue in 2000. JR central has to charge fares 20% higher than 
they should be because of the high repayments on the long term debts imposed by the 
Government in 1987 when the former Japanese National Railways (JNR) was privatised 
(Knutton, 2001). JR central and JR east, which serve the Tokyo-Osaka Shinkansen 
route, have been increasing operating revenue and recorded their highest level of 
turnover in 2006.  
4.6 Comparison of French and Japanese Experience 
The experience of air-rail competition in the European market has been different to that 
of Japan.  
In this section, several competitive domestic routes in France are compared with the 
Japanese routes. The French domestic market is one of the toughest regions for low cost 
carriers (LCC) in the EU. The HSR network has been widely developed in France with 
a network length of 1,400 km and 1.47m/sqkm of line density (see Table 4.2). Table 4.8 
gives examples of Time and Fare indices of French routes which are computed using 
data for April 2004. In France, the routes with a Time index of about 0.5 had a LCC 
operating with the traffic volumes increasing as a result of the cheaper fares (Fare index 
: 0.45-1.79), even though the Fare indices of Air France were relatively high; 1.8-2.82. 
Competition between HSR and LCC has been experienced in markets where distance is 
more than 700kms and the Time index is less than 0.5. Because of a lack of slots at 
Paris airports, LCC are concentrating on the stronger markets for air transport and are 
focusing on more profitable routes including international routes from Paris, where the 
“Time index” is less than 0.5, in order to best utilise available slots. 
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Table 4.8: Example of Time index and Fare index on the domestic routes departing from Paris 
Fare index 
 
Air 
Passenger 
Volume 
Per day 
 
Carriers 
 
Time 
Index 
5 weeks 
before 
4 weeks 
before 
3 weeks 
before 
2 weeks 
before 
1week 
before 
         
Paris-Nice 
(698km) 
8,428 
AF 
EZY 
TGV 
0.49 
0.50 
1.00 
2.02 
1.34 
1,00 
2.02 
1.34 
1.00 
2.82 
1.35 
1.00 
1.75 
0.95 
1.00 
2.33 
1.34 
1.00 
Paris-
Toulouse 
(608km) 
8,034 
AF 
EZY 
TGV 
0.48 
0.55 
1.00 
0.39 
0.45 
1.00 
1.80 
1.70 
1.00 
2.33 
1.79 
1.00 
2.45 
1.64 
1.00 
2.76 
1.64 
1.00 
Paris-
Marseille 
(657km) 
5,601 
AF 
TGV 
0.89 
1.00 
0.73 
1.00 
2.61 
1.00 
2.50 
1.00 
2.50 
1.00 
2.50 
1.00 
Paris-Lyon 
(414km) 
1,746 
AF 
TGV 
1.48 
1.00 
1.22 
1.00 
2.13 
1.00 
2.63 
1.00 
2.75 
1.00 
3.68 
1.00 
Source: Trafic Des Principales Relations Intérieures De Metropole Année 2004. The access times and fares are 
collected from the following website (http://www.aeroportsdeparis.fr/ADP/rn-GB/passengers) and the 
presentation study by Mr. Ralph Anker in 2004.  
Notes: The exchange rates used adopted the “Representative Rates for Selected Currencies”, which was reported in 
the exchange rate archives by month of the International Monetary Fund in April, 2004; USD 1 = Euro 1.23 
 
On the Paris-Lyon (414 kms) route, air traffic has decreased year on year; especially 
after the TGV Mediterranean route to Marseille opened in 2001. Time index of air 
transport on the routes was 1.48 with fare indices varying from 1.22 to 3.68 in 2004.  
On the Paris-Marseille route (657kms, Time index: 0.89), the air traffic share dropped 
from 45-55% to 35-45 % as a result of the introduction of high speed rail services (Park 
and Ha, 2006). The air traffic volume was 2,975,150 in 2000 which decreased by 16.6% 
in 2001 after the TGV service commenced. After easyJet entered the route in July 2003, 
the number of passengers carried in 2004 increased by 1.2 % compared to a fall of 6% 
in 2003. The fare index of Air France ranged from 0.73 to 2.61 in 2004, which is 
relatively lower than on other routes because of the low TGV fare. EasyJet stopped 
operating the route in from March 2005, resulting in traffic dropping by 7% in 2005 
(see Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6: Air transport demand on several French domestic routes 
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SourceAuthor based on  data from Trafic Des Principles Relations Intérieures De Metropole from 1997 to 2005 
 
Interestingly, Air France’s fares on these routes are almost the same as the Japanese 
network carriers. For example, on the Tokyo-Hiroshima route (894 kms, Time index: 
0.73), fares ranged from USD120.9 to USD245.5 (Fare index: 0.73–1.55), while Air 
France’s fares on the Paris- Nice route (698 kms, Time index: 0.49) are from USD 132 
to USD 333.3 (Fare index: 1.75 to 2.33). These high fare indices of Air France in 
comparison with the Japanese fare indices show that the TGV offers much cheaper fares 
than Japan Railways.  
Air passenger volume has increased as a result of the high frequencies and low fares 
(Fare index is lower than 1.35) in the French market. As the TGV can offer low fares, 
airlines need to compete in the market, where the Time index is less than 0.5 using 
varieties of lower fares (see Table 4.8). For this reason, LCCs have left the markets like 
Paris-Marseille and Paris-Lyon aside (Time index: more than 0.5, Fare index: more than 
1.5) in order to concentrate their assets on more potential routes, where they can 
stimulate demand more profitably. The above demonstrates one of the reasons why the 
French domestic market from Paris has been relatively untouched by European LCCs.  
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4.7 Summary and discussion 
The French domestic market, where the HSR network has been expanded, has been one 
of vigorous competition for LCCs. Figure 4.7 shows that the competitive market 
segment in France differs from that of Japan. LCCs have been operating in the specific 
segment of more than 700 km distance, where the time index is less than 0.5. The 
relatively lower fare of the TGV is a more significant demand influencing factor rather 
than the speed. If its speed could be improved further by technical innovation, this 
market could become even more challenging for air transport. Furthermore, low fare 
high speed rail is now increasingly provided on mixed traffic lines on several routes, as 
it is recognised that the increased flexibility yields more advantage rather than through 
expensive construction and maintenance costs (Briginshaw, 2005). 
 
In Japan, competition has been experienced in the markets where the Time index is 0.4-
0.9 (550-1,000kms) and Fare index is 0.8-1.5, in particular, on the Tokyo-Osaka route 
(552.6 kms, Time index: 0.93). In 2003, the number of Nozomi departures increased 
from 75 to 135 in order to offer more frequency and speed. Market growth has been 
delivered by competition between the high-speed train and airlines on specific routes. 
However, fare competition is not so prominent because of the absence of LCCs in the 
Japanese market. The Tokyo routes are important cash cows for both airlines and JR. 
Discounted fares have stimulated demand on several routes, such as Tokyo-Hiroshima. 
Competition will enter into another era soon. Two airports (Kobe and Kitakyushu) were 
newly opened in 2006. Kobe and Kitakyushu are major cities, which are served by 
Shinkansen rail services. As a result, competition will be intensified more in the range 
of 550 kms-1,000 kms. 
The Time index has changed dramatically, not only by the speed of the trains but also 
by the development of the “Access and egress service”; improvements of facilities and 
surface transportation to airports and stations,14 and advanced reservation and payment 
systems using mobile phones and IC cards15. The development and management of the 
“Access and egress service” is becoming more of an important issue and the key to 
                                                     
14 It takes only 16 min from the central area in Kobe to Kobe airport by urban automated guiding transit system. 
15 “Express reservation” Services of Tokaido high speed rail provides IT technology service, which enables 
passengers to directly arrange or change their reservations online via PC or web browser-equipped mobile telephone 
as often as they like. 
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success for any kind of transportation in terms of managing security, especially after the 
terrorism plot in the UK in 2006. 
Figure 4.7: The competitive market segment between air transport and HSR in Japan 
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Notes:1: Each label shows the destination from Tokyo : fuk ( Fukuoka ), osa ( Osaka ) in category 1 , kix ( Kansai ), 
hij ( Hiroshima ) in category 2, axt ( Akita ), aoj ( Aomori ), okj (Okayama), ubj ( Yamaguchiube ) in category 
4, gaj (Yamagata), ygj (Yonago), syo ( Syonai ), kkj ( Kitakyushu ) in category 5. 
Notes 2: Each circle reflects a specific route. The areas which show the situation of Air France in the French 
domestic market differ from that of the Japanese domestic market. 
 
Fare competition in Japan is not as severe as in France yet. Competition has focused 
more on “Utility” rather than “Cost” in Japan. Customers’ reactions are very sensitive to 
this balance with increased competition. Even in the Japanese market, some routes like 
those to Hiroshima or Okayama have experienced higher air transport demand as a 
result of low discount fares. 
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In 2009, the number of Haneda airport slots will be increased to 1,114 a day, which will 
be about 40% more than in 2005 (782 slots a day). Kyushu Shinkansen will be 
connected from Hakata (Fukuoka) to Shin-Yatsushiro (123kms) to enable son-stop 
operation from Fukuoka to Kagoshima by high-speed train in 2010. In addition, the 
Tohoku Shinkansen line will be extended from Hachinohe to Shin-Aomori (81 kms) in 
2010 and the Hokkaido Shinkansen is planned to be extended from Shin-Aomori to 
Shin-Hakodate (149kms) on the island of Hokkaido via an underwater tunnel in 2015. 
The total budget of the new Shinkansen projects in 2005 was set at JYE 220 billion 
including 32% in Government grants, while the remaining 68% is covered by local 
government and JR companies (Railway Gazette International, 2005). Huge investments 
will be injected into both infrastructure and high technology services, including carriage 
performance development. Meanwhile, all of these destinations involve categories 4 or 
5 airports, which have experienced decreasing demand after deregulation. These 
projects will result in large changes to the Time index in the Tokyo route market. It is 
very difficult to develop the market for both air transport and HSR without very low 
fares, which stimulate demand. In the Tokyo market, competition will be experienced 
with more equilibrium between “Utility” and “Cost” in the Customers’ Valuation on 
several high demand routes. 
 
The study in this chapter has demonstrated how low fares have stimulated air transport 
demand on several routes like Hiroshima and Okayama as the result of competition 
between air and HSR in Japan. However, fares are relativily expensive on the most of 
routes serving Tokyo The trade-off of these variables, “Utility” and “Cost” for 
passengers, will be needed more if competition is stronger as “Cost” competition is 
getting harder. It is crucial to improve synergies between air transport and HSR on 
routes which have been experiencing stagnation of demand especially in route 
categories 4 and 5, in order to develop demand through low fares and better access 
services. The absence of very low fares, which increase demand is constraining the 
market and preventing the development of air transport as witnessed in other parts of 
the world. Comprehensive measures in respect of both air transport and HSR are needed 
to ensure the huge investments in both airports and HSR are effective. Speed is high 
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enough, but low fares are needed in order to sustain a more competitive market in 
Japan. 
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Chapter 5: The slot allocation system at Tokyo 
international airport 
“There is a certain amount that ANA can do on its own, but there is a certain amount 
that ANA can’t do” (All Nippon Airways Former CEO Yoji Ohashi)16 
5.1 Introduction 
Facilities at Tokyo international airport (Haneda) have been developed with capacity 
responding to the rapid growth in demand for air transport resulting from the economic 
development of Japan. New slots have been allocated to operators by the Government at 
each time Haneda airport was extended and its capacity increased. In 2000, the number of 
daily slots was 660. Because of the delay in the construction of the Narita international 
airport (Narita) and the absence of secondary airports in the Tokyo area, slots at Haneda 
airport have never satisfied the growing demand in the domestic market of Japan. The 
shortage of slots at Haneda airport has been recognised as a bottleneck for the economic 
revitalisation not only of the Tokyo area itself but also of all the regional parts of Japan, 
especially during and after the recession. 
Figure 5.1: Number of slots at Haneda airport 
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16 Airline Business, Volume 20 Number 9 p.36 
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This chapter aims to investigate the policy and process of the slot allocation system at 
Haneda airport by focusing on the policy making procedures and implementation process. 
 
Between 1997 and 2003 the number of slots at Haneda airport was expanded five times. 
The slot allocation system used during this period was segmented into three phases. The 
first slot allocation system, “Phase I” was started with the additional slots of the new C 
runway in July, 1997. The second allocation, “Phase II” resulted from the additional slots 
of the new B runway in 2000. The third one, “Phase III” was introduced between 2005 
and 2006. 
 
Figure 5.2: The slot allocation system at Haneda airport 
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These slot allocation policies were implemented according to the policy and guidelines 
devised following meetings not only with experts and business leaders in various fields 
but also with airlines staff. During these meetings, airlines had several opportunities to 
express their opinions and ideas to the Government for the slot allocation policy. This slot 
allocation system at Haneda airport is a unique system compared to other regions not only 
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because of its characteristic market but also for its slot allocation policy and 
implementation methods.  
 
This slot allocation policy, which started in 1997, is comprehensively called “The slot 
allocation system at Haneda airport” in this thesis in order to distinguish it from the slot 
allocation policy before liberalisation.  This slot allocation system is discussed in detail in 
the following sections. 
5.2 Slot allocation in 1997 - Phase I 
Prior to liberalisation and the vast revision of the air law in 2000, 80 slots were added by 
the new C runway in July 1997. This meant the beginning of a new age of slot allocation 
policy at Haneda airport. The objectives were to increase transparency and fairness in 
promoting more competition in the Japanese domestic market. These 80 slots were 
categorised into three kinds of slots, “Public Obligation” slots, “New entrants” slots and 
“Non-restrictive” slots. 
 
Twelve “Public Obligation” slots were secured for routes to two new airports (Odate and 
Saga) and also for routes which only had one return flight a day, in order to improve 
access. In addition, twelve slots were provided to each new entrant as “New Entrant 
Slots”.  Such slots were allocated to two new airlines, which had announced their intention 
to start operations in 1998 (Skymark and Air Do). Unused new entrant slots were 
provisionally allowed to be used by incumbent airlines until a new entrant started its 
operations. Fifty-six “Non-restrictive” slots were divided among the incumbent airlines 
(JAL, ANA, and JAS). Thus, some of the slots controlled by this slot allocation policy 
consider the destination and operators in order to promote competition and stimulate low 
demand markets (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 5.3: Slot allocation in 1997- Phase I 
Public 
Obligation 
Slots: 12 
Non-
restrictive 
Slots: 56 
New entrants 
Slots: 12 
1997 
Phase I 
Total slots added 
in Phase I: 80 
Routes to new airports:
           Odate noshiro airport
           Saga airport 
 
2000 Phase II 
Liberalisation 
ANA and JAL 
Skymark : 6
Air Do: 6 
Available slots: 560
Slots used: 560 
Before 
1997 
580 in 1997
580 in 1997
660 in 1998, 1999
640 in 1998, 1999
1. New C Runway
 
5.3 Slot allocation in 2000; the fundamental circular of the Haneda 
slot allocation system in 2000 - Phase II 
With liberalisation of Japanese domestic air transport in 2000, the new slot allocation 
policy at Haneda airport was promulgated in order to respond to the significantly growing 
demand of the Tokyo routes as a result of the increased slot availability at Haneda airport 
in Phase I. Several meetings and debates took place prior to the implementation of the 
policy to resolve these slot allocation matters. The main topics of the discussions are 
detailed below. 
 
The fundamental points of these policies relating to the slot allocation rules at the 
congested airports were discussed in the Council of the Transportation Policy and Air 
Transport Meeting Report of April, 1998. This suggested that the slot allocation rules 
should be objective with a transparent policy implemented for the sake of promoting 
consumers’ convenience and efficient slot allocation for airlines. 
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Table 5.1: Main meetings for policy making of the slot allocation system at congested airports prior to 2000 
(Phase II) 
April, 1998 Council of the Transportation Policy and Air Transport Meeting Report 
November, 1998 Slot allocation system study meeting report 
February, 2000 Slot allocation system at congested airports meeting report 
 
The Slot allocation system study meeting report of November, 1998 discussed policies and 
procedures to recall and re-allocate slots at congested airports. The following policies 
were combined for recalling slots: (1) Fixed ratio recall rule (5–10% of slots recalled from 
incumbent airlines); (2) “Use it or lose it” rule, based on criteria related to the efficient 
usage of slots by airlines. For re-allocating slots, it was decided to give priority to new 
entrant airlines and routes in order to promote the development of local air services. The 
key points of discussion in these meetings were “the promotion of competition”, “the 
promotion of the development of local air networks” and “the evaluation of incumbent 
airlines” (cf. infra). Thus, these policies became fundamental guidelines for “the slot 
allocation system at congested airports meeting report in February 2000”. 
 
This Congested airports slots allocation system meeting report of February 2000 for the 
first time defined “New entrants” as (1) airlines operating less than 12 slots per day at 
Haneda airport or (2) a start-up airline using Haneda airport.  It also stated that 18 slots 
were supposed to be saved for start-up airlines. As a result of these discussions, the key 
policy was established to allocate 114 additional slots as a result of the new B runway at 
Haneda airport in 2000. It was legislated in the air law of 2000 that this policy should be 
reviewed every five years until 2009, when the number of slots at Haneda airport will be 
extensively increased. 
5.4 The Haneda additional slots fundamental circular of 2000 
The aforementioned policies were implemented by the so-called “Haneda additional slots 
fundamental circular”. As one of the outcomes of liberalisation, it was assumed to have a 
large impact on the domestic air transport market in Japan. 
 
This circular consisted of four fundamental Policy principles: 
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1 The promotion of competition 
2 The improvement of consumers’ convenience by the formation of a diverse air 
transport network 
3 Slot allocation based on the results of the evaluation of each incumbent airline 
4 The non-admission of small aircraft (less than 60 seats) except during early morning 
and late evening (arrival during 23:00-08:30 and departure during 20:30-23:00). 
 
Categories of slots in this circular were differently named from the former circular of 
1997. However, the concepts of the slot allocation policy were almost the same as in 1997 
with three kinds of slots categories: New entrant slots, Public obligation slots and Non- 
restrictive slots. 
a) New entrant slots: promotion of competition 
30 slots were allocated to new entrants in order to promote competition and 18 
slots were saved for future new entrants. The new entrants were defined here as 
airlines which had less than 12 slot operations per day. 
b) Public obligation slots: the expansion of the local network 
Two slots were secured for routes to newly opened airports with the aim of 
expanding the local network. There were no restrictions on who could claim 
the slots as any airline could apply. These two slots were one for the “New 
Monbetsu airport”, which opened in July 1999, and another for “Noto airport”, 
which opened in July 2003. Both of them have been operated by the ANA 
group as a result. 
c) Incumbent airline slots 
The other 80 slots were allocated to the three incumbent airlines (JAL, ANA 
and JAS) according to the standard evaluation, which is based on: the 
improvement of consumer convenience, the promotion of efficient airline 
management, the promotion of the efficient usage of slots and other criteria 
such as the business performance of incumbent airlines. This standard 
evaluation aimed to provide transparent and fair slot allocation and has mainly 
three objectives to evaluate by numerical values (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2: The evaluation objectives and criteria 
 Objectives Examples of Criteria 
The improvement of consumers’ 
convenience 
 
Lower fares 
Revenue per RPK has been decreased in the past five 
years 
Safety No fatal accident in the past five years 
1 
Local routes network 
Frequency on the routes (traffic: less than 0.1 million) is 
more than average or number of frequencies on the 
routes has increased in the past five years. 
The share of local routes network is more than 50% of 
the total of the Tokyo routes. 
2 Effective airline management 
Operation cost per Passenger kilometre decreased in 
the past five years. 
Operation revenue per employee increased in the past 
five years. 
3 
Effective usage of slots at Haneda 
airport 
Number of passengers carried per slot increased in the 
past five years 
4 Others No administrative sanction in the past five years. 
 
5.5 Additional slot allocation: Competition promotion slots of 2002 
The fundamental policy of 2000 was succeeded by a new policy in 2002, which promoted 
competition in order to encourage the activities of new entrants and developing airlines 
(Skymark, Air Do and Skynetasia). An additional 24 slots were allocated to these airlines 
for their route expansion. An extra 34 slots were allocated to new entrants or other 
developing airlines as New entrant slots. All of these slots not used by new entrants and 
developing airlines were allowed to be allocated to the incumbent airlines (JAL and ANA 
group). Under this policy, the developing airlines were named “Specific incumbent 
airlines”, including Skymark, Air Do and Skynetasia, because these airlines already had 
several years operating experience, and thus could not be called “new entrants” anymore. 
They are called “Developing airlines” in this study. 
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Figure 5.4: Slot allocation Phase II 
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allocated to new entrants. However, these slots also were pooled and used by 
incumbent airlines, because new entrants didn’t have enough aircraft to utilise 
them. 
4. 24 slots as a result of Japan Airlines and Japan Air System’s consolidation in 
2002. These slots were allocated to new entrants. 
5. 28 slots as a result of the improvement of air navigation at Haneda airport in 
2003. 20 slots were allocated to new entrants, while 8 slots were provided to 
international charter flights. 
Of the 44 slots allocated to new entrants in 2002 and 2003, only half of them are used by 
these airlines; the other 22 slots were earmarked as ‘reserve’ and eventually used by 
incumbent airlines in 2003. As a result of Phases I and II, 254 additional slots were 
allocated including 24 Public Obligation Slots (New airport routes: 16, International 
charter flights: 8), 136 Non-restrictive Slots for incumbent airlines and 94 New entrants 
Slots (Skymark: 34, Air do: 20, Skynetasia: 24 and Reserve: 16). In July 2004, the total 
number of slots used for domestic flights were 774 including 686 by incumbents and 78 
by new entrants (see Figure 5.5). 
Chapter 5: The slot allocation system at Tokyo international airport  
- 80 - 
Figure 5.5: Summary of the results of Phases I and II 
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5.6 Slot allocation in 2005; the Haneda fundamental policy circular, 
Phase III 
The review of slot allocation at Haneda airport proceeded according to the legislation17, 
eight years after the first slot allocation. In 2009, the number of slots at Haneda airport 
will be increased to 1,114 a day, which will be about 40% more than in 2005 (782 slots a 
day). The number of slots is currently limited and will cause a shortage until 2009. This 
issue causes an obstruction to development not only for air transport but also the economic 
market in Japan as a whole.  Six meetings were held in 2004 to discuss the utilisation of 
the current 782 daily slots at Haneda airport. As a result of these discussions “The Haneda 
fundamental policy circular” was established. 
Table 5.3: Main meetings for the slot allocation system in 2005 
Meeting Date Topics & Agenda 
                                                     
17 According to air law, the slot allocation procedure needed to be reviewed every 5 years. 
Chapter 5: The slot allocation system at Tokyo international airport  
- 81 - 
1 20 Feb 2004 Present situation and issues in Airline industry in Japan 
2 25 Mar 2004 Hearing (presentations by airlines) 
3 14 May 2004 Discussion, Hearing 
4 18 Jun 2004 Discussion, Hearing 
5 6 Aug 2004 Report draft, Discussion 
6 7 Sep 2004 Report draft 
 
Japanese carriers had the opportunity to present their opinions and ideas for slot allocation 
during a series of hearings. This resulted from the recognition by the Government that 
slots have a profound impact on airlines’ business activities. It was significant that the 
terms “New entrants” and “Slots” were defined in the official documents for the first time 
in this circular. The definitions are as follows. 
a) “New entrants” are defined as: 
i) Airlines which have less than 12 slots at Haneda airport 
ii) Airlines which are going to apply for permission to operate at Haneda 
airport.18 
b) “Incumbent airlines” are defined as airlines which are not new entrants.19 
c) “Major airlines” are defined as the two big airline groups, JAL and ANA. 
 
This Haneda fundamental policy circular’s main aim was the promotion of competition 
and the expansion of local air services networks. It followed the main government policy 
of 1997. 
 
80 slots (JAL: 44 slots, ANA: 36 slots) were taken from the total of 680 slots of these 
major two airlines at Haneda airport. 40 of the 80 slots were allocated to a new entrant 
(Starflyer) and developing airlines (Skymark, Air do and Skynetasia) as “Additional new 
entrant slots” and the other 40 slots were re-allocated to the two major carriers as “slots by 
airline evaluation” according to the same evaluation standard of 2000. As a result, 22 slots 
went to the JAL group and 18 to the ANA group. Thus, the total number of New entrant 
slots became 144, including an existing 104 slots in this category. 12 slots of the 
                                                     
18 Starflyer requested an AOC in 2004 for starting operations in 2006. 
19 They include Skymark, Air Do and Skynetasia. 
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additional 40 slots were saved for future new entrants and designated as “Future new 
entrant” slots. A new start up airline, Starflyer acquired the right to use all these slots in 
2005 (see Figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.6: Slot allocation Phase III 
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5.7 Summary 
The proportion of allocated slots for new entrants to the total number of slots increased 
from 2% in 1998 to 15% in 2005 during these slot allocations. Regarding the prospect to 
acquire slots for new entrants, they had enough opportunities to expand the routes. 
However, they failed to exercise the opportunity to utilise the allocated slots during the 
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slot allocation process. It was evidenced that more than 48% of slots (the 20 of 42 
allocated slots) for new entrants were reserved in 2000 and 14% in 2004 (see Table 5.4). 
As a result, the total number of slots for incumbent carriers (JAL, ANA) changed to 650 in 
2005 from 552 in 1998 and 670 in 2004. Despite 40 slots being recalled by the 
reallocation in 2005, the reserve 20 New entrant slots enabled them to use 670 slots until 
2006.  
Table 5.4: Share of allocated slots for airlines 
Phase Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Share of total allocated slots 1998 2000 2004 2005 
Allocated slots 98% 93% 88% 85% 
Incumbent airlines 
Used slots 98% 96% 89% 88% 
Allocated slots 2% 7% 12% 15% 
New entrants 
Used slots 2% 4% 11% 12% 
 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Influstructure, Land and Transport (2005) 
 
IATA states that as part of its fundamental role of the slot allocation framework as they 
manage regulatory affairs and policy matters on behalf of airline members by cooperating 
with many international regulatory bodies. They also mention that slot allocation is only 
required where there is insufficient airport capacity to meet demand and does not increase 
capacity, i.e. it is only a mechanism for distributing what is available. 
 
Its fundamental policies are: (1) globally convertible, (2) market driven and aimed solely 
at the maximum effective use of airport capacity, (3) transparent fair and non-
discriminatory, and (3) simple, practical and economically sustainable (IATA, 2000). The 
standards and procedures of slot allocations are specified in the Worldwide Scheduling 
Guidelines (WSG), which is developed jointly by airlines and airport coordinators to 
ensure the interests of both bodies are reflected in the standards. The principle is based on 
historic slots and WSG explains the exceptional cases as additional regulations by 
governments in the regions, such as the “new entrants provisions” in the EU. 
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The slot allocation system at Haneda airport belongs to this exceptional case under the 
promotion policy of competition in order to increase slots for new entrants and improve 
the local air services networks. The facts, that more than 11% (80 slots of 680) of the total 
network carriers’ slots were taken and re-allocated by the Government was extremely 
exceptional. However, by 2006 network carriers were able to use 670 slots including 
pooled New entrant slots, while they lost only 10 slots (1%). Including additional slots, 
Skymark acquired 54 slots, Air Do 34 and Skynetasia 36 slots as a result. 
 
In the following chapter 6, the study will explain how the Tokyo routes market has been 
affected by the slot allocation system at Haneda airport and how airlines have responded 
to the slot allocations. It also evaluate whether the objectives of these slot allocations at 
Haneda airport have been accomplished.  
 
 
 - 85 - 
Chapter 6: Analysis of the impact of deregulation and 
the effects of the slot allocation system on the Tokyo 
routes market  
In this chapter 6, the effects of the slot allocation system on individual routes and 
market categories of the Tokyo market as a result of deregulation are analysed in detail 
using several factors. The specific data matrices are listed in the following appendices. 
  
Appendix J: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 1997 
Appendix K: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2000 
Appendix L: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2001 
Appendix M: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2003 
 
First of all, the characteristics of each market including demographic and economic 
backgrounds during the period from 1997 to 2005 are analysed by category in sections 1 
to 5. In section 6, the overall effects on the air transport market are demonstrated by 
category and the process of deregulation outlined in 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2003. How 
fares have been transformed is analysed in section 7 using data from 1999 to 2005. The 
markets where new entrants have operated are evaluated in section 8. The results of the 
effects of slot allocation and liberalisation are summarised in section 9 (see Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1: The structure of chapter 6 
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6.1 Category 1 routes 
6.1.1 Characteristics: the High demand market 
All the routes in this category are ranked in the top busiest routes in the world. The 
features of this air transport market are as follows. 
Table 6.1: The market characteristics; Average in 2000 
Routes from 
Tokyo to 
Stage Length 
(km) 
Number of 
departures per 
year (day) 
Number of 
passengers per 
year 
Average 
Passengers 
per  flight 
 
Average load 
factor 
 
Sapporo 894 31,812 (87) 8,982,063 282 65% 
Fukuoka 1,041 28,816 (79)  7,989,491 277 64% 
Osaka 514 13,009 (36) 4,359,858 335 71% 
Okinawa 1,687 13,062 (35) 3,745,444 287 72% 
Average 1,034      21,675 (60) 6,269,214 295 68% 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000) 
Notes: the numbers are calculated using the statistics records of JCAB from in 2000 
 
These routes are the most profitable routes, characterised by high load factors and 
operated by large capacity aircraft at high frequency. For example, there are almost 
eighty take offs per day on the Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo-Fukuoka routes. All Japanese 
airlines have been vigorously focusing on this category 1 market. To fulfil high demand 
during peak periods on these routes, airlines have been operating large aircraft. Figure 
6.2 shows revenue by route compared with the stage length of Japan Airlines in 2003. 
The top four routes in terms of revenue are all category 1 routes from Tokyo to 
Sapporo, Fukuoka, Okinawa and Osaka. 
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Figure 6.2: Japan Airlines' routes in 2003 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2003) and Fact 
sheets of Japan airlines in 2003 
 
6.1.2 Market growth  
The category 1 market has been driving the development of the air transport market in 
Japan as it has been the biggest and most profitable market. Especially, on Fukuoka and 
Sapporo routes, where new entrants (Skymark Airlines and Air Do) entered in 1998 and 
1999, the expansion of the market was expected very much. However, traffic on these 
market routes did not grow but was saturated by overcapacity as a consequence. 
 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 demonstrate the growth rates in this market from 1997 to 2003 in 
route categories 1 and 2. They evidence the prolonged market growth on the Fukuoka, 
Sapporo and Kansai routes. Only the Osaka route is dynamically indicating its activity, 
which has the possibility for development.  
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Figure 6.3: Air transport market growth over the previous year in route categories 1 and 2 in 2003 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (from 1997 to 
2003) 
Figure 6.4: Air transport market growth over 1997 in route categories 1 and 2 in 2003 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (from 1997 to 
2003) 
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The category 1 market has the geographical advantage as Sapporo and Okinawa are 
located on the north and south large islands respectively, and are almost 1,000 kms 
away from Tokyo. The proportion accounted for by air transport stands at 97% in the 
modal choice of passengers from Hokkaido to Tokyo. The effects of the development of 
air transport on the local economies are enormous in this area. Figure 6.5 shows the 
increased total passenger movements from Hokkaido to other prefectures and the 
proportion that air transportation accounts for this increase. The ratios referred to here 
as “the market growth contribution” are computed by the increased percentage rate of 
each transport mode’s passengers multiplied by each market share of the total number 
of passengers of a previous year. It shows how much air transportation plays in the 
growth of the total number of passengers. 
Figure 6.5: Air transport market growth contribution to total passenger growth in the Hokkaido prefecture 
from 1998 to 2003 
Air transportation share index per increased number of passengers
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2003) 
        Note1: the total number of passengers means the total number of passengers who moved by all transportation 
modes including trains, ships, cars and private trains. 
        Note2: The contribution is computed as follows. 
                    Contribution of transport mode i = )( 12 yy −∆ / the total number of passengers in year 1 
                                      = )( 12 yy −∆ / 1y   ×  ( 1y / the total number of passengers in year 1) 
                                     1yQ  = the number of passengers in year and 2y = the number of passengers in year 2 
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After 1999, the air transport contribution dropped except in the case of Okinawa. 
Hokkaido, where the air transport accounts for 97% of the movements, the rail 
contribution point has been increasing, particularly in 2002 as a result of the Tohoku 
Shinkansen (high speed rails) being connected to Hachinohe from Morioka.20 
Figure 6.6: Air transport market growth contribution point to the total passenger growth in Fukuoka from 
1998 to 2003 
Fukuoka
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2003) 
        Notes: the total number of passengers means the total number of passengers who moved by all transportation 
modes including trains, ships, cars and private trains. 
In Fukuoka, the air transport contribution was slightly higher than from the trains (see 
Figure 6.6), but has been decreasing. Moreover, the total number of passengers carried 
by air in the Fukuoka market did not grow significantly, even after the entry of Skymark 
in 1998. This is evidence of market saturation caused by the entry of a new entrant. 
Interestingly, the air transport market growth contribution in Osaka was lower 
compared with other areas. In addition, this was relatively stable even though demand 
for air transport on the Tokyo routes in this market was increasing (see Figure 6.7). It 
shows the Tokyo-Osaka market has a potential to develop more for both JR and air 
transport.  
                                                     
20  This extension enables connections from Tokyo to Aomori (the northeast prefecture in the Honshu main islands) 
by high speed rail (see Figure 4.1 in chapter 4). 
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This category 1 market (except in the case of Sapporo and Okinawa) has also had a 
strong competitor, high speed rail since the 1970s. The competition with high speed rail 
has affected the air transport market extensively. Further discussion and analyses were 
provided in chapter 4. 
Figure 6.7: Air transport market growth contribution point to the total passenger growth in Osaka from 1998 
to 2003 
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Figure 6.8: Air transport market growth contribution point to the total passenger growth in Okinawa from 
1998 to 2003 
Okinawa
-80,000
-60,000
-40,000
-20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
In
cr
ea
se
d 
nu
mb
er
 of
 pa
ss
en
ge
rs
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
Co
nt
rib
ut
ion
 po
in
t
Increased number of passengers
Contribution point (air)
 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2003) 
Notes: the total number of passengers means the total number of passengers who moved by all transportation 
modes including trains, ships, cars and private trains. Okinawa does not have any surface transportation to 
other prefectures. 
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6.2 Category 2 routes 
6.2.1 Characteristics: the Competitive routes 
All of these destinations in this category are local political and economic centres. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the characteristics of this category of routes. 
Average frequency is 25 departures per day on relatively large scale aircraft carrying 
over two hundred passengers per flight.  
 
Table 6.2: The characteristics of the routes in category 2 in 2000 
Routes from 
Tokyo to 
Stage Length 
(km) 
Number of 
departures per 
year(day) 
Number of 
passengers per 
year 
Average 
number of 
passengers 
per flight 
Average load 
factor 
Kansai 687 10,552 (29) 2,325,985 220 64% 
Hiroshima 790 9,916 (27) 2,231,196 225 65% 
Komatsu 528 7,609 (21) 2,021,863 266 61% 
Kagoshima 1,111 9,134 (26) 2,025,747 222 70% 
Average 804 9,295 (26) 2,151,198 231 65% 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000) 
Notes: the numbers are calculated using the statistics records of JCAB in 2000 
 
The passenger demand in this market category has been influenced not only by the 
demography of the airport location city, but also by the populations of the surrounding 
areas and the relatively strong economic activities at each airport periphery area like 
Hiroshima and Komatsu (see Table 6.3). Therefore, these routes have been considered 
as semi-trunk routes in the domestic market in Japan. 
 
The Hiroshima and Komatsu routes have been two of the most valuable business routes 
in the local domestic market because of their strong economic background (GDP per 
capita: Hiroshima, USD 24,083 and Komatsu, USD 24,117). Both air routes offer fast 
travel times for business travellers compared with surface transportation.  
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Table 6.3: The demographic and economic background of category 2 routes 
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Osaka 8.82 -2.3 3,096 -0.3 0.7111 
Nara 1.44 -1.8 2,703 -0.8 0.333 
Wakayama 1.06 -1.6 2,396 -0.6 0.245 
Mie 1.86 -3.4 2,853 -0.1 0.454 
Hyogo 5.59 -5.2 2,657 -0.4 0.489 
Kansai 
Kyoto 2.64 -5.6 2,768 -0.4 0.499 
Hiroshima Hiroshima 2.88 -2.2 2,904 -0.4 0.454 
 Okayama 1.95 1.0 2,791 -0.1 0.392 
Komatsu Ishikawa 1.18 -2.2 2,950 -0.4 0.377 
 Fukui 0.83 -1.1 2,903 -0.6 0.335 
 Toyama 1.12 -3.7 2,916 -0.4 0.341 
Kagoshima Kagoshima 1.77 -1.5 2,285 0.0 0.266 
 Miyazaki 1.16 -3.9 2,440 -0.1 0.249 
 Kumamoto 1.85 -2.2 2,522 -0.6 0.308 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan, Statistics Bureau 
(2005) 
Note: Budget index is computed by deviding the budget revenue of the local government by their expected 
expenditures. It shows the strength of the financial standings of the local governments. 
 
However, Figure 4.4 in chapter 4 shows that there is a discrepancy between demand and 
supply, with airlines having aggressively introduced large-scale aircraft as these routes 
are considered semi-trunk routes after the relaxation of the double and triple designation 
rules. 
In 1995, load factor plummeted and the oversupply situation has become remarkable on 
these routes following deregulation in 2000. In the next section, Hiroshima routes will 
be examined in detail as an example of this case in order to investigate the reasons for 
this situation and the key factors contributing to market growth. 
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6.2.2 The Hiroshima routes market 
Former Hiroshima airport (now called Hiroshima-nishi airport) was opened in 1961 
with its 1,200 m runway being extended to 1,800 m in 1972. The new Hiroshima airport 
was constructed in another location in the mountains, about 50 km east from the centre 
of the city of Hiroshima, and opened in 1993 with a 2,500 m runway to accommodate 
large jet aircraft operations. The runway was extended to 3000 m in 2001 in order to 
accept international flights (see Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: Number of carriers and type of aircraft at Hiroshima airport 
Year 
Runway 
length (m) 
Carriers 
Average carried 
passengers per 
flight 
Average seats 
per  flight 
Type of aircraft 
1980 1,200 NH 87 94 YS11 
1985 1,800 NH 167 234 B737 
1990 1,800 NH/JL/JS 221 281 B767 
1995 2,500 NH/JL/JS 233 338 B747 
1999 2,500 NH/JL/JS 256 369 B747/B777 
2000 2,500 NH/JL/JS 225 345 B747/B777 
2001 3,000 NH/JS 194 345 B747/B777 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (From 1980 to 
2003) 
Note: Two letter codes refer to the name of the airline, NH (All Nippon Airways), JL (Japan Airlines) and JS (Japan 
Air System). 
 
In spite of oversupply, this Hiroshima market is slowly but steadily increasing among 
category 1 and category 2 markets (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). 
Air transport on Tokyo-Hiroshima has seen strong growth compared with other modes 
of transportation. The Tokyo-Hiroshima routes accounted for 82% of the domestic air 
transport market from Hiroshima in 2003 (see Figure 6.10). In response to the runway 
extension at Hiroshima airport in 1995 so B747 and more international flights could be 
accepted (see Table 6.4, Figures 6.9 and 6.10), airlines introduced large-scale aircraft on 
all flights. By doing so, they fulfilled the specific demands of business travellers during 
periods of high demand. This resulted in the relatively low load factors in these route 
categories. 
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Figure 6.9: Destinations served from Hiroshima Airport (International flights) in 2003 
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Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2003) 
 
Figure 6.10: Destinations served from Hiroshima Airport (Domestic flights) in 2003 
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Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2003) 
 
Although in the category 1 and category 2 markets, which cover the large domestic 
market in Japan and in which new entrants have featured, the growth rate of demand has 
Chapter 6: Analysis of the impact of deregulation and the effects of the slot allocation system on the Tokyo routes market  
- 96 - 
been insignificant. In fact, on the Sapporo and Fukuoka routes from Tokyo, which have 
seen more new entrants, traffic in 2003 dropped. On other routes like to Kansai, demand 
has steeply declined at 18.5% over the previous year, with the growth rate since 1997 at 
only 5% (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). The market growth on the Tokyo–Hiroshima routes 
has been delivered by competition between air transport and high speed railways rather 
than by new airline entrants as discussed in chapter 4. The findings in chapter 4 are 
hereby confirmed for route categories 1 and 2.  
6.3 Category 3 routes 
6.3.1 Characteristics: Local centres and VFR traffic 
All of the routes in the category 3 markets are located in other large islands (Kyushu 
and Shikoku) from Honshu (Main Island, where Tokyo is situated) and the average 
distance from Tokyo is about 900km. These destinations are not only the locations of 
the prefecture government but they are also big VFR markets in Japan. Therefore this 
market is characterised by seasonal demand and it results in relatively low load factors 
(see Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5: The characteristics of the routes in category 3 in 2000 
Routes from 
Tokyo to 
Stage Length 
(km) 
Number of 
departure per 
year(day) 
Number of 
passengers per 
year 
Average 
Number of 
passengers 
per flight 
 
Average load 
factor 
Kumamoto 1056 6,494(18) 1,460,076 225 66% 
Hakodate 786 5,547(15) 1,146,330 207 63% 
Miyazaki 1023 7,021(19) 1,248,306 178 60% 
Nagasaki 1143 6,505 (18) 1,542,253 237 63% 
Okayama 685 2,889 (8) 359,017 124 58% 
Takamatsu 711 5,398 (15) 1,094,735 203 67% 
Matsuyama 859 5,787 (16) 1,228,202 212 72% 
Oita 928 6,554 (18) 1,197,224 183 60% 
Average 899 5,774 (16) 1,159,518 196 63% 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000) 
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Table 6.6: The demographic and economic background of category 3 routes 
 
Airport & 
Prefecture 
Population 
(million) 
GDP 
growth in 
2001 
Income per 
capita JYE (000) 
in 2001 
CPI growth 
 in 2003 
Budget index 
 in 2002 
Kumamoto 1.02 -2.2 2,522 -2.6 0.308 
Miyazaki 1.16 -3.9 2,440 -0.9 0.249 
Nagasaki 1.5 -1.4 2,336 -3.3 0.232 
Okayama 1.95 1 2,791 -5.1 0.392 
Takamatsu 1.02 0 2,746 -4.3 0.356 
Matsuyama 1.48 -1.2 2,466 -3.3 0.316 
Oita 1.22 -5.2 2,632 -1.3 0.271 
Average 1.34 -1.8 2,562 -3.5 0.354 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan, Statistics Bureau 
(2005) 
 
Socio and economic indices used in this analysis are listed in Appendix N: List of socio-
economic indices by prefecture. 
 
Figure 6.11 compares average percentage change in the number of passengers in 2002 
by category with 2003 according to the population size. Overall, category 3 market 
routes had similar population backgrounds and traffic volumes increased compared with 
other markets. However, traffic volumes dropped on the routes where the population 
range was from 0.61 to 1.6 millions. These routes include the Tokyo-Miyazaki route, 
where a new entrant (Skynetasia airlines) entered in 2003. On the other hand, in the 
Tokyo- Okayama route market, where the population was about 2 million and income 
per capita was JYE 2,791, the traffic increased by competition with HSR. 
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Figure 6.11: Average percentage change of the number of passengers over the previous year by category 
in 2003 
 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan, Statistics Bureau 
(2005) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2003) 
Note 1: The numbers (in thousands) refer to the population range of the market based on the Population data in 
2003. 
Note 2: The large increase in category 4 markets was caused by restarted services on the Tokyo-Yamagata city-pair. 
 
The category 3 market is a large tourism market for air transport as well. Table 6.7 
shows the proportion of leisure travel by each mode of transportation by region for the 
year 2002. Air transport accounted for 16% in the Shikoku area and 21 % in the Kyushu 
area (both of which are category 3 routes) compared with the average of 8.7%. In 
addition, the ratio of tertiary industry in the category 3 market is high (83%) compared 
with other market categories (average: 79%).  
 
Appendix O: The proportion of the labour forced engaged in tertiary industry in each 
prefecture by market category 
 
 
 
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
61-160
161-260
261-360
461-560
561-660
861-960
5
4
3
2
1
%
Market category 
Change of the number of passengers over 2002 
Chapter 6: Analysis of the impact of deregulation and the effects of the slot allocation system on the Tokyo routes market  
- 99 - 
Table 6.7: Transportation mode used for leisure travel in Japan (2000) 
 
Rail 
(%) 
Automobile 
(%) 
Ship 
(%) 
Air 
(%) 
Others 
(%) 
Unknown 
(%) 
Hokkaido 8.2 93.8 0.3 12 0.7 1 
Tohoku 14.8 88.9 0.3 8.2 1.8 － 
Kantou 22.3 82.7 1.4 7.2 1.1 2.3 
(Tokyo) 28.1 79.2 1.9 6.7 0.5 3.5 
Hokuriku-koushinetsu 20.8 88.9 2.7 5.5 0.8 1 
Tokai 19.0 86.4 2 8.4 0.6 1.5 
Kinki 24.1 80 1.5 8.5 0.8 0.4 
Chugoku 30.0 84.3 4.1 5.9 0.4 0.4 
Shikoku 8.7 86.5 1.6 20.6 1.6 － 
Kyushu 10.2 83.3 8.2 16.0 1.9 0.5 
Average 19.7 84.8 2.2 8.7 1 1.2 
Source: Author based on data from the 9th Nation wide Travel Movement Survey Report (Statistics Bureau in Japan, 
2002) 
Notes: This survey is carried out every five years. All travels are excluding one-day return trips. 
6.4 Category 4 and 5 routes 
6.4.1 Characteristics: the Local city, secondary and newly opened airports 
routes 
Airports in market categories 4 and 5 are situated in the same locations of local 
prefectures’ government offices as the category 3 market. However, all of the 
demographic and economic backgrounds in these areas are not as large as in category 3. 
The population range in categories 4 and 5 is from 0.8 to 1.2 million per prefecture. 
Average income per capita is around USD 19,000-23,000 (1USD = JYE126, April 
2001). This is relatively high because some regions have strong local based secondary 
industries, like Toyama. The labour force index of secondary industry 21  in these 
prefectures is 38.4 in Toyama and 32.4 in Okayama (see Figure 6.12, average 29.5 in 
Japan). Moreover, the proportions of primary industries in route categories 4 and 5 are 
                                                     
21 This index is computed by the proportion of the number of employees in secondary industry over the total number 
of employees of all industries in each prefecture. 
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slightly higher compared to other route categories. The average labour force index of 
primary industry in category 5 is 11.0 and 9.2 in category 4 compared with 5% on 
average in Japan. 
Figure 6.12: Proportion of the labour force (the labour force index) in secondary industries by prefecture in 
categories 4 and 5 in 2005 
 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (2005) 
 
Appendix P: The primary industry labour force proportion by prefecture 
Appendix Q: The secondary industry labour force proportion by prefecture 
 
It is crucial to have stable and convenient transportation access to Tokyo for these local 
cities as all the economic and political activities are concentrated in the Japanese 
capital. Several secondary airports such as Iwami (opened in 1993), Odatenoshiro (in 
1998), Saga (in 1998) and Noto (in 2003), were opened in these route categories in 
order to promote their economy and provide greater access to major cities. In addition, 
air transport in route categories 4 and 5 has obtained an advantage compared to other 
modes of transport because these routes have long surface journey times reflected in the 
strong time indices from 0.74 to 0.84 (c.f. supra, chapter 4). 
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Table 6.8: The characteristics of the routes in category 4 in 2000 
Airport 
Stage Length 
(km) 
Number of 
departures per 
year( day) 
Number of 
passengers per 
year 
Passengers 
per flight 
A207verage 
load factor 
Akita 555 4,727(13) 882,392 187 61% 
Toyama 570 4,205(12) 872,164 207 70% 
Yamaguchi 935 3,637(10) 670,223 184 67% 
Tokushima 703 5,063(14) 807,927 160 61% 
Kochi 824 5,637(15) 861,112 153 62% 
Asahikawa 1,052 4,783(13) 735,004 154 57% 
Aomori 690 5,783(16) 978,419 169 65% 
Kushiro 1,032 3,758(10) 530,830 141 58% 
Average 795 4,703(13) 792,259 168 62% 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000) 
Table 6.9: The characteristics of the routes in category 5 in 2000 
Airport 
Landing 
charge 
Reduction* 
Stage 
Length 
(km) 
Number of 
departures per 
year(day) 
Number of 
passengers 
per year 
Average 
number of 
passengers 
per flight 
Average 
load factor 
Yonago  776 2,867(8) 369,201 129 59% 
Izumo  801 3,078(8)  517,710 168 57% 
Memanbetsu  1,156 3,078(8) 503,609 164 59% 
Obihiro  999 2.895(8) 517,457 179 61% 
Tottori  667 2,188(6) 310,650 142 64% 
Kitakyushu  958 1,946(5) 259,662 84 71% 
Misawa  685 2,836(6) 239,355 84 60% 
Nankishirahama X 634 1,856(5) 135,134 73 51% 
Odatenoshiro X 628 1,208(3) 116,521 96 64% 
Saga X 1,130 1,458(4) 162,605 112 66% 
Wakkanai X 1,195 1,014(3) 146,637 145 66% 
Nakashibetsu X 1,118 1,437(4) 90,681 63 63% 
Yamagata X 441 728(2) 59,633 82 58% 
Iwami X 907 1,447(4) 59,986 41 64% 
Average  889 2,016(6) 235,892 130 61% 
Source:  Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000). 
Note: landing charge reduction * refers landing charge at Haneda airport is reduced by 50%. 
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In order to protect the routes and promote demand, three PSO policies were provided to 
the routes in categories 4 and 5: (1) 20 PSO slots allocation in 1997 to five routes from 
Tokyo like Iwami, Nakashibetsu, Wakkanai, Saga and Odatenoshiro, (2) 4 PSO slots 
were allocated in 2000 to two newly opened airports routes from Tokyo like Noto and 
Shin-monbetsu, (3) two flights on the route rule: slots are pooled by government in case 
the number of flights becomes less than two flights per day on the route from Tokyo by 
airlines as a result of slot allocation at Haneda airports. Moreover, landing charges on 
ten routes like Wakkanai, Yamagata, Monbetsu, Nakashibetsu, Odatenoshiro, Noto, 
Nankishirahama, Iwami and Saga from Tokyo are reduced to 50% (see Table 6.9). 
Table 6.10: The demographic and economic background of category 4 routes 
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Akita 1.17 36,779 -1.5 2,402 -2.5 0.232 
Toyama 1.12 43,150 -3.7 2,916 -7 0.341 
Yamaguchi 1.51 54,654 -1.5 2,801 -4 0.351 
Tokushima 0.82 25,051 -2.2 2,659 -4.4 0.265 
Kochi 0.81 24,303 -2.6 2,318 -1.5 0.199 
Aomori 1.46 44,872 -2.6 2,359 -1.4 0.257 
Average 1.15 38,135 -2.4 2,576 -3.7 0.274 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (2006) 
 
The categories 4 and 5 markets are characterised by secondary and newly opened 
airports. Most airports are owned and managed by local governments (c.f. infra, chapter 
9). Odatenoshiro airport opened in 1998 in Akita prefecture, about 600 km north from 
Tokyo and Akita airport established in 1982. Aomori prefecture has Aomori and 
Misawa airport. Both of these routes from Tokyo have competition with high speed rail 
since the Akita and Tokoku high speed rail services opened in 2002 (c.f. supra, chapter 
4). Noto airport opened in 2003 in the Hokuriku area, includes Toyama, Ishikawa and 
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Kanagawa prefectures, which already had two airports. Besides, other prefectures like 
Shimane and Tottori prefecture have four airports, Yonago, Tottori, Izumo and Iwami 
airport in the same economic region, about 900 km west from Tokyo. However, the 
economic activity scale in this area is not large enough to have four airports, as the total 
number of population in this area was less than 1.4 million, the total amount of GDP 
was USD 45,453 million in 2002, income per capita was around USD 23,800 in 2001 
and GDP growth ratio varied from -0.6 to -0.7 % in 2003. Especially demand on the 
Tokyo-Iwami route dropped due to reduced frequencies after the Phase II Slot 
Allocation in 2002. These airports are owned and managed by local governments. Its 
burden reflects the budgets indices of these prefectures, which were very low around 
0.22 compared with the nation average 0.422 (see Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6.11: The demographic and economic background of category 5 routes 
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Yonago Tottori 
Tottori Tottori 
0.61 21,555 -0.7 2,524 -3.3 0.220 
Nankishirahama Wakayama 1.06 31,513 -0.7 2,396 -4.4 0.245 
Odatenoshiro Akita 1.17 36,779 -1.5 2,402 -2.5 0.232 
Saga Saga 0.87 27,714 -3.6 2,453 -1.3 0.272 
Yamagata Yamagata 1.23 40,897 -5.9 2,446 -2.6 0.275 
Izumo Shimane 
Iwami Shimane 
0.75 24,303 -0.6 2,478 -0.4 0.201 
Average  0.94 30,460 -2.2 2,452 -2.4 0.241 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (2006) 
                                                     
22 Budget index of Shimane prefecture was 0.2 and that of Tottori was 0.22 in 2002. They were ranked the worst and 
second worst in Japan. 
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Thus, many of airports were opened in categories 4 and 5 in order to improve the 
economic activities by developing air transport industry including airport construction 
business. Several slots were provided on the routes of these categories as Public 
Obligation Slots and other incentives like landing charge reductions were granted for 
nine routes on these route categories. However, during the process of the slots allocation 
system, airlines reduced frequencies and raised fares on these routes and as a result of 
liberalisation, demand and frequency dropped. As a consequence, the debt to construct 
and maintain airports become a burden for local government finance and hence, to tax 
payers in these regions. 
Table 6.12: Summary of economic and demographic background on routes from newly opened airports to 
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Yonago 5 Tottori N 
Tottori 5 Tottori 
0.61 21,355 2,524 0.220 
N 
Izumo 5 Shimane N 
Iwami 5 Shimane 
0.75 24,098 2,478 0.201 
N 
Total number of population and GDP in the region 1.36 45,453    
Akita 4 Akita Y 
Odatenoshiro 5 Akita 
1.17 36,779 2,402 0.232 
Y 
Total number of population and GDP in the region 1.17 36,779    
Aomori 4 Aomori Y 
Misawa 5 Aomori 
1.46 44,872 2359 0.257 
Y 
Total number of population and GDP in the region 1.46 44,872    
Saga 5 Saga 0.87 27,714 2,453 0.272 Y 
Fukuoka 1 Fukuoka Y 
Kitakyushu 5 Fukuoka 
5.05 166,298 2,529 0.513 
Y 
Yamaguchiube 4 Yamaguchi 1.51 54,654 2,801 0.351 Y 
Total number of population and GDP in the region 7.43 248,666    
Toyama 4 Toyama 1.12 43,150 2,916 0.341 N 
Komatsu 2 Ishikawa N 
Noto 5 Ishikawa 
1.18 43,137 2,950 0.377 
N 
Total number of population and GDP in the region 2.3 86,287    
Source: Authour based on data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (2006) 
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6.5 Category 6 Routes 
6.5.1 Characteristics: the remote island routes 
This category market is composed of routes to remote islands in Japan. Hachijyojima, 
Oshima and Miyakejima belong to the Tokyo metropolitan administration, while 
Amamioshima is in the Kagoshima prefecture and Ishigaki, Amamioshima, Miyakojima 
and Kumejima are the Okinawa prefecture. Air transportation is not only an important 
lifeline for local people but is also crucial for promoting tourism to these islands, which 
are located in a tropical climate. Most of the routes like those to Amamioshima, Ishigaki 
and Kumejima are very attractive sun tourism destinations with limited capacity by 
airlines. For example, the Tokyo-Kumejima routes are operated only several months of 
the year in the summer from Tokyo using B-737. Average annual load factor on the 
Tokyo-Kumejima route is very high, because this route operates only several months 
during the summer. Most of these flights are fully booked in spite of the very high fares 
(see Tables 6.13 and 6.14). 
Table 6.13: The characteristics of the routes in category 6 in 2000 
Airport 
Stage Length 
(km) 
Number of 
departures per 
year(day) 
Number of 
passengers 
per year 
Average 
passengers 
per flight 
Average load 
factor 
Hachijyojima 353 2,859(8) 236,040 83 54% 
Oshima 162 2,030(6)  90,275 44 70% 
Ishigakii 2,171 954(3) 116,232 122 72% 
Amamioshimai 1,436 718(2) 72,840 101 62% 
Miyakojima 2,020 724(2) 84,004 116 70% 
Kumejima 1,888 237(1) 25,402 107 72% 
Average 1,333 1,254(3) 104,132 83 67% 
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000) 
 
The Hachijyojima, Oshima and Miyakejima routes from Tokyo are more commuter 
routes rather than the sunshine tourism destinations. Landing charges on all of these 
category 6 routes are reduced to 1/6 as important PSO routes for remote island areas in 
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Japan to promote air transport and protect the local citizens’ convenience. However, 
demand, supply and frequency went down while fares increased after liberalisation. 
 
Table 6.14: Fares and Time index the in category 6 market 
Airport 
Total  
time(flight + 
access 
&egress) 
Normal fare 
(JYE) 
Peak fare 
(JYE) 
Discount fare 
(highest) 
(JYE) 
Discount fare 
(lowest) 
(JYE) 
Time index 
Hachijyo 50 17,100 16,700 16,700 16,700 0.03 
Oshima 55 11,000 10,700 7,700 7,700 0.17 
Miyakejima 70 13,000 14,000 13,200 13,200 0.07 
Amamioshima 185 36,500 41,500 36,500 36,500 0.09 
Kumejima 190 44,900 44,900 27,500 27,500 0.08 
Miyako 195 48,700 48,800 38,000 28,000 0.09 
Ishigaki 195 50,200 52,200 38,000 33,800 0.09 
Sources:  Author based on data from Japanese airlines’ timetables (JAL and ANA) in June 2005 and Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005). 
Notes: Fares are including security and fuel surcharge JYE600. 
 
6.6 The effects of the slot allocation system on the market 
Airlines have been operating large capacity aircraft with low load factors in order to 
satisfy the specific demands during the peak season and periods of the day on the Tokyo 
routes. After deregulation and the changes to the slot allocation policy, competition 
should have resulted in increased demand. Shortly after deregulation, competition 
seemed to have indeed been experienced in the market, but this trend did not last very 
long. In this section, the results and effects of the slot allocation system are analysed 
with respect to each category market, along with the process of each allocation: Phases I 
(from 1997 to 1999), II (from 2000 to 2004) and III (from 2005 to 2009). Due to data 
limitations, the effects are only analysed up to Phase II (until 2004). 
 
In 2001, following liberalisation and the first impact of the Phase II Slot Allocation in 
2000, the overall market grew. Table 6.15 shows market size and average demand and 
supply changes over the previous year by category in 2001, 2003 and 2004. Even 
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though market supply in route categories 3, 4 and 5 decreased, demand increased over 
the previous year. Both supply and demand grew in market categories 1 and 2, but after 
three years the situation turned out differently, despite additional slots becoming 
available under the Competition promotion slots 2002 policy. Comparing 2003 and 
2002, demand in category 1 routes increased only 2.94% over the previous year, against 
an increased seat supply of 7.96%. In other markets the traffic volumes and flight 
frequencies decreased. Just before the Phase III Slot Allocation in 2005, all of the 
indices in Table 6.15 demonstrate a decrease in all route categories. In addition, HHI 
indices show low competitive intensity in the markets during the process of the slot 
allocation system. In spite of the aims to promote competition and increase demand by 
slot allocation at Haneda airport, it is apparent that competition has diminished between 
airlines.  
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Table 6.15: Average demand and supply change (%) over the previous year by market category in 2001, 
2003 and 2004 
%  increase over the previous  year 
Ye
ar
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
Number of 
departures 
Number of 
passengers 
Number of  
seats 
supplied 
 
Load 
factor(%) 
HHI 
Frequency Demand Supply 
Load 
factor 
(%) 
2001 1 23,089 6,630,066 9,852,31 68.1 0.33 7.96 6.56 6.42 0.21 
 2 9,939 2,213,753 3,324,106 66.7 0.40 6.76 2.90 0.58 2.47 
 3 6,505 1,290,556 2,081,797 62.9 0.51 3.54 3.82 4.73 -0.82 
 4 4,784 811,642 1,264,951 64.2 0.64 1.69 2.67 -0.37 3.09 
 5 1,945 260,509 408,640 61.5 0.96 3.14 4.50 -0.87 5.58 
 6 1,236 109,416 165,894 68.7 1.00 -0.36 3.53 0.32 3.66 
2003 1 24,955 7,030,702 10,938,476 65.5 0.45 6.85 2.96 7.96 -4.42 
 2 10,884 2,148,862 3,543,872 61.5 0.48 -0.59 -4.86 -0.39 -3.94 
 3 8,218 1,400,466 2,326,290 60.6 0.50 10.33 1.49 3.12 -1.25 
 4 5,300 856,675 1,432,797 60.0 0.57 4.74 -0.92 6.08 -6.26 
 5 1,943 235,892 389,232 61.0 0.97 1.59 -1.55 -0.92 -1.38 
 6 1,250 108,969 179,458 62.1 0.87 3.86 4.45 7.80 -5.86 
2004 1 25,271 7,051,704 10,910,322 65.2 0.45 1.20 0.74 1.20 -0.35 
 2 10,675 2078,872 3,262,843 64.9 0.47 -1.27 -3.17 -7.74 5.58 
 3 8,051 1,358,999 2,158,973 63.5 0.49 -3.00 -3.07 -7.49 5.13 
 4 5,100 843,144 1,315,983 63.9 0.61 -3.61 -1.50 -6.96 6.81 
 5 2,023 245,702 384,398 63.6 1.00 1.06 1.24 -1.74 3.19 
 6 1,185 104,559 172,828 63.3 0.94 -5.90 -4.98 -3.99 1.97 
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6.6.1 Fares 
In the process of deregulation, the number of fare types increased from 4 in 1985 to 8 in 
2000 and over 19 in 2005. Appendix R shows examples of the types of fares in the 
domestic market in Japan. Even after deregulation, airlines have been reporting to 
Government the types and levels of fares two months before departure, which are then 
published in airline timetables. Although two months notice for fare setting is not 
regulated in the air law, which only mentions “advanced notice”, this notice period 
became a kind of traditional custom in Japanese airlines. It is because of the so-called 
“meeting for schedule arrangement”, under which airlines discuss their schedule 
arrangements every two months. The fare setting policy according to distance has not 
been changed even after deregulation. 
 
Appendix R: Types of fares and prices on selected Tokyo routes in June 2005 
 
This situation is also evidenced from the data of Table 6.16, which shows average fares 
and the annual price increases (%) over the previous year by market category in 2001, 
2003 and 2004. The highest fares were not increased at all compared with 2000 in all 
route categories, while the lowest fares went down except for categories 3 and 4 in 
2001. The discount rate of the lowest fares was between 44% and 55 % of the highest 
fare in the overall market. In the category 3 market, which is the main VFR market of 
the Tokyo routes, the discount fares were raised by around JYE5,000 (USD39.6) 23on 
each route in 2001. This was especially evident on the Tokyo-Oita and Tokyo-Nagasaki 
routes, where passenger demand decreased. Overall, the discount rates of these fares 
were raised in 2000. In 2003, the highest fares were decreased by about 9.9% in route 
categories 1 and 2, which have competition from both new entrants and high speed 
railway services. The difference between the highest and lowest fare was down to 53% 
from 55% in route category 1 as a result of the discount fares being increased. On 
category 3 routes, the highest fares were down by about 9% and the highest discount 
fares were 6.6% lower because of new entry. In other route categories, especially 
relatively low demand markets like categories 4 and 5, the difference between the 
                                                     
23 The exchange rate adopted here is the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, which was reported in the 
exchange rate archives by month of the International Monetary Fund in April 2001; USD 1 = JYE126.3. 
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highest and lowest fares had decreased by about 20%. As a result, fares were raised in 
2003 in all route categories despite liberalisation and the Haneda airport slot allocation 
(Phase II). The differences between the highest and cheapest fares were reduced more 
and more, especially in low demand markets.  
 
The decreasing spread in highest and lowest fares accelerated in 2004 and 2005. Table 
6.16 shows the ratio of discount fares over fully flexible fares in June 2005 for each 
route category. The discount levels of the most expensive discount fares were less than 
30% and those of the cheapest discount fares varied between 24% and 52 %. The 
average difference between the highest and lowest discount fare was only 16% over all 
the Tokyo routes. Some of the routes operated by new entrants had discounts of more 
than 70%. However these cheapest discount fares are very limited. Besides, on the 
routes operated by Air Do, such as Tokyo–Sapporo and Tokyo-Asahikawa, the 
difference between discount fares was around 20% to 29 %, which is almost the same as 
in other duopoly markets operated by JAL and ANA. This is due to the management 
cooperation between ANA and Air Do, since Air Do had been under the Civil 
Rehabilitation Reorganisation Act since 2002.24 
 
In 2005, the competitive situation seems to have faded away between airlines even 
including the new entrants. JAL and ANA have been setting exactly the same fares on 
almost every route, even though another new entrant (Skynetasia) provided simple and 
very low discount fares (less than 70% of the normal fare). On other routes, operated by 
Skymark and Air Do, fares showed 10%-20% rates of discount. 
 
Despite liberalisation, all fares and schedules are fixed and published in the airlines 
timetables two months before departure. The discounted fares are refundable even 
though some charges are made. Moreover, the differences in discount fares are not so 
prominent. For example, the maximum discount rate of the 21 days advanced booking 
fares was 57% and that of the 7 days advanced booking discount fares was 58% on the 
Tokyo-Sapporo route in June 2005. However, some one day advanced booking discount 
                                                     
24 This law was established in 2000 in order to revitalise a company, which was bankrupt, but still has a possibility to 
recover. The airline has fallen under the court for revitalisation.  
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fares were more than 61 % of the fully flexible fares. On the Tokyo-Fukuoka route, the 
difference between the fully flexible fares and the discount fares was only JYE 1,500 
(USD13.84).25  In addition, some of the 7 days advanced booking fares were cheaper 
than the 21 days advanced booking fares and one day before departure booking fares 
vary from 25 % to 60% discount on the fully flexible fares in the Tokyo routes market. 
Passengers can not obtain much discount on price even though they booked and paid in 
advance. In other words, they possess opportunities to book and purchase discount fares 
at better prices, even only one day before departure. This fare setting policy of the 
airlines, which has been showing this tendency since 1997, did not change even after 
liberalisation. 
 
                                                     
25 The exchange rate adopted is the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, which was reported in the 
exchange rate archives by month of the International Monetary Fund in June 2005; USD 1 = JYE108.35. 
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Table 6.16: Average fares and annual price changes (%) over the previous year by route category in 2001, 
2003 and 2004 
 
% fare increase over the previous  year 
Ye
ar
 
C
at
eg
or
y Number 
of 
airlines 
Average 
number 
of new 
entrants 
Highest  
fare 
(JYE) 
Highest 
discount 
fare 
(JYE) 
Lowest 
discount 
fare 
(JYE) 
Highest fare 
Highest 
discount 
fare 
Lowest 
discount 
fare 
Lowest 
fare 
2001 1 3.8 0.5 28,000 21,750 12,475 0.00 4.17 -2.95 0.55 
 2 3.0 0.0 24,000 16,375 13,375 0.00 6.62 -6.18 0.44 
 3 2.4 0.0 28,625 21,563 17,538 0.00 14.12 22.81 0.39 
 4 1.9 0.0 26,500 20,563 14,163 0.00 0.99 13.70 0.45 
 5 1.1 0.0 28,188 21,672 16,000 0.00 5.03 -3.70 0.42 
 6 1.0 0.0 35,500 19,500 14,958 0.00 -5.68 -5.38 0.50 
2003 1 2.8 0.5 25,225 21,500 11,700 -9.90 3.10 2.53 0.53 
 2 2.5 0.3 21,625 15,625 11,075 -9.86 -4.00 3.65 0.46 
 3 2.4 0.4 26,113 20,813 15,438 -8.70 -6.58 -2.27 0.40 
 4 1.1 0.0 24,613 20,188 13,200 -6.21 -3.08 2.45 0.46 
 5 1.0 0.0 26,953 22,700 19,400 -6.61 2.63 35.40 0.29 
 6 1.4 0.0 33,550 26,125 19,383 -3.83 44.02 41.32 0.34 
2004 1 2.5 1 27,875 23,675 11,838 10.23 9.85 2.55 0.57 
 2 2.25 0.25 24,000 17,875 10,500 10.94 12.62 -3.90 0.55 
 3 2 0.25 28,625 22,288 15,250 9.66 7.35 0.71 0.46 
 4 2.25 0.29 26,438 21,400 14,625 6.89 5.19 12.56 0.45 
 5 1 0.0 28,813 24,084 20,969 9.49 8.66 16.29 0.26 
 6 1.17 0.0 35,333 26,900 21,050 4.34 3.43 7.20 0.33 
Sources: Author based on data from Japanese Airlines’ timetables (JAL, JAS, ANA, SKY, ADO, SNET) in April 2000-
2004 and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000 -2004) 
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Table 6.17: Fares and levels of discount fares versus fully flexible fares on Tokyo routes by category in 
June 2005 
Category 
Fully flexible fare 
 
(USD) 
Discount fare 
(highest) 
(USD) 
Discount fare 
(lowest) 
(USD) 
Ratio of 
discounted 
(highest) 
Ratio of 
discounted 
(lowest) 
1 279.8 217.0 131.7 0.78 0.47 
2 227.5 172.2 103.5 0.76 0.48 
3 279.5 228.1 158.9 0.82 0.57 
4 250.3 197.1 159.8 0.78 0.64 
5 256 215.4 195.9 0.84 0.76 
6 301.3 215.5 189.8 0.77 0.71 
Total 265.0 210.9 169.1 0.81 0.65 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics in 2005  
Notes: All fares are excluding special fuel charge (JYE300), special security charge (JYE300) and Haneda airport 
charge (JYE100) 
 
Appendix S: Fares and percentage changes of discount fares versus normal fares on 
Tokyo routes by category in June 2005 
6.6.2 New entrant routes 
Skymark entered the Tokyo-Fukuoka route in September 1998, while Air Do started 
operating the Tokyo-Sapporo route in December 1998. Traffic volumes on these routes 
(Category 1) are very high and accounted for more than 30% of all domestic Tokyo 
routes in 2001, with more than 85 departures provided daily on each route. Figure 6.13 
shows the annual number of passengers carried on the Tokyo-Sapporo route from 1985 
to 2005. Passenger demand increased extensively from 1985 to 1996 because of the 
effects of deregulation which was started in 1985 and the increased slots availabilities as 
a result of the sea-side extensions at Haneda airport (c.f. infra, chapter 9). However, the 
effects of a new entrant, Air Do on the market were not so prominent. Air Do had been 
suffering financial problems since 1998 and was under the Industrial Revitalisation 
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Cooperation Act (IRCA)26 with management support of ANA in 2000. Air Do had 
difficulties to increase services on this route because they were not able to acquire 
enough aircraft due to lack of capital. After having the management control of ANA, 
Air Do leased the aircraft from ANA and increased frequencies on this route (see Figure 
6.14). This meant the end of competition between a new entrant and network carriers on 
this route. It affected fares markedly. In 2001, the difference between the highest fare 
and the lowest fare was about 43% on the Tokyo-Sapporo route. The highest fares 
dropped 10% in 2003, but from that year the difference between fares became only 20-
29%, which is almost the same as in other duopoly markets operated by JAL and ANA. 
Air Do changed its role from a competitive new entrant to a quasi low-cost subsidiary of 
ANA. 
Figure 6.13: Number of passengers carried on the Tokyo-Sapporo route from 1985 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1985-2005)  
 
                                                     
26 This law was established to revitalise Japanese companies that, although having valuable management resources, 
are unable to move forward because of excessive debt. The Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) 
purchases the debt of concerned companies and assists the revitalisation of individual businesses by providing 
financial assistance and external advice for their operation. In the Skynetasia case, the IRCJ owned 57% of the 
shares by JYE3.4 billion capital injections and appointed ANA as an operative cooperation company by transferring 
14.99% of the shares to ANA from IRCJ. Although IRCJ owns 42% of the shares, in order to remain in the 
management. ANA influences the management as a key shareholder. 
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Figure 6.14: Number of departures per day on the Tokyo-Sapporo route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2005)  
 
A similar situation has been experienced on the Tokyo-Fukuoka route (Category 1, 
1,141kms). This air transport dominating route also increased demand during 1985 to 
1996 because of the effects of deregulation. Frequency was increased from about 62 per 
day in 1997 to 90 per day in 2004 since Skymark started operation in 1998, offering half 
the fare of network carriers’ fares. However, pricing competition was intense on this 
route and network carriers started to provide exactly the same prices on the flights 
which departed at similar times as Skymark. Skymark kept about 80% load factors in 
1998 and dropped to 65.5% in 2000 as a result. 
After liberalisation in 2000, the number of passengers carried on this route increased 
4%, the lowest fare decreased 7.7% in 2001, and the highest fare dropped 10%, 
although other discounted fares increased 5-10%. However, in 2004 all types of fares 
increased between 11.1% and 26.3%, even after the new entrant came into this market, 
while the load factor dropped from 64% in 1999 to 60%. Traffic volume increased only 
20% from 6.7 million in 1997 to 8.1 million in 2004. Therefore, discount fares have not 
been attractive enough to stimulate potential demand and Figures 6.15 and 6.16 clearly 
demonstrate that the market has already become saturated (see Table 6.18). 
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Figure 6.15: Number of passengers carried on the Tokyo-Fukuoka route from 1985 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1985-2005)  
Figure 6.16: Number of departures per day on the Tokyo-Fukuoka route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2005) 
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Table 6.18: Example routes of new entrants, Skymark and Air Do, during the process of the slot allocation system: Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo-Fukuoka routes 
  
% increase in 
number of 
passengers 
Load 
factor 
(%) 
HHI 
(a) 
Max fare 
USD (JYE) 
(b) 
Discount 
Max 
USD (JYE) 
(c) 
Lowest fare 
USD (JYE) 
% 
increase 
in (a) 
% increase 
in (b) 
% increase in 
(c) 
 
The % 
difference of (a) 
& (c) 
 2001 4.29 67.7 0.30 
221.69 
(28,000) 
174.19 
(22,000) 
95.0 
(12,000) 
0.00 0.00 -7.69 0.57 
SPK 
(894km) 
2003 -3.7 64.3 0.42 
213.0 
(25,200) 
186.0 
(22,000) 
76.1 
(9,000) 
-10.0 0.00 0.00 0.64 
 2004 -1.57 66.1 0.42 
269.2 
(28,000) 
230.8 
(24,000) 
96.1 
(10,000) 
11.1 9.09 11.1 0.64 
 2001 3.57 63.7 0.30 
245.4 
(31,000) 
190.0 
(24,000) 
78.4 
(9,900) 
0.00 0.00 -10.0 0.68 
FUK 
(1,041km) 
2003 -1.88 59.4 0.41 
235.8 
(27,900) 
177.5 
(21,000) 
82.8 
(9,800) 
-10.0 5.0 10.1 0.65 
 2004 -1.96 60.5 0.40 
298.1 
(31,000) 
254.8 
(26,500) 
105.8 
(11,000) 
11.1 26.2 12.4 0.65 
Sources: Japanese Airlines’ timetables (JAL, JAS, ANA, SKY, ADO) in April 2001 to 2004 and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2001- 2004). 
Notes: These exchange rates adopted are the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, which were reported in the exchange rate archives by month of the International Monetary 
Fund in April, 2001, 2003 and 2004. 
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Skymark tried to develop other high demand routes such as the Tokyo-Kagoshima route 
(1,111kms), one of the strong VFR markets in category 2. All types of fares were 
dropped in 2003 after Skymark started operating in 2002 with a strong support by local 
companies in the Kagoshima area. However, traffic volume did not increase 
significantly and average load factor dropped from 62% in 2000 to 56% in 2005 and all 
fares subsequently increased even though some discounted fares were 50% cheaper than 
in 2001 (see Figures 6.17 and 6.18). Skymark entered with some low discount fares to 
attract both business and VFR traffic. However, these fares were not sufficiently cheap 
to encourage additional demand, especially potential VFR traffic. Because of this, on 
some of these routes traffic volume by automobiles increased 20% in 2003 over the 
previous year. Their products (not only fares but also reliability, branding and flight 
schedule, etc 27 ) were not sufficiently attractive to increase VFR demand while 
competing with network carriers.  
 
Figure 6.17: Number of passengers carried on the Tokyo-Kagoshima route from 2000 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2000-2005)  
 
                                                     
27 Skymark often cancelled flights because of the lack of spare aircraft and several problems caused by safety and 
pilot issues. 
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Figure 6.18: Number of departures per day and average load factors on the Tokyo-Kagoshima route from 
1997 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2005)  
 
Skymark’s strategy became increasingly unclear. On the Tokyo-Aomori route 
(Category 4, 690km), the market demand and frequency were developed after the Phase 
I Slot Allocation at Haneda airport in 1997. Because high speed rail started services on 
this route in 2002, ANA planned to leave this route (c.f. supra, chapters 4 and section 
6.4 of this chapter). In 2003, Skymark entered this route by leasing an ANA B-767 
aircraft to replace ANA services while offering a 20-40% discount fare. However, the 
market was very small and only 40% discount was not attractive enough to increase 
demand while competing with HSR. In the following year, Skymark closed this route, 
which became a monopoly market by JAL. Frequency dropped 30% from 16 in 1998 to 
11 per day in 2004. The number of passengers carried was 900,000 in 1999 and 
decreased by 22% to 700,000 in 2005 as a result (see Figure 6.19). Skymark 
experienced the same kinds of failure on the Tokyo-Tokushima route as well. 
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Figure 6.19: Number of passengers carried and departures per day on the Tokyo-Aomori route from 1997 
to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2005)  
 
On other routes, another new entrant, such as Skynetasia, was not successful 
either.Figure 6.20 shows the annual number of passengers carried and the number of 
departures per day on the Tokyo-Miyazaki route from 1997 to 2000. The number of 
departures per day increased from 19 in 1997 to 29 in 2004 as a result of Skynetasia’s 
entry on the Tokyo-Miyazaki route (Category 3, 1,023kms) in 2003. The traffic volume 
increased a little by 0.78% over the previous year in 2003. Even though cheap discount 
fares (USD 72-90) were offered by Skynetasia, they did not enable the development of 
the market and the fully flexible fares increased in 2005 to higher levels than those of 
2000. Skynetasia strongly believed that high freaquencies increased demand on the 
route and persisted with this policy. However, frequency of 29 departures per day was 
too much for this catgegory 3 market to deliver appropriate load factors for low cost 
carriers. Moreover, Skynetasia experienced huge financial trouble because of the lack of 
sound business management. Although Skenetasia had strong support by local 
industries and government, the airline became governed by the Industrial Revitalisation 
Cooperation Act (IRCA) with managenent support from ANA in 2004 as was 
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implemented for Air Do in 2000. In 2005, the fully flexible fares returned to the same 
level (USD 290) as those of 2000 on this route as a result.  
Figure 6.20: Number of passengers carried per year and departures per day on the Tyo-Miyazaki route 
from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2005)  
 
All routes where new entrants entered after deregulation experienced similar patternes. 
In the beginning, the market was developed a little by increased frequencies and 
discounted fares offered by new entrants. Competition among airlines seemed to be 
experienced in the market. This situation was not sustainable and new entrants started to 
suffer not only big financial problems but also changed their managements and 
strategies, especially on network development issues. As a result, most new entrants 
became governed by the IRCA and under the control of ANA. This affected the market, 
which resulted in fares to increase and demand to drop, notably on the low demand 
routes such as categories 4 and 5 routes. These results affect local economic activities 
and aggravate economic stagnations in the regions because most new entrants are 
supported by companies and government in the local regions.  
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Interestingly, these new entrants have been able to keep “New entrant slots” at Haneda 
airport, even after ANA gained management control. New entrants keep and request the 
new entrant slots while network carriers own the new entrants shares (upto 20%) and 
provide human resourses in the new entrants’ management teams. ANA provides also 
distribution services via ANA’s reservation centres. In fact, all those new entrants’ 
network strategies and fares are decided under the control of ANA and these new 
entrants continue operation and functions as de facto subsidiary airlines of ANA to 
operate relatively low demand routes. 
 
Skymark entered an appeal to a court against this situation, in particular, Air Do 
keeping “New entrants slots” in December 2004. Skymark claimed against Minister of 
Land, Infrustructure and Transportation that this situation acted in violation of the 
competition law. However, Skymark’s appeal was dismissed in April 2006.  
 
The insignificant effects of new entrants on the market and their failures were 
demonstrated in this section. The reasons of new entrants’ failures are analysed by 
focusing on the Skymark case in chapter 9. 
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Table 6.19: Effects of new entrant, Skymark, during the process of the slot allocation system; Tokyo-Kagoshima route 
 
% increase in 
number of 
passengers 
Load 
factor 
(%) 
HHI 
(a) 
Max fare 
USD (JYE) 
(b) 
Discount 
Max 
USD (JYE) 
(c) 
Lowest fare 
USD (JYE) 
% increase 
in (a) 
% increase 
in (b) 
% increase 
in (c) 
 
The % 
difference of 
(a) & (c) 
2001 4.23 62.9 0.37 
261.3 
(33,000) 
162.3 
(20,500) 
162.3 
(20,500) 
0.00 20.6 20.6 0.38 
2003 -1.78 58.7 0.38 
251.1 
(29,700) 
164.8 
(19,500) 
77.6 
(9,800) 
-10.0 -4.88 10.1 0.67 
2004 -0.7 58.0 0.36 
319.2 
(33,200) 
254.8 
(26,500) 
105.8 
(11,000) 
11.1 35.9 12.2 0.67 
2005   0.42 
311.1 
(33,600) 
250.9 
(27,100) 
101.8 
(11,000) 
1.1 2.2 0.0 0.67 
Sources: Japanese Airlines’ timetables (JAL, JAS, ANA, SKY) in April 2001 to 2005 and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2001- 2005) 
Notes: These exchange rates adopted are the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, which were reported in the exchange rate archives by month of the International Monetary 
Fund in April, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
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6.7 Summary 
During the process of the slot allocation system and liberalisation, the structure of 
airlines in Japan changed dramatically. JAL and JAS were consolidated, while ANA 
had a leasing contract with Skymark for its operations on new routes to Aomori and 
Tokushima. Skymark also had a codesharing operation with JAL on the Tokyo- Kansai 
route. None of the new entrants could utilise the chance to expand their businesses using 
New entrant slots (c.f. supra, chapter 5). Air Do and Skynetasia were subjected to the 
control of ANA being under the Industrial Revitalisation Cooperation Act from 2000 
and 2007. 
 
The average fully flexible fares were higher in 2005 compared to 2000. The highest 
discount fares and new entrants’ fares became only around 30% lower than the fully 
flexible fares. The differences between the fully flexible fares and lowest discount fares 
were around 50% even in the high demand categories 1 and 2 markets. On some routes 
the lowest discounted fares stimulated demand, for example, on the Tokyo-Hiroshima, 
Fukuoka, Komatsu routes and on several new routes like Tokyo-Toyama and Okayama, 
as a result of competition with surface transportation, especially high speed rail. In 
competitive markets with good surface transportation like the category 2 routes, the 
fully flexible fares have not risen and the discount fares are 20% lower than in 2000. 
This is the effect of competition with high speed rail in this category. However, on other 
low demand routes like categories 3, 4 and 5, the lowest discount fares were increased 
by more than 20% to 35%, although the fully flexible fares were lowered by 2%. As 
frequencies have decreased in category 5 routes, passenger demand is less after five 
years of deregulation with an average of 45,000 passengers on each route annually. 
 
The key objectives of the slot allocation policies were the promotion of competition and 
the improvement of consumers’ convenience with safety assured. It would appear as a 
result of this market analysis that these objectives have not yet been accomplished. 
Airlines have strong voices not only for making policies but also among industries and 
society. Even under the competition promotion policy after liberalisation, airlines are 
able to set exactly same fares as other airlines on the routes. Most new entrants became 
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de facto subsidiary airlines of ANA and they can keep their new entrants slots. Real 
competition like other regions in the world has not occurred in the Tokyo domestic 
market. This is because the industry structure, customs and culture in the Japanese 
airline industry including Government, who have been extremely reluctant to 
experience strong competition. Especially the so-called “Huddling culture” among 
airlines has been a big obstacle for competition.  
 
The slot allocation policy of 2005 (Phase III) has been acted upon in 2006. JAL and 
Skymark have faced safety issues, which have been recognised to be caused mainly by 
organisational problems. A new start-up airline in 2006, Starflier, had received a 
warning from JCAB because of operation manual violation only two months after its 
first flight.  
 
The routes from Tokyo have become very competitive sectors not only between airlines 
but also high-speed railways. Both airlines and high-speed railways, which want to 
increase profit in these markets, inject their business assets more on these sectors and 
keep fares high. Competition occurs in terms of service frequency and product quality 
rather than through cheap fares. In addition, relatively low demand markets like route 
categories 3, 4 and 5 do not seem to participate in this market development with fares 
increasing more and more. These markets have experienced decreasing frequencies and 
demand, and stagnancy of the local economies. On the other hand, in these markets air 
transport has a significant advantage over surface transportation in terms of distance and 
infrastructure. 
Three prominent results of liberalisation were found during the process of the slot 
allocation system: (1) decreased demand, (2) increased fares and (3) new entrants’ 
failures. All of these results are different from the experiences of other countries after 
deregulation. The result of this slot allocation system has indicated important 
suggestions for competition policymaking. It is clear that there are several constraints 
for competition in the domestic market in Japan (see Tables 6.20 and 6.21) 
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In the next chapter 7, comparative analysis with the UK domestic and intra-EU market 
serving the UK is undertaken to demonstrate the different experiences between these 
two markets. 
 
Table 6.20: The results of deregulation by market category in 2003 over 2000 
 
 The Tokyo routes (%) 
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 
General Experiences 
in the US and EU market 
Traffic volume 12 - 1 12 8 - 13 4 Increase 
Frequency 15 16 30 12 - 46 - 3 Increase 
Load factor - 4 - 6 - 4.4 - 4 4 - 7 Increase 
Highest fares -10 -10 - 9 - 8 - 3 - 5 Decrease 
Highest discount fares 0 2 10 - 3 7 26 EU data not available 
Lowest fares 9.9 - 22.3 5 2 18 24 Decrease 
 
 
Table 6.21: The results of deregulation by market category in 2000 over 1997 
 The Tokyo routes (%) 
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 
General Experiences 
in the US and EU market 
Traffic volume 22 21 8 6 - 5 6 Increase 
Frequency 33 29 8 12 - 7 - 8 Increase 
Load factor - 3 - 1 0 - 4 - 7 - 3 Increase 
Notes: Each number refers to the ratio of 2003 over 2000 and that of 2000 over 1997 by category, which is computed 
using the results. (See Appendix H and Appendix J) 
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Chapter 7: Comparative analysis between the Tokyo 
routes and a selection of routes in the intra-European 
market 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 7 several individual routes in the intra-European market, which are serving in 
countries in the European Union, are analysed using the same factors used in chapter 6. 
The routes are categorised according to the same scale as used for the Tokyo routes 
market using UK CAA data for 2000. This data only includes the scheduled flights on 
intra-European routes serving the UK and those serving the UK domestic market. All of 
the top 30 routes of categories 1, 2 and 3 and several routes of the categories 4 and 5 
markets are analysed using UK CAA data from 1997 to 2005 in order to focus on the 
level of demand, frequency, load factor, the number of airlines and airports on 
individual routes and to investigate in detail how they have changed over time. Fares 
have been excluded from the analysis because of the limitation of publicly available fare 
data in the intra-European market. The category 6 routes serving remote islands are 
removed in order to draw attention to the traditional carriers and LCCs activities in this 
analysis. The outcomes of these analyses are compared with the results of the Tokyo 
route market analysis (supra, chapter 6) in order to demonstrate the characteristics of the 
European market after deregulation and the differences with the Tokyo routes market. 
 
In Europe, the process of liberalisation was started in 1986 and the air transport market 
has seen significant developments since the European Commission published the third 
package of liberalisation proposals in 1992. Figure 7.1 shows the growth of the intra-
European market serving the UK and the UK domestic market from 1997 to 2005 and 
the impact of LCCs on the market. The total number of passengers reached more than 
120 million in 2005 and increased by 1.8 times from 67.3 million in 1997. The number 
of passengers carried by LCCs has increased by about 31% per year on average between 
1997 and 2005, and the market share of LCCs has increased to 48% in 2005 compared 
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with 10% in 1997, while the traditional carriers’ traffic grew only by an average 1% 
over the previous year. 
Figure 7.1: The total numbers of passengers carried in the intra-European market serving the UK and on 
UK domestic routes (1997- 2005) 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
7.2 Categories 1 and 2 routes in the intra-European market 
serving UK and UK domestic routes 
Table 7.1 shows the top 20 sectors of the intra-European routes serving the UK in 2000 
and segmented by category, which is a similar approach to that used for the Tokyo 
routes analysis (supra, chapter 3). 
The category 1 routes of the intra-European market are summarised in Table 7.2 and 
compared with the Tokyo routes. The combined numbers of passengers on 4 category 1 
routes from the UK are about the same as the sum of the top 2 Tokyo routes, Tokyo-
Sapporo and Tokyo-Fukuoka. The average number of departures per day was 95 for the 
category 1 UK-intra-European routes compared with 58 for the category 1 Tokyo 
domestic routes. This highlights three significant characteristics of the Tokyo domestic 
market: (1) the size of the Tokyo routes is larger than the largest UK routes, (2) despite 
this fact, these routes are operated at lower frequency by larger aircraft, and (3) this can 
Chapter 7: Comparative analysis between the Tokyo routes and a selection of routes in the intra-European market  
- 131 - 
be explained by the scarcity of slots and non-existence of secondary airports serving 
Tokyo. 
Table 7.1: Examples of intra-European routes serving the UK and UK domestic routes by category in 2000 
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1 DUB-LON 4,383,287 39,765 5,763,274 145 76 76 76 
1 AMS-LON 3,895,212 42,555 5,333,556 125 80 72 73 
1 EDI-LON 3,032,737 29,184 4,297,747 147 71 70 71 
1 LON-PAR 3,012,981 33,867 4,866,503 144 - 62 62 
1 GLA-LON 2,880,517 28,428 4,159,421 146 74 67 69 
 Average 3,440,947 34,760/95 4,884,100 142 75 69 70 
2 FRA-LON 2,350,892 21,883 3,713,972 170 65 63 63 
2 LON-MAN 2,059,076 20,545 3,046,275 141 68 68 68 
2 BFS-LON 1,937,997 18,938 2,747,205 145 73 69 71 
2 LON-ZRH 1,780,027 20,001 2,931,620 147 76 59 61 
2 LON-MAD 1,739,002 15,829 2,754,557 174 72 61 63 
 Average 1,973,399 19,439/53 3,038,726 155 71 64 65 
3 LON-ROM 1,687,365 14,116 2,446,192 173 77 68 69 
3 LON-MIL 1,651,257 18,497 2,853,909 154 63 57 58 
3 BRU-LON 1,493,603 23,213 2,918,004 136 - 52 52 
3 CPH-LON 1,457,598 15,319 2,337,477 153 63 62 62 
3 GVA-LON 1,456,840 14,787 2,318,740 157 75 58 63 
3 LON-STO 1,417,820 13,085 2,153,585 165 68 65 66 
3 LON-MUC 1,359,873 12,271 2,010,506 164 64 68 68 
3 BCN-LON 1,344,631 11,152 1,796,533 161 82 71 75 
3 LON-NCE 1,068,000 8,772 1,449,517 165 79 71 74 
3 ATH-LON 1,022,295 7,340 1,425,162 194 82 70 72 
3 AMS-MAN 922,370 14,033 1,586,525 99 80 53 58 
3 DUB-MAN 814,322 11,359 1,171,574 102 67 73 70 
 Average 1,330,263 14,035/38 2,070,300 152 72 62 64 
Source: Author based on UK CAA data (2000) 
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Table 7.2: The characteristics of category 1 intra-European routes serving the UK and UK domestic routes 
compared with the Tokyo routes in 2000 
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1 LON-DUB 4,383,287 39,765/109 145 3 2  5 1 76% 
1 LON-AMS 3,895,212 42,555/116 125 5 1  5 1 73% 
1 LON-EDI 3,032,737 29,184/80 147 4 3  5 1 71% 
1 LON-PAR 3,012,981 33,867/93 144 5 0 X 5 2 62% 
1 LON-GLA 2,880,517 28,428/78 146 4 2  5 1 69% 
 Average 3,440,947 34,760/95 142 4 1.6  5 1 70% 
           
1 TYO-SPK 8,898,882 30,375/83 294 3 1  1 1 66% 
1 TYO-FUK 7,752,652 28,711/79 271 3 1 X 1 1 63% 
1 TYO-OSA 4,320,154 13,004/36 336 3 0 X 1 1 71% 
1 TYO-OKA 3,815,422 12,948/35 296 3 0  1 1 72% 
 Average 6,196,778 21,675/58 299 3 0.5  1 1 68% 
Source: Author based on the data from UK CAA (2000) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation 
statistics (2000) 
Note: High speed rail (HSR) refers to train services with a speed of more than 250 kms/ hour. 
 
These characteristics of the Tokyo routes market are highlighted more clearly in the 
category 2 market. The number of departures per day was 25 on the Tokyo routes and 
55 on the European routes (see Table 7.3). In 2000, the total number of passengers in 
route categories 1 and 2 in Japan (8 routes), which was about 33 million, was equivalent 
to the total number of passengers on the top 15 routes in Europe. The categories 1 and 2 
markets of the Tokyo routes carry a very large number of passengers, although only two 
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traditional carriers (Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways) operated most of the flights 
on these 8 routes in 2000. 
Table 7.3: The characteristics of category 2 intra-European routes compared to Tokyo routes in 2000 
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2 LON-FRA 2,350,892 21,883/60 170 4 1  5 2 63% 
2 LON-MAN 2,059,076 20,545/56 141 2 2 X 5 4 68% 
2 LON-BFS 1,937,997 18,938/52 145 2 3  5 2 71% 
2 LON-ZRH 1,780,027 20,001/55 147 2 1  5 2 61% 
2 LON-MAD 1,739,002 15,829/43 174 3 3  5 1 63% 
 Average 1,973,399 19,439/53 155 2.6 1.4  5 2 65% 
           
2 TYO-KIX 2,325,985 10522/29 344 3 0 X 1 1 64% 
2 TYO-HIJ 2,231,196 9,916/27 345 3 0 X 1 1 65% 
2 TYO-KOJ 2,025,747 9,134/25 361 3 0  1 1 61% 
2 TYO-KMQ 2,021,863 7,609/21 381 3 0  1 1 70% 
 Average 2,151,198 9295/26 356 3 0  1 1 65% 
Source: Author based on  data from UK CAA (2000) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation 
statistics (2000) 
Note: High speed rail (HSR) refers to train services with a speed of more than 250kms/hour. 
 
On the busiest route serving the UK, London-Dublin, the number of passengers 
increased by 1-10% per year from 1997 to 2005, although it dropped by 4% in 2001. 
The market was shared out 35% to LCCs and 64% to traditional carriers in 1997, and 
45% to LCCs and 55% with traditional carries in 2003. With market liberalisation, 
airlines tried to increase frequency in order to increase their market share. However, 
both LCCs and traditional carriers reduced their frequencies from 2001 on this busiest 
sector in order to adjust the balance of supply and demand (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). 
The share of departures between low cost carriers and traditional airlines was almost 
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same as the market share of the two, with LCCs accounting for 35% in 1997 and 43% in 
2003 and traditional carriers 65% in 1997 and 57% in 2003. 
Figure 7.2: Number of passengers on the London-Dublin route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
Figure 7.3: Number of departures on the London-Dublin route from 1997 to 2005 
25214
26781 26138
24318 23985
22480
20290 19586 19152
13459
13903 14407
15447
13918
14584
15127
16557
14211
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of departures per year
LCCs
Traditional carriers
 
Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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On the London-Dublin route traffic increased by 8% as a result of a strong LCC, 
Ryanair, which increased its market share from 35% in 1997 to 41% in 2000. Figures 
7.4 and 7.5 show the competitive situation between Aer Lingus and Ryanair on this 
sector. 
 
Figure 7.4: The share of seat capacity on London-
Dublin in 1997 
Figure 7.5: The share of seat capacity on London-
Dublin in 2000 
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Source: UK CAA (1997) Source: UK CAA (2000) 
 
Another busy route, London-Amsterdam, where traditional carriers occupied 90% of the 
market in 1997, was also affected by LCCs. In 2000, the market share of LCCs was 
increased by more than 50% over the previous year, reaching 30% in 2005. EasyJet’s 
market share was only 2% in 1997, but increased to 21% in 2003 and became 25% in 
2005 compared with 25% for British Airways and 26% for KLM. This shows how the 
strong European LCCs have been able to achieve an important position when competing 
with traditional carriers on a route (see Figure 7.6). 
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Figure 7.6: Number of passengers carried on London-Amsterdam from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Load factors of key players on these routes were relatively high; that of easyJet was 
about 80% and KLM maintained around 78% on the London-Amsterdam route (see 
Table 7.4.) 
Table 7.4: Average load factors of key players on the London-Amsterdam/Rotterdom route 
 1997 2000 2003 2005 
BMI British midland 73% 76% 67% 68% 
British Airways 68% 68% 68% 59% 
EasyJet 72% 80% 81% 80% 
KLM 76% 77% 78% 78% 
Transavia 67% - 70% 51% 
VLM 59% 62% 52% 55% 
Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Williams (2002) mentioned that in the initial phases of LCC development, they had 
been concentrating mainly on the London-Scotland trunk market, the London-
Edinburgh and London-Glasgow, both category 1 routes. Figure 7.7 demonstrates the 
substantial impact of LCCs on the London-Edinburgh route. Demand increased to 3.5 
million passengers in 2005 from 2.5 million in 1997, whilst the market share of 
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traditional carriers in 1997 was 97% and falling to 60% in 2000 as a result of the 
increased frequencies by LCCs. 
 
Figure 7.7: Number of passengers on London-Edinburgh from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
EasyJet gradually increased seat capacities on the London-Edinburgh route and in 2000 
provided a total of 1.7 million seats, which was more than British Airways’ supply. 
From 2003, easyJet slightly decreased frequency, while keeping high average load 
factors (80%) and a strong market share (36%) compared with the two traditional 
carriers’ share (61%). British Airways and BMI British Midland tried to maintain their 
market shares by increasing frequency and average load factors (British Airways: 68% 
in 1997, 80% in 2003) (see Figures 7.8 and 7.9). 
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Figure 7.8: Number of departures on the London-Edinburgh route 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Figure 7.9: Supplied seat capacity on London-Edinburgh from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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Figure 7.10: Number of passengers carried in the category 1 market from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Figure 7.10 shows the total number of passengers carried in the category 1 market and 
the market share growth of LCCs. It also shows that the market has not increased very 
much after 2000 compared to the beginning of deregulation. Although competition 
between traditional carriers and LCCs continued to be fierce, airlines have moved their 
focus to other route categories in order to optimise operations resource (infra, section 3 
of chapter 7). 
Another UK domestic route, the London-Liverpool/Manchester route (340 kms) in the 
category 2 market has competition with surface transportation modes like rail and 
automobile. The number of carried passengers per year was about 2 million in 1998 (see 
Figure 7.11). Traditional carriers increased frequencies on this route to compete with 
LCCs and surface transportation (see Figure 7.12). In 2000, the number of airlines on 
this route was 5 and the annual number of carried passengers was about 2.3 million, 
being shared out 10% to LCCs and 90 % to British Airways and BMI British Midland. 
Although easyJet stopped services on this route in 2003, 9 airlines including 3 LCCs 
were operating in 2005. However, average load factors on this sector were lower than 
those of other routes in the categories 1 and 2 markets (see Table 7.5). 
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Figure 7.11: Number of passengers on the London-Manchester/ Liverpool from 1998 to 2005 
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Figure 7.12: Number of departures on the London-Manchester/ Liverpool from 1998 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1998-2005) 
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Table 7.5: Average load factors of key players on the London-Manchester/Liverpool route 
 1998 2000 2003 2005 
BMI British midland 45% 76% 67% 68% 
British Airways 64% 68% 68% 59% 
EasyJet 50% 80% 81% 80% 
KLM 43% 77% 78% 78% 
Flybe  37%   
City   90%  
Ryanair   65% 59% 
VLM(Belgium)   57% 55% 
Air Berlin    69% 
Jet 2    43% 
Source: Author based on the data from UK CAA (1997-2005)  
Note: Underlined airlines names refer LCCs. 
 
On this short (340 kms) UK domestic route, the time index is about 1, which means the 
journey time of air transportation is almost the same as that of train and automobile. In 
Japan, air services on route distances of around 350-400 kms have been reduced as the 
result of the effects of the high speed rail (HSR) service, although the market of which 
the time index is 1 becomes the competition field between air transport and HSR in 
Japan. It demonstrates the competition market segment between air and HSR in Europe 
differs from that of Japan (infra, chapter 4).  
On the London-Manchester/Liverpool route, demand was increased by the entry of 
LCCs and this stimulated competition between airlines and surface transportation. By 
the further improvement of railway services including speed, punctuality, fares and 
infrastructure on this route, competition between air and surface transport will continue 
in this market. 
On the London-Madrid route (1,750 kms) of category 2, the number of passengers was 
1.2 million in 1997 and grew up to 1.7 million in 2000, i.e. 20% growth due to the LCC 
effect (see Figure 7.13). In 2000, the LCC growth rate in this market was more than 
35% over the previous year. The market share of traditional carriers was 92% in 1997 
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and dropped to 80% in 2005 compared with 20% for LCC (easyJet). However, the 
number of airlines decreased from 7 in 1997 to 4 in 2005, and traffic in the market 
actually declined between 2003 and 2005 (see Figures 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16). 
 
Figure 7.13: Number of passengers on the London-Madrid route from1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Figure 7.14: The market share (seat capacity) on 
the London-Madrid route in 1997 
Figure 7.15: The market share (seat capacity) on 
the London-Madrid route in 2003 
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Figure 7.16: The market share (seat capacity) on the 
London- Madrid route in 2005 
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7.3 Category 3 routes in the intra European market serving the 
UK and in the UK domestic market 
Air transport demand in route category 3 has been stimulated and developed by LCCs 
and Figure 7.17 shows that the market has continued to grow steadily after 2000. In 
2000, the average number of passengers carried in route category 3 was about 1.3 
million. The average number of departures per day on the UK intra-European category 
3 routes was 38 compared with 17 for the Tokyo category 3 market, which carried 
annually 2 million per sector on average using larger aircraft in 2000 (see Table 7.6). 
The category 3 market size of the intra-European rotues serving the UK and the UK 
domestic routes in 2000 was 30% greater than that of 1997 and became 17 million in 
2005 compared with 11 million in 1997. Indeed, LCCs have been expanding routes 
aggressively and traditional carriers are also trying to maintain the shares in the market. 
The intensity of competition became greater after 2002 in the category 3 market in 
Europe. In the following, selected routes in the category 3 intra-European UK markets 
are analysed in detail in order to demonstrate this competitive situation. 
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Figure 7.17: Number of passengers carried in category 3 intra-European routes serving the UK and in the 
UK domestic market 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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Table 7.6: The characteristics of category 3 intra-European and Tokyo routes in 2000 
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3 LON-ROM 1,687,365 14,116 173 3 1  5 2 69% 
3 LON-MIL 1,651,257 18,497 154 4 1  5 3 58% 
3 LON-BRU 1,493,603 23,213 136 4 0 X 5 2 52% 
3 LON-CPH 1,457,598 15,319 153 2 2  5 1 62% 
3 LON-GVA 1,456,840 14,787 157 3 1  5 1 63% 
3 LON-STO 1,417,820 13,085 165 2 1  5 3 66% 
3 LON-MUC 1,359,873 12,271 164 2 2  5 1 68% 
3 LON-BCN 1,344,631 11,152 161 3 1  5 1 75% 
3 LON-NCE 1,068,000 8,772 165 2 1 X 5 1 74% 
3 LON-ATH 1,022,995 7,340 194 4 1  5 1 72% 
3 MAN-AMS 922,370 14,033 99 4 1  4 4 58% 
3 MAN-DUB 814,322 11,359 102 3 1  4 4 70% 
 Average 1,330,263 14,035/38* 152 3 1  5 1 64% 
3 TYO-KMJ 2,025,747 7,591 15 3 0  1 1 65% 
3 TYO-HKD 2,282,289 5,308 430 2 0  1 1 61% 
3 TYO-KMI 2,397,259 7,633 314 3 0  1 1 55% 
3 TYO-NGS 2,482,450 7,090 350 3 0  1 1 61% 
3 TYO-OKI 742,381 3,272 227 1 0  1 1 69% 
3 TYO-TKM 1,696,476 5,805 292 2 0  1 1 69% 
3 TYO-MYJ 2,022,223 6,374 317 2 0  1 1 64% 
3 TYO-OIT 2,048,200 7,260 282 3 0  1 1 63% 
 Average 2,007,815 6,292/17* 319 2 0  1 1 63% 
 
Source: Author based on the data from UK CAA (2000) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation 
statistics (2000) 
Note: * The number of departures per day 
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On the London-Rome route, the market was stimulated by competition between 
Traditional carriers and LCCs. In 1997 when easyJet entered this route, the number of 
passengers carried by the 5 Traditional carriers was 1.3 million per year. After 
Ryanair’s entry in 2001, competition was accelerated and the number of passengers 
carried by LCCs was increased by 102% over the previous year compared with a 20% 
decline for traditional carriers. Although demand dropped temporarily in 2002 because 
BMI British Midland stopped services on this route, two LCCs further stimulated 
demand on this market pair and the number of passengers carried by LCCs was 0.84 
million in 2005, representing 42% of the market. While traditional carriers (British 
Airways and Alitalia) saw their share decrease until 2003, they attempted to compete 
with LCCs and stop their expansion on this route, resulting in a stabilisation of market 
shares (see Figures 7.18 and 7.19). This route is characterised as experiencing severe 
competition between traditional carriers and LCCs. 
 
Figure 7.18: Number of passengers on the London-Rome route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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Figure 7.19: Supplied seat capacity on the London-Rome route from 1998 to 2005 
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Figure 7.20 demonstrates the significant impact of LCCs on the London-Barcelona 
route. In 1997 the number of passengers on this route was only 0.8 million carried by 6 
airlines including one LCC, easyJet. EasyJet had been developing demand at a 13%-
18% growth rate every year and shared 45% of the market, which was 1.7 million in 
2002. The number of passengers carried by LCCs (easyJet and Ryanair) increased by 
45% over the previous year after the entry of Ryanair in 2003 and total demand rose to 
2.5 million passengers, which was carried by 2 traditional carriers (British Airways and 
Iberia and 2 LCCs (easyJet and Ryanair) (see Figure 7.21). In 2005 the LCCs’ growth 
dropped by 7% over the previous year compared with a 1% increase for traditional 
carriers. The London-Barcelona market was expanded by 16% per annum from 1997 to 
2003. However, the significant growth which was observed in 5 years from 1997 
seemed to abate from 2004, similar to the London-Rome routes. Four airlines, including 
2 LCCs, survived on this route and all of them are trying to maintain the market share 
on this fiercely competitive market pair. 
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Figure 7.20: Number of passengers on the London-Barcelona route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Figure 7.21: Supplied seat capacity on the London-Barcelona route from 1998 to 2005 
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Another popular holiday route, the London-Nice market was also stimulated by LCCs. 
The number of passengers was increased from 0.66 million in 1997 to 1.3 million in 
2005 due to easyJet’s active expansion on this route (see Figure 7.22). It was increased 
by 30% per annum at high load factors until 2002. After the market was shared out 
50/50 to both traditional carriers and easyJet in 2003, the number of passengers carried 
by traditional carriers in 2005 was about 4% higher compared to 1997 (see Table 7.7 
and Figure 7.23). 
 
Figure 7.22: Number of passengers on the London-Nice route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
Table 7.7: Average load factors on the London-Nice route 
Airline 1997 1998 2000 2003 2005 
AB Airline  53%    
BMI British midland 75% 62% 63% 60% 71% 
British Airways 73% 74% 73% 71% 74% 
EasyJet 70% 69% 79% 77% 82% 
Average 73% 72% 72% 70% 76% 
Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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Figure 7.23: Supplied seat capacity on the London-Nice from 1998 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1998-2005) 
7.4 Categories 4 and 5 routes in the intra-European market 
serving UK and the UK domestic market 
The routes of which the number of carried passengers is less than 1 million are 
categorised as categories 4 and 5 in this study. Most intra-European routes serving the 
UK and many UK domestic market pairs fall in to one of these categories. For example, 
97% of the 656 intra-European routes serving UK and the UK domestic market belong 
to these categories 4 and 5, excluding 22 routes of categories 1, 2 and 3. In this analysis, 
the routes with less than 1 million, but more than 0.7 million passengers per year, are 
categorised as category 4. Other small markets are categorised as category 5 according 
to the category scale of the Tokyo market analysis. Like the categories 4 and 5 markets 
on the Tokyo routes, the markets of the routes in categories 4 and 5 were so dynamic 
that the market scale was changed dramatically in a year, e.g. the London-Malaga route. 
This phenomenon is more prevalent on the intra-European routes serving UK and the 
UK domestic market than in Japan. This dynamic power is a characteristic of the intra-
European routes serving the UK and the UK domestic routes and has a substantial 
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impact on the market. In order to demonstrate these characteristics, several routes are 
chosen from categories 4 and 5 routes and analysed as follows (see Tables 7.8 and 7.9). 
 
Table 7.8: Examples of category 4 intra-European and Tokyo routes in 2000 
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4 LON-OSL 949,168 10,595 149 3 1  5 1 60% 
4 LON-ABZ 936,020 8,661 157 1 2  5 1 69% 
4 LON-LIS 854,767 7,002 169 2 1  5 1 72% 
4 LON-AGP 847,496 6,550 162 3 2  5 1 80% 
4 LON-DUS 875,695 14,548 131 4 0  5 1 55% 
4 LON-VIE 781,092 7,363 166 4 0  5 1 64% 
4 LON-HAM 753,995 10,620 125 3 2  5 2 57% 
4 LON-ORK 752,358 6,806 142 2 2  5 1 78% 
4 LON-NCL 725,146 8,855 122 3 1 X 5 1 67% 
 Average 830,637 9,000/25* 147 3 1  5 1 67% 
           
4 TYO-AXT 882,392 4,727 309 2 0 X 1 1 61% 
4 TYO-TOY 872,164 4,205 298 1 0  1 1 70% 
4 TYO-UBE 670,223 3,627 275 1 0 X 1 1 67% 
4 TYO-TKS 807,927 5,093 262 2 0  1 1 61% 
4 TYO-KCZ 861,112 5,637 247 3 0  1 1 62% 
4 TYO-ASJ 735,004 4,783 269 2 0  1 1 57% 
4 TYO-AOJ 978,419 5,783 260 2 0 X 1 1 65% 
4 TYO-KUH 530,870 3,758 246 2 0  1 1 58% 
 Average 792,264 4,703/13* 270 1.8 0  1 1 62% 
Source: Author based on data from the UK CAA (2000) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation 
statistics (2000) 
Note:* Number of departures per day 
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Table 7.9: Examples of category 5  intra-European and Tokyo routes in 2000 
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5 LON-BER 696,257 6,826 165 3 1  5 3 62% 
5 LON-VCE 638,094 6,594 154 1 2  5 1 63% 
5 LON-STR 376,419 5,023 161 3 0  5 1 53% 
5 LON-PSA 380,432 3,125 163 2 1  5 2 74% 
5 LON-MME 157,962 2,174 117 2 1  5 1 62% 
 Average 449,833 4,748/13* 152 2 1  5 2 63% 
           
5 TYO-YGJ 364,843 2,867 127 1 0 X 1 1 61% 
5 TYO-IZO 498,303 3,078 162 1 0  1 1 68% 
5 TYO-MMB 498,760 3,078 162 3 0 X 3 1 57% 
5 TYO-OBO 523,311 2,895 181 2 0  3 1 62% 
5 TYO-SYO 366,093 2,163 169 1 0  1 1 69% 
5 TYO-TTJ 331,490 2,188 152 1 0  1 1 64% 
5 TYO-KKJ 158,818 1,946 82 1 0 X 1 1 61% 
5 TYO-MSJ 430,397 2,836 152 1 0  1 1 58% 
5 TYO-SHM 142,962 1,856 77 1 0  1 1 56% 
5 TYO-ONJ 106,702 1,248 85 1 0  1 1 57% 
5 TYO-HSG 166,030 1,458 114 1 0  1 1 59% 
5 TYO-WKJ 155,327 1,014 153 1 0  1 1 59% 
5 TYO-SHB 109,672 1,437 76 1 0  1 1 50% 
5 TYO-GAJ 72,258 728 99 1 0  1 1 58% 
5 TYO-IWJ 102,083 1,447 71 1 0  1 1 43% 
 Average 268,470 2,016/6* 124 1 0  1 1 59% 
Source: Author baed on data from   UK CAA (2000) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation 
statistics (2000) 
Note: * Number of departures per day 
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Several routes in the category 5 market have grown extensively due to competition 
between traditional carriers and LCCs even after 2003. This is particularly the case on 
the routes serving the destinations which have multiple alternative airports. Figures 7.24 
and 7.25 show the dynamic competitive developments on the London-Berlin route of 
category 5. In 1997, the annual number of carried passengers was 0.5 million on this 
route, of which 86% were flown by the traditional carriers. Traffic dropped by 7% in 
1998 as a result of a LCC exiting this route. However, the following year demand 
increased by 35% over the previous year when Eurowings entered this market. In 2000, 
while this market became occupied only by the traditional carriers again, the number of 
passengers carried reached 0.69 million. In the following year, demand increased due to 
the new entrant, Air Berlin. The LCCs’ market share grew to 47% when Ryanair 
entered in 2003 and increased to 63% with the entry of easyJet in 2004. The number of 
passengers carried increased to 1 million in 2005, although the growth rate of the 
traditional carriers over the previous year had been negative since 2003. Two strong 
LCCs (Ryanair and easyJet) and the Berlin-based new entrant, Air Berlin expanded the 
market on the London-Berlin route of category 5, while the Traditional carriers set up 
the traditional carriers’ LCC subsidiaries (Germanwing and Go fly) in order to compete 
with strong LCCs. 
Figure 7.24: Number of passengers on the London-Berlin route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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Table 7.10 shows the change of average load factors on this route, which were very low 
in 1997 compared to those of 2005, and demonstrates that airlines with high load factors 
ultimately survived. 
Figure 7.25: The market share on the London-Berlin route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
Table 7.10: Average load factors on London-Berlin route 
Airline 1997 2000 2003 2004 2005 
AB Airlines 33%     
Air Berlin   62% 62% 67% 
Augsburg Airways GMBH   74%   
British Airways 61% 65% 73% 77% 74% 
Deutsche BA 49%  31% 24%  
easyJet    81% 79% 
Eurowings   44%   
KLM  60% 48%   
Lufthansa 62%     
Ryanair   77% 79% 84% 
Virgin Express Ireland  55%    
Average 51% 60% 58% 65% 76% 
Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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The London- Pisa /Florence route is another example of a category 5 market. Pisa and 
Florence are located in Tuscany, Italy, an attractive popular holiday destination with a 
population of 2.2 million in the 1 hour drive time catchment area from Pisa airport and a 
relatively strong economic background. Local regional GDP per capita was USD 27,615 
in 2003, which was larger than that of Osaka (USD 25,714) and Berlin (USD 25,270). 
The market was stimulated by an LCC (Ryanair) and traffic tripled in 8 years as a result. 
The number of passengers carried was only 0.2 million in 1997 and grew by 30% over 
the previous year in 2000 and increased to 0.6 million in 2005 (see Figure 7.26). 
 
Figure 7.26: Number of passengers on the London-Pisa/ Florence route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
Figure 7.27 demonstrates the market growth of Ryanair and the decline in this market of 
Alitalia, the Italian flag carrier. The average load factor of Alitalia was only 51% 
compared with 73% of British Airways and 77% of Ryanair during 1997 to 2005. 
Ryanair built its market presence in Pisa by establishing an operatingbase at Pisa airport 
in 2005. 
 
Chapter 7: Comparative analysis between the Tokyo routes and a selection of routes in the intra-European market  
- 156 - 
Figure 7.27: Supplied seat capacity on the London-Pisa/Florence route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
 
By contrast, on the London-Stuttgart route, a business route between Germany and the 
UK in category 5, the market had been dominated by the traditional carriers, such as 
British Airways and Lufthansa (see Figure 7.28). Although the number of passengers 
had been increasing from 1997 to 2000 as a result of economic growth and of 
deregulation, demand decreased from 2000 until 2003. BMI British Midland stopped air 
services on this route following its strategy change which involved switching routes to 
sun destinations in 2003. On the other hand Lufthansa established its LCC subsidiary, 
Germanwings in 2002 and expanded its share by utilising its Stuttgart-based LCC from 
2003 to compete with British Airways on this market pair (see Figure 7.29). The market 
share on the relatively small size business route is subsidised by the traditional carrier’s 
LCC to compete with other traditional carriers. Interestingly, this characteristic is very 
similar to that of Japanese market and Japanese traditional carriers’ reactions such as on 
the Tokyo-Asahikawa and Miyazaki routes. However, the demographic and economic 
backgrounds are totally different between the London-Stuttgart route and the Tokyo-
Asahikawa and Miyazaki routes. The population in the Stuttgart area (1 hour drivetime 
catchment) was more than 5.2 million in 2000 compared with 1.6 million in Miyazaki 
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and the local regional GDP per capita of the Stuttgart case was USD 35,097 contrasted 
with USD 19,839 in the Japanese case. 
Figure 7.28: Number of passengers on the London-Stuttgart route from 1997 to 2005 
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Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
Figure 7.29: Supplied seat capacity on the London-Stuttgart route from 1997 to 2005 
bmi british midland
British Airways
germanwings / Eurowings
Lufthansa
0.00
100,000.00
200,000.00
300,000.00
400,000.00
500,000.00
600,000.00
700,000.00
800,000.00
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Source: UK CAA (1997-2005) 
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7.5 Summary 
The growth of the intra-European air transport market serving the UK and the 
substantial impact of LCCs has been demonstrated in this chapter. These results are 
summarised and compared with the Tokyo routes in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. The analysis 
shows that given the significant size of the Tokyo market the routes are operated by 
large aircraft at lower frequency compared to the intra-European market serving the 
UK. The average number of airlines operating on the intra-European routes serving the 
UK varies between 4 and 6 compared with 1 to 4 in Japan. In particular, the impact of 
LCCs on the market is prominent in Europe while in Japan it has been very limited (c.f. 
supra, chapter 6). Moreover, the number of airports at the destinations is totally 
different between the intra-European and Tokyo markets. It is clear that the airport 
system consisting of 5 airports in London area has provided significant opportunities to 
stimulate demand in the intra-European market. In Europe, the category 1 market was 
developed extensively until 2000 by the effects of competition between traditional 
carriers and LCCs as a result of deregulation. While both types of airline had continued 
competing in the busy category 1 market, the focus of competition shifted to the 
category 2 market from 2000. Moreover, competition was extended to the categories 3, 
4 and 5 markets in order to optimise the operational resources and expand any 
possibilities to survive in the market. This has been demonstrated clearly since 2002. 
 
In particular, as a result of competition the reactions of airlines to reduce or increase 
supply on the route in attempting to keep very high load factors is very sensitive 
compared to that of Japan. The intra-European routes serving the UK are very 
responsive to changes in demand because airlines, especially LCCs, have chosen 
destinations which have enough potential to develop the market. Among the categories 
4 and 5 markets, on the London-Oslo (population: 1.5 million, GDP per capita: USD 
67,254), the London-Pisa/Florence and the London-Stuttgart routes, demand was 
stimulated significantly by competition among airlines. This is demonstrated by the 
year-on-year percentage changes in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. All of the categories in the 
intra-European market serving UK increased from 2000, whereas there was negative 
growth in 2003 on the Tokyo routes except category 1 routes. 
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Table 7.11: Average demand and supply change by market category in the intra-European routes serving UK and Tokyo routes in 2000 
% change over the previous 
year 
% change over 1997  
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Intra-European routes serving UK   
 
             
1 3,440,947 34,760/95 142 5 4 1.6 1 5 1 1% 4% 1% 3% 1% 18% 16% 2% 70% 
2 2,018,495 20,281/56 155 5 2.6 1.4 1 5 2 5% 11% 8% 3% 5% 31% 37% -4% 65% 
3 1,330,263 14,035/38 152 12 4 2 2 4 2 3% 7% 4% 4% 3% 31% 28% 2% 64% 
4 821,241 8,555/23 147 9 3 1 2 5 1 5% 6% 3% 0% 5% 36% 39% 2% 66% 
                   
TYO routes    
 
             
1 6,269,214 7,591/21 315 4 3 0.5 2 1 1 9.5% 6.8% 8% -1% 33% 22% 26% -2% 65% 
2 2,151,198 5,308/15 430 4 3 0 2 1 1 17% 8% 14% -5% 29% 21% 22% 0% 61% 
3 1,256,580 7,633/21 314 8 2 0 0 1 1 7% 4% 4% 0% 9% 8% 7% 0% 55% 
4 792,259 7,090/19 350 8 2 0 3 1 1 6.7% 6.6% 3% 6% 12% 6% 10% -4% 61% 
5 268,603 3,272/9 227 15 1 0  1 1 5.6% -0.2% 4% -6% -8% -4% -3% -6% 69% 
Source: UK CAA (1997-2000) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2000), Note: The intra-European routes serving UK includes the UK domestic 
market. 
Chapter 7: Comparative analysis between the Tokyo routes and a selection of routes in the intra-European market  
- 160 - 
Table 7.12: Average demand and supply change by market category in the inter European and Tokyo routes in 2003 
% change over the previous 
year 
% change over 1997   
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Inter EU routes                
 
 
1 3,568,846 34,422/94 141 3 1.4  5 1 -3% 0% -2% 2% 10% 22% 15% 6% 
 
73% 
2 1,988,607 19,625/54 144 2.6 1.6  5 2 -2% 2% -4% 6% 29% 29% 24% 4% 
 
71% 
3 1,429,982 13,676/37 148    5 2 2% 6% 6% 1% 24% 40% 25% 12% 
 
70% 
4 917,732 8,375/23 150    5 1 2% 5% 4% 1% 25% 51% 29% 19% 
 
73% 
                 
 
 
TYO routes                
 
 
1 7,051,704 25,271/ 432 3.5 0.5 X 1 1 1.2% 0.7% 1.2% -4% 54% 37% 47% -6% 
 
65% 
2 2078,872  10,675 306 3 0 X 1 1 -1.3% -3.2% -7.7% -4% 51% 21% 30% -6% 
 
65% 
3 1,358,999 8,051 268 2 0  1 1 -3% -3% -7.5% -1% 42% 21% 24% -5% 
 
64% 
4 843,144 5,100 258 2 0  1 1 -4% -1.5% -7% -6% 27% 15% 24% -7% 
 
64% 
5 243,702 2,023 190 1 0  1 1 1% 1% -1.7% -1% -21% -15% -15% -2% 
 
64% 
Source: UK CAA (1997-2004) and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (1997-2004)  
Note: The intra-European routes serving UK includes the UK domestic market. 
Chapter 7: Comparative analysis between the Tokyo routes and a selection of routes in the intra-European market  
- 161 - 
The demographic and economic background of the market is relatively smaller on the 
Tokyo routes compared with the intra-European routes serving the UK. Table 7.13 
shows the population and local regional GDP per capita of the destinations studied in 
the previous analysis. According to this data in each airport’s catchment area, the 
catchment size of Edinburgh (category 1) is almost the same as Hiroshima (category 2) 
and Dublin (category 1) is similar to Komatsu (category 2). Both the Tokyo-Hiroshima 
and Komatsu routes have expanded the markets because of the large catchment size and 
strong economic activities. In addition, Berlin (category 5) has a similar catchment size 
and GDP per capita as Fukuoka (category 1). It evidenced potential demand on the 
London-Berlin route. 
 
More than half of category 5 routes in the Tokyo market are the same size as the 
London-Durham market. The number of passengers carried per year is around 0.1 to 
0.15 million. The population in the catchment area was less than 1 million compared to 
2.2 million in Durham in 2003 although GDP per capita was similar at USD 21,000 per 
year. For example, Skymark airlines entered the Tokyo-Aomori 28 and Tokyo-
Tokushima 29  route, where the market sizes were smaller than that of the London-
Durham (see Table 7.13). In addition, the Tokyo-Aomori routes have competition 
between air transport and HSR since 2002.  Therefore, Skymark and other airlines 
added too much capacity to this type of markets (c.f. chapter 9, section 9.4). 
 
Three outstanding results of liberalisation in the Tokyo route market were found as a 
result of the study in chapter 6: (1) decreased demand, (2) increased fares and (3) new 
entrant failures. Two of those results, decreased demand and the insignificant impact of 
new entrants in the Tokyo route market, were demonstrated in the comparative analysis 
of this chapter 7. The results also show that the difference in the number of airports 
serving routes is also significant. Moreover, airlines in Europe are very responsive in 
order to optimise operational resources by adjusting supply and frequency as a result of 
competition. Furthermore, it was highlighted that on most of the Tokyo routes, air 
services are carrying larger number of passengers, even though the demographic and 
                                                     
28 The population in Aomori was 1.5 million and GDP per capita was USD18, 259 in 2003. 
29 The population in Tokushima was 0.8 and GDP per capita was USD24, 049 in 2003. 
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economic activities are lower than those of the intra-European market serving the UK. 
Indeed, there is a huge gap between the level of the market size and the demographic 
/economic activities surrounding the airport region in Japan compared with the intra-
European market. Moreover, some of the Tokyo routes have experienced competition 
with HSR. 
By investigating the aforementioned differences, it can be seen that the three results of 
liberalisation in the Tokyo route market are caused by several constraining factors for 
competition in Japan. 
 
To demonstrate and confirm the unique situation in Japan after liberalisation, an 
analysis based on Structural Equation Modelling is conducted in chapter 8 using the 
factors which have been studied in chapters 4 and 6. In the following chapter 9, these 
constraints on competition and their inter relationship are specified and analysed. 
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Table 7.13: Population and local regional GDP per capita of the destinations by category 
C
at
eg
or
y 
City Airport 
Population 
(60 min drive 
catchment 
area) 
Local regional 
GDP Capita 
(USD, 2003) C
at
eg
or
y 
Airport/ 
Prefecture 
Population 
Local regional 
GDP Capita 
(USD, 2003) 
1 London LHR 12,066,568 44,038 1 Tokyo 12,310,000 36,069 
1  LTN 9,547,987 44,038 1 Osaka 8,820,000 25,714 
1  LGW 9,270,310 44,038 1 Fukuoka 5,050,000 22,223 
1  STN 5,884,688 44,038 1 Sapporo 5,660,000 21,513 
1 Paris CDG 11,671,408 43,477 1 Okinawa 1,350,000 17,261 
1  ORY 11,671,408 43,477     
1 Amsterdam AMS 7,698,652 37,750     
1 Edinburgh EDI 2,757,934 28,317     
1 Glasgow GLA 2,582,350 26,905     
1 Dublin DUB 2,128,370 42,229     
2 Frankfurt FRA 6,375,426 34,441 2 Hiroshima 2,880,000 24,083 
2 
Manchester & 
Liverpool MAN/LPL 7,691,377/5,649,887 27,401/21,454 2 Kagoshima 1,770,000 
18,926 
2 Madrid MAD 4,865,976 26,772 2 Komatsu 1,180,000 24,117 
2 Zurich & Basel BSL 4,217,248 40,477     
2 Belfast BFS 1,692,500 23,339     
3 Milan LIN 7,559,893 32,153 3 Kumamoto 1,850,000 20,473 
3  BGY 7,116,088 32,153 3 Nagasaki 1,500,000 18,487 
3  MXP 6,002,178 32,153 3 Matsuyama 1,480,000 19,645 
3 Barcelona BCN 4,575,632 24,410 3 Oita 1,220,000 22,375 
3 Rome CIA 3,596,698 29,087 3 Miyazaki 1,160,000 19,839 
3  FCO 3,596,698 29,087 3 Takamatsu 1,020,000 22,392 
3 Munich MUC 3,384,553 41,589     
3 Copenhagen CPH 2,600,000 38,315     
3 Stockholm ARN 2,400,000 44,654     
3  NYO 2,400,000 44,654     
3  VST 2,400,000 44,654     
3 Geneva GVA 1,805,010 40,477     
4 Hamburg & Lubeck HAM/LBC 3,804,404/2,571604 29,804/25,884 4 Yamaguchi 1,510,000 23,846 
4 Athens ATH 3,761,810 16,417 4 Aomori 1,460,000 18,259 
4 Lisbon LIS 3,500,000 20,527 4 Akita 1,170,000 19,806 
4 Vienna VIE/BTS 2,745,149/2,753,000 43,048/13,301 4 Toyama 1,120,000 25,562 
4 Pisa & Florence PSA 2,271,306 27,615 4 Tokushima 820,000 24,049 
4 Newcastle NCL 2,058,840 24,865 4 Kochi 810,000 18,918 
4 Nice NCE 1,539,362 26,219 4 Kushiro  21,513 
4 Oslo OSL/TRF 1,500,000/600,000 67,254/30,971     
4 Malaga AGP 986,193 15,393 5 
Nanki 
shirahama 1,060,000  
4 Cork ORK 400,000 42,229 5 Izumo 750,000  
4 Aberdeen ABZ 331,846 37,800 5 Iwami 750,000  
5 Stuttgart STR 5,226,640 35,097 5 Yonago 610,000  
5 Berlin SXF 4,683,110 25,270 5 Tottori 610,000  
5  TXL 4,477,950 25,270     
5  THF 4,470,595 25,270     
5 Venice VCE 2,938,129 28,437     
5 Durham Tees Valley MME 2,248,975 21,123     
Source: Author based on data from Eurostat (2003) and Ministry of Internal affairs (2000 and 2003)
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Chapter 8: Structural equation modelling analysis of 
the Tokyo routes market 
In this eighth chapter, Structural Equation Modelling is conducted in order to 
demonstrate and confirm the results of the analyses in chapters 4 and 6. This chapter 
aims to investigate the relationship between factors, which are discovered as key 
determinants of the structure of the Tokyo domestic air transport market in Japan. 
Structural Equation Modelling and its mechanism is explained using the relevant 
literature30 in sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
8.1 Structural Equation Modelling 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a relatively new and sophisticated technique 
that allows the testing of various models to ascertain the interrelationships among a set 
of variables. Based on multiple regression and factor analytic techniques, it allows the 
importance of each independent variable in the model to be evaluated and the overall fit 
of the model to the data to be tested, as well as comparison of alternative models 
(Pallant, 2002). In other words, SEM uses various types of models to represent 
relationships among observed variables, with the same basic objective of providing a 
quantitative test of a theoretical model hypothesized by a researcher. Various theoretical 
models can be tested in SEM that hypothesise how sets of variables define constructs 
and how these constructs are related to each other (Schumacher and Lomax, 2004). 
Factors have been used both as independent variables and dependent variables in the 
literature modelling the effects of air transport liberalisation (c.f. supra, chapter 1 and 
appendices A and B). In Structural Equation Modelling, it is quite unique that all the 
observed variables, which are used in regression modelling equations, are considered as 
independent variables. In this way, it can show the relationship between variables in the 
model in order to suggest the fitness of the hypothesised theory. 
 
                                                     
30 Kano and Miura (2003), Kojima (2004),  Schumacher and Lomax (2004), Tabachnich and Findel (2001) and 
Toyoda  (2004) 
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Tabachnick et al (2001) described SEM modelling as the combination of exploratory 
factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. She explained this relationship using 
the following example of a simple model of multiple regression and Structural equation 
modelling (see Figure 8.1). All four of the measured variables in the boxes are 
connected by lines with arrows. The score of the entrance exam, gender, and caffeine 
(the independent variables) predict the graduate school success of students. A line with 
two arrows refers to a correlation between the independent variables. The residual 
shows imperfect prediction. 
 
Figure 8.1: Path diagram of multiple regression 
  
Score of 
Exam   
Gender   
  
Average daily caffeine 
consumption 
   
  
School 
Graduate 
Success 
 
 
Residual  
 
Source:  Tabachnick et al (2001) 
Note: This model estimates and examines the relationship between variables (the score of the entrance examination, 
gender of students and average daily caffeine consumption) and the Students’ school graduate success  
 
In SEM, measured variables which are called “observed variables” and “indicators” are 
represented by squares or rectangles. Factors that have two or more indicators are called 
“latent variables” or “unobserved variables” and are represented by circles or ovals. A 
relationship between variables is indicated by lines; the lack of a line connecting 
variables implies that no direct relationship has been hypothesised. A line with one 
arrow represents a hypothesised direct relationship between two variables, and a line 
with two arrows represents a correlation relationship between two variables. The 
variable with the arrow pointing to it is the dependent variable. Latent variables (latent 
factors) are variables that are not directly observable or measured. They are deduced 
from a set of measurable variables, which are called “observed variables”. A regression 
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model consists only of observed variables where a single dependent observed variable is 
predicted or explained by one or more independent observed variables. 
 
 Figure 8.2: Path diagram of structural modelling 
 
Source: Using multivariate statistics (Tabachnick et al, 2001) 
Note: The latent variables or unobserved variables are represented by circles or ovals, the observed variables by 
squares or rectangles. “e”  and “d” represent “ errors “ or residuals. 
 
Tabachnick illustrates SEM using the path diagram in Figure 8.2, in which “Success in 
Graduate School” is a latent variable that is predicted by gender (measured variable) 
and under graduate success (a factor). The construct factor predicts measurement 
variables. The Graduate School Success drives or creates the Number of publications, 
Grades or Faculty evaluations. The construct factor is not measurable, so it is obtained 
by measuring many observed variables which is a similar logic to factor analysis. 
“Gender” and “Undergraduate success” are independent variables in the model while 
the others are all dependent variables. 
In the following section, the mechanism of SEM is explained using Schumacher and 
Lomax’s examples. 
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8.2 The mechanism of Structural Equation Modelling  
The idea behind SEM is that a hypothesised model has a set of underlying parameters 
which correspond to (1) the regression coefficients, and (2) the variance and 
covariances of the independent variables in the model. These parameters are estimated 
from the sample data to be “best guesses” about population values. The estimated 
parameters are then combined by means of covariance algebra to produce an estimated 
population covariance matrix. This estimated covariance matrix is compared with the 
sample covariance matrix and, ideally, the difference is very small and not statistically 
significant. 
 
The structured population covariance matrix  ≈    the sample covariance matrix. 
 
Covariance algebra is used for calculating variance and covariance in SEM models. It 
shows how parameter estimates are combined to produce an estimated population 
covariance matrix for a small sample. The following are the important equations of 
SEM. 
Equation 8-1 The important equations of SEM 
 
1. COV (C, X 1 ) = 0                                                                                                  (8.1) 
2. ),( 21 XXcCOV = ),( 21 XXcCOV                                                                     (8.2) 
3. ),( 321 XXXCOV + = ),( 31 XXCOV + ),( 32 XXCOV                                 (8.3) 
In words, 
1. The covariance between a variable and a constant is zero. 
2. The covariance between two variables where one is multiplied by a constant is the 
same as the constant multiplied by the covariance between the two variables. 
3. The covariance between the sum (or difference) of two variables and a third variable 
is the sum of the covariance of the first variable and the third and the covariance of 
the second variable and the third. In SEM, as in multiple regressions, we assume 
that the residuals do not correlate with each other or with other variables in the 
models. 
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A simple example of the covariance algebra of structural equation modelling is now 
explained using the Tabachnick model. 
Figure 8.3: The example of path diagram 
 
 
 
 
γ
 
γ 21
β 21
X 1 
Y1 
Y2
ε 1
ε 2a 
b 
c
 
Equation 8.2 The structural model equation 1 
Y1 = εγ 111 1+X                                                                                                          (8.4) 
Y2 = εγβ 22121 11 ++ XY                                                                                           (8.5) 
The covariance between X1 and Y1 is computed as follows. 
Cov (X1, Y1) = COV (X1, εγ 111 1+X )                                          
            = COV(x1, 1
11
xγ ) + COV(x1,ε 1 )           
            =COV (x1, 1
11
xγ ) = )1,1(11 XXCOVγ                                                            (8.6) 
   , where γ 11 is the path coefficient of X and COV (X1, X1) is the variance of X1. 
Q As there are no covariance between errors and other variables, COV(x1,ε 1 ) = 0 
COV (Y1, Y2) = COV ( εγ 111 1+X , εγβ 22121 11 ++ XY ) 
            =COV ( 11
2111
YX βγ ) + COV ( XX 121111 γγ ) + COV ( εγ 2111 X )  
             + COV ( Y 1211βε ) + COV ( X 1211γε ) + COV ( εε 21 ) 
             = COV ( 11
2111
YX βγ ) + COV ( XX 121111 γγ )                                         (8.7) 
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Because the error terms ε 1 and ε 2  do not correlate with any other variables.31 
All of the estimated covariances in the model could be derived in the same manner; but 
as is apparent, even in this small example, covariance algebra can be used to estimate 
parameters and then a population covariance matrix estimated from them. Estimated 
parameters provide us the estimated population covariance matrix. 
The structural model given by Equation.8.4 and 8.5 can be represented in matrix form 
as: 
Equation 8.3 The structural model equation in matrix form 
    


+






+


=



ζ
ζβγ
γ
2
1
2
1
21
1
21
11
2
1
0
00
y
y
xy
y
 
 
     ζ+Β+Γ= yxy                                                                                                       (8.8) 
 
   where  y is a p x 1 vector of observed endogenous variables 
           x is a q x 1 vector of observed exogenous variables 
          Β is a p x p coefficient matrix that relates endogenous variables to each other 
          Γ is a p x p coefficient matrix that relates endogenous variables to endogenous  
variables 
          ζ is a p x 1 vector of disturbance terms where 
          ϕ=)(yCOV  is the  p x p covariance matrix of the disturbance terms 
          φ=)(XCOV , the q x q covariance matrix for exogenous variables 
          
    The elements of Β  and Γ  represent the structural relationships among the variables. 
8.3 The process of Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
Findel (2001) stated that SEM is a confirmatory technique in contrast to exploratory 
factor analysis. It is used most often to test the theory which is already acknowledged 
                                                     
31 Note: COV ( εε 21 ) = 0 
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by evidence. Therefore, previous knowledge or hypotheses about potential relationships 
among variables are required for SEM analysis. This is the major difference between 
SEM and other multivariate statistical techniques. Thus, planning driven by theory and 
estimation of parameters are essential to any SEM analysis. 
In this section, the process of SEM analysis is described using Schumacher and 
Lomax’s diagram. 
Figure 8.4: Diagram of the Conventional approach to Structural Equation Modelling 
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Discussions
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of Fitness 
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Source Schumacher and Lomax (2004) 
8.3.1 STEPS 1 and 2: Theory and model specification, hypothesised model 
The researcher specifies a model that should be confirmed with variance-covariance 
data. The goal is to determine the best possible model that generates the sample 
covariance matrix. The sample covariance matrix S implies some underlying, yet 
unknown theoretical model or covariance structure. The researcher needs prior research 
and theories to choose among reasonable explanations and specify a model, ie, to 
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develop an implied theoretical model (model specification). The exclusion of important 
or inclusion of unimportant variables will produce implied models that are miss-
specified. A miss-specified model may result in biased parameter estimates and 
estimates that are systematically different from the true model. This bias is known as 
specification error, so that a more appropriately specified model may be evaluated in the 
model modification process. The identification is required to be investigated before the 
estimation of parameters in SEM on the basis of the sample data contained in the 
sample covariance matrix S and the theoretical model implied by the population 
covariance matrix∑. 
8.3.2 STEP 3: Sample size and assessment of fitness 
Sufficient sample size is needed to estimate parameters and determine model fit given 
the specific theoretical relationships among the latent variables in SEM. A saturated 
model with p variables has p (p+3)/2 free parameters. For example, with 10 observed 
variables, 10(10+3)/2 = 65 free parameters. If the sample size is small, then there is not 
enough information to estimate parameters in the saturated model for a large number of 
variables. The chi-square fit statistic and derived statistics such as Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC) and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) cannot be 
computed. In addition, the fit of the independence model is required to calculate other 
fit indices such as the comparative fit index (CFI) and the normal fit index (NFI). SEM 
is based on covariances. Parameter estimates and chi-square tests of fit are also very 
sensitive to sample size. Therefore, the literature suggests inspecting the determinants of 
the covariance matrix. An extremely small determinant may indicate a problem with 
multi-collinearity or singularity. After model estimation, the residuals should be small 
and centred around zero. The frequency distribution of the residual covariances should 
be symmetric. In the confirmatory approach a specific theoretical model is 
hypothesised, data are gathered, tested for significance and checked whether they are 
acceptable or not. Only a limited number of theoretically different models are tested to 
determine which model the data fits best. A Chi-square difference test is then conducted 
to compare each of the alternative models. The aim of generating the model is to find a 
model that fits the data well statiscally, but that also should have practical and 
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theoretical meaning. The following are the two criteria used in judging the statistical 
significance and substantive meaning of a theoretical model as found in the literature. 
 
1. The non-statistical significance of the chi-square test and the root-mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA) values, are widely used fit measures. The chi-square 
test indicates that the sample covariance matrix and the reproduced model-implied 
covariance-matrix are similar. An RMSEA value less than or equal to .05 is 
considered a good fit model. More than 1 is not acceptable. 
2. The statistical significance of individual parameter estimates for the paths in the 
model, which are critical values (CR) computed by dividing the parameter estimates 
by their respective standard errors as a t-value. A tabled t-value of 1.96 at the 0.05 
level of significance is commonly used. 
8.3.3 Model modification and discussion 
If the theoretical model is not as strong as one would like, then the next step is to 
modify the model and evaluate the new modified model. In order to determine how to 
modify the model, there are a number of procedures available for discovering 
specification errors. By doing this, properly specified models may be evaluated. During 
these processes, it is meaningful to know how the default model is modified and then 
compare the results of alternative modified models. This is the most different 
characteristic of Structural Equation Modelling compared to other multivariate 
statistical analysis. 
In the following section, SEM analysis of the Tokyo routes is undertaken. 
8.4 Structural Equation Modelling analysis of the Tokyo routes 
8.4.1 Background of the model 
The Tokyo market has been changed during the process of deregulation. The 
relationship between influencing factors has been revealed as one of the outstanding 
features of air transport deregulation in much of the literature. Based on the analysis of 
the Tokyo routes in chapter 6 which focused on these factors, the results were 
summarised in Tables 6.20 and 6.21 (supra, chapter 6). In chapters 6 and 7 the different 
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experiences in the Tokyo routes market were demonstrated and compared with those in 
the intra-European market. Key differences in the Tokyo routes market were as follows: 
 
1. Traffic volumes were not increased significantly. 
2. Some of the routes experienced increased frequencies. 
3. Load factors decreased. 
4. The highest fares decreased by 10%. 
5. The highest discount fares increased by between 2% and 26%. 
6. Lowest fares increased by 10% to 20%. 
7. Even on the routes with new entrants operating, fares increased and load 
factors decreased. 
 
8.4.2 Objectives of the Structural equation modelling analysis 
The objectives of the SEM are to model and hopefully reproduce the results obtained 
from the study in chapters 6 and 7 and the relationships among factors, which were 
revealed as the key determinants of the structure of the deregulated air transport market 
with respect to the Tokyo routes.  
There are five main reasons for adopting SEM to pursue these objectives: 
1. It allows the importance of each factor in the model to be evaluated and the 
process of the model modification to be carried out. 
2. A theoretical model can be tested using SEM that hypothesises how sets of 
factors define constructs, which cannot be observed by variables, and how 
these constructs are related to each other. 
3. It is unique that all the variables, which are used in regression modelling 
referred to in academic literature, are considered as independent variables in 
the model and it can show the relationship between variables in the model. For 
example, both traffic volume and fare are independent variables in this model, 
although traffic volume is the dependent variable in traditional demand 
equations. 
4. The relationship is represented and illustrated visually by the path model. The 
illustrated model, each path and the estimated parameters of factors are 
assessed statistically using several measures of the “goodness of fit”. 
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5. It is meaningful to know how the default model is modified and the results of 
an alternative modified model are compared. This is the most different 
outcome of SEM compared to other multivariate statistical analysis techniques 
(Findel, 2001). 
8.4.3 Hypothesised theory and data 
This analysis was conducted using SPSS and AMOS software in order to fulfil the 
above objectives. The model is specified based on hypothesised theory in order to 
analyse the Tokyo routes so as to pursue the main objectives of this research (c.f. supra, 
chapter 1). The basic path model for the analysis of the Tokyo routes is illustrated in 
Figure 8.4 using basic concepts for the relationship between factors (see Figure 1.2 in 
chapter 1). Derived from these concepts and the results of the aforementioned analysis 
in chapters 6 and 7, the following theory is hypothesised: 
 
Following the process of deregulation of domestic air transportt in Japan from 2000 
to 2003, the Tokyo routes hav eexperienced develoment by several key elements 
(changes of supply, demand, load factors and fares, new entrants and competition). 
“Market innovation” will be explained by several factors, representing these key 
elements. Besides, the prominent feature of deregulation, “Competition” influences 
“market innovation” (see Figures 1.2 in chapter 1 and 8.4 in chapter 8). 
 
For this modelling, the data sample size is 134, representing all the Tokyo routes from 
2001 to 2003. Primary data sample size is 220 covering the period 1999 to 2003. 
Primary data for the analysis was obtained from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transportation Statistics.32 In addition, the schedule data and fares were collected from 
the timetables of each airline as submitted to the JCAB. The combined data sets have 
over 2,421 cases from 2001 to 2003.  
 
Appendix K: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2000; 
Appendix L: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2001; 
Appendix M: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2003. 
                                                     
32 see http://toukei.mlit.go.jp/koukuu/koukuu.html 
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Figure 8.5: Basic concepts for the path model based on Figure 1.2 
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8.4.4 The hypothesised model and analytical structure 
The sample size needs to be sufficient to estimate parameters and determine model fit 
given the specific theoretical relationships among the latent variables in SEM. In this 
case, the sample size is 134 and the two latent variables are named “Market innovation” 
External factors affect the market from the outside 
Internal factors affect or effected by the market 
Latent factors 
Notes:
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and “Competition”. Demographic and economic factors will be included in the analyses 
of the Tokyo domestic route market, which has sufficient sample size.  
 
From the matrix, which was produced from the descriptive study of Tokyo routes, 10 
factors are selected for the SEM analysis. These 10 observed variables are extracted and 
composed of two components using the exploratory factor analysis with Varimax 
rotation. Based on the result of this component matrix, Model 1 is specified. The 
observed variables are as follows: 
Table 8.1: Observed variables 
psincdep percentage increase of departures over the previous year on each route 
psincpax percentage increase of the number of passengers over the previous year on each 
route 
psinclodf percentage increase of load factor over the previous year on each route 
psincseat percentage increase of supplied seats over the previous year on each route 
incpslowf percentage increase of lowest discount fare over the previous year on each route 
Incpmaxdis percentage increase of highest discount fare over the previous year on each route 
diffmaxlow Discount percentage of lowest fares over the highest fares on each route 
HHI Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index  
nrairlne Number of airlines operating on each route in each year 
nrnewent Number of new entrants operating on each route in the year 
Unobserved, endogenous variables: Market innovation 
Unobserved, exogenous variables: competition, e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8, e9, e10, e8, d1 (residuals) 
Notes: HHI is an index which is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by summing 
the squared market share of each firm competing in a market. 
8.4.5 Estimation and model modifications 
8.4.5.1 Model 1: the default model 
This is the basic model, which has two latent variables, “Market innovation” and 
“Competition”. It is the unique point and the strength of SEM that the relationship 
between the dependent variables and independent variables in the demand equation 
model is represented in the model simultaneously. Model 1 is specified according to the 
assumption that fare factors could be more related to “Competition”. However, the 
results of statistical indices rejected this model (see Figure 8.5). 
 
The results of statistical goodness of fit indices are as follows: 
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936.527
2 =χ  df = 34 and P = 0.000. CFI = 0.581, RMSEA= 0.330 and AIC = 589.936 
 
Figure 8.6: Model 1, the default model 
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8.4.5.2 Model 2: Direct path to the number of passengers and market 
consentration (HHI) 
In demand equations, fare is one of the important variables to determine the number of 
passengers. In Model 2, the direct relationship between fares and demand (the number 
of passengers) is added by drawing the path. Moreover, a direct relationship between 
“Market innovation” and market concentration (HHI) is added. To avoid the un- 
identification of this model, the regression coefficients of these three variables are fixed 
at 1. As the relationship between these variables could be shown in this model, these 
factors are connected with other supply factors, which are “the number of supplied 
seats” and “the number of departures”, which are linked to HHI. The result of Model 2 
is as follows: 
39,665
2 =χ  df = 33 and P = 0.000. CFI = 0.464, RMSEA= 0.380 and AIC = 729.393 
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The statistical fitness indices still reject this model. The Chi-squared index shows more 
negative results. However, the indices, RMSEA and AIC have improved a little. 
Therefore, the basic idea of this model is kept. 
Figure 8.7: Model 2 
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8.4.5.3 Model 3: Relationship between observed variables 
Based on the assumption that fare factors could have a more closed relationship with 
each other, the residual of fare factors is connected by two arrow lines. In addition, the 
relationship between “the number of supplied seats” and “the number of departures”, 
“the number of carried passengers “and “load factor” could be important. Thus, 
residuals of these factors are connected by two arrow lines in Model 3. It is assumed 
that the difference between the most expensive fares and the lowest discount fares has a 
relationship to HHI. Therefore, residuals of these variables are also connected in Model 
3. The results of statistical goodness of fit indices of Model 3 are as follows: 
 
455.70
2 =χ  , from 665,393 of Model 2 and 527.936 of Model 1, which is much 
improved: df = 11 and P = 0.000. CFI = 0.961, RMSEA = 0.117 and AIC = 150.455 
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Figure 8.8: Model 3 
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8.4.5.4 Model 4: To eliminate the factors, the number of new entrants and airlines 
On all the Tokyo routes, the number of new entrants is still limited even after full 
deregulation. So assuming that the number of new entrants has not affected competition 
in the overall market much, the observed variable “number of new entrants” will try to 
be eliminated in Model 4. Moreover, as most routes in the Tokyo market are still 
supplied on an oligopoly or monopoly basis, the number of airlines is also removed. 
The result is as follows: 
242.26
2 =χ  df = 11 and P = 0.006, CFI = 0.981, RMSEA = 0.102 and AIC = 92.242 
 
These model fit indices suggest that the sample data have an acceptable fit to the 
combined measurement model. However, variances between some residuals are not 
positively defined in the results (e7 and e8, e8 and e9, e8 and e10). For the next model 
5, two arrows between these residuals are removed. 
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Figure 8.9: Model 4 
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8.4.5.5 Model 5 
The model fit indices of Model 5 suggest that the sample data have an acceptable fit to 
the combined measurement model ( 0.28
2 =χ , df = 14, p = .014, CFI = .983, RMSEA 
= .087 and AIC = 88.028). Therefore, Model 5 is adopted as the result. 
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Figure 8.10: Model 5 (un-standardised model) 
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Figure 8.11: Model 5 (standardised model) 
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8.4.6 Assessment of fitness of the model 
Table 8.2 shows the goodness of fit of each model. According to the results of selected 
fit indices, Model 5 is the most acceptable. 
Table 8.2: Goodness of fit of each model 
Chi-square statistic CFI NFI RMSEA AIC 
 
Model Chi- 
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Probability 
level 
Acceptable 
>0 .95 
 
Good fit < 
0.008 
Reject > 
1.0 
Smaller 
AIC is 
better 
Model 1 527.936 34 .000 .581 .569 .330 589.936 
Model 2 663.393 33 .000 .461 .457 .380 729.393 
Model 3 67.947 24 .000 .963 .945 .117 149.947 
Model 4 26.242 11 .006 .981 .969 .102 92.242 
Model 5 28.028 14 .014 .983 .967 .087 88.028 
 
For Model 5 the chi-square statistic, technically a measure of badness of fit, is equal to 
28.0, with 14 degrees of freedom and a p value of .014. The root- mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is equal to .087, which is an acceptable level of this measure 
of fit, RMSEA < 1.0.  Besides, NFI (Bentler-Bonett normed fit index) and CFI 
(comparative fit index) are .967 and .983 respectively, which are at acceptable levels for 
these measures of fit (criterion CFI >.95 and both CFI and NFI mean better fitness the 
closer to 1.0). 
Across this particular set of model fit indices, the conclusion is that the data-to-model fit 
is approaching a reasonable level (see Table 8.3).  
 
There are many arguments in the literature regarding the interpretation of model fit 
criteria and acceptable fitness indices of SEM. Table 8.3 summarised these criteria 
covered by the literature. 
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Table 8.3: Model fit criteria and Acceptable Fit Interpretation 
Model Fit Criterion Acceptable level Interpretation 
Chi-square Tabled chi-square value 
Compares obtained chi-square value with table value 
for given DF 
Tucker- Lewis index 0 (no fit) to 1 (perfect fit) Value close to  .95 reflects a good model fit 
Normed fit index 0 (no fit) to 1 ( perfect fit) Value close to  .95 reflects a good model fit 
Root-mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) 
< .05 ( good fit model) 
> 1.0 ( not acceptable) 
Value less than  .05 indicates a good model fit 
Value more than 1.0 indicates the model is not 
acceptable 
Akaike Information criterion 
(AIC) 
0 (perfect fit) to negative 
value (poor fit) 
Compares values in alternative models 
Source: This table is compiled by the author based on the criteria of Schumacher and Lomax (2004), Arbuckle 
(2005), and Yamamoto and Onodera (2002). 
8.4.7 Summary and discussion 
According to the process and the result of the SEM analysis, an acceptable specified 
model (Model 5) has been derived. The hypothesised relationships among demand 
factors are drawn and the path diagram is accepted and supported sufficiently by several 
model fit indices. The strong relationship between the number of passengers and 
competition is supported by the direct path from “Competition”. However, the effect of 
competition is not so prominent in this model, because the estimate value is -.276, 
which is negative and its CR (Critical ratio) is below 1.96 (e.g. it is not significant). 
This indicates the effect of “Competition” on “Market innovation” is not significant. 
Interestingly, it is demonstrated by the result of this model that the new entrants did not 
significantly affect the Tokyo market after all. The regression weight of “incpmaxdis” 
(percentage increase of highest discount fares over the previous year) is estimated to be 
69.8. This means that “incmaxdis” goes up by 69.8 when competition goes up by 1. It 
demonstrates that the highest discounted fares have been going up even after 
deregulation. Moreover, the regression weight of “incplowf” (percentage increase of 
prices of the lowest fares) is estimated to be 285.551 and that of “diffmaxlow” – 1.682. 
The lowest fares went up and the discount percentage of lowest fares compared to the 
highest fares went down when competition went up by 1. Much academic literature has 
demonstrated that the lowest fares are lower and departure frequencies are higher on 
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fully liberalised routes. However, the outcome of this analysis indicates the opposite 
result with respect to the Tokyo routes after deregulation. This indication is extremely 
interesting and the path models permit theoretically meaningful relationships to be 
drawn between variables. Nevertheless, some CR (Critical ratio) values of regression 
weights are not significant. In addition, strictly speaking, the value of RMSEA has a 
possibility to be improved according to Arbucke (2005). He mentioned that there is also 
the opinion that a value of about .08 or less for the RMSEA would indicate a reasonable 
error of approximation. 
 
Considering again the results of the aforementioned descriptive analysis of the Tokyo 
routes, the results of 2000 and 2003 were significantly different from each other (see 
Appendix H and Appendix J). Therefore, it is assumed that more appropriate results will 
be available by further study with additional samples and variables over a longer period 
(2000-2005), including economic and demographic variables to investigate the effect of 
deregulation on the market overall. 
8.5 Structural equation modelling analysis of competition 
between air transport and high speed rail 
In this section, the relationship between the Time index and the Fare index in the air 
transport market serving Tokyo is examined and analysed using Structural Equation 
modelling (SEM). The objectives of this SEM analysis are to model and validate the 
results of the analysis in chapter 4 and the relationships between the factors, which were 
revealed as the key determinants of air transport competition with HSR in Japan. 
8.5.1  Hypothesised theory 
According to the process of deregulation of domestic air transportt in Japan from 
2000 to 2003, the Tokyo routes have experienced development  by several key 
elements (changes of supply, demand, load factors and fares, new entrants and 
competition with HSR). “Market innovation” will be explained by several factors, 
which represent these key elements. Moreover, the prominent feature of deregulation, 
“Competition” influences “market innovation” (see Figures 1.2 in chapter 1 and 8.4 
in chapter8). 
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8.5.2 Data and variables 
The primary data covers the month of April for the years from 2000 to 2005. The data 
for analysis was obtained from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation 
Statistics33. The schedule data and fares used were collected from the timetables of each 
airline and the data provided by JCAB. For the fare index and time index data, the result 
of chapter 4 is adopted. The combined data sets have over 2,706 cases covering 2003 
and 2005.  
 
Table 8.4: Observed variables in the time and fare index study 
frequency Percentage change of departures over the previous year on each route 
demand 
Percentage change of the number of passengers over the previous year on each 
route 
Load factor Percentage change of load factor over the previous year on each route 
supply Percentage change of supplied seats over the previous year on each route 
fareindexlow Fare index of the lowest discount fare 
fareindexdisc Fare index of the highest discount fare 
fareindexpeak Fare index of the highest fare 
fareindex Fare index of the fully flexible fare 
timeindex Time index 
newentrants Number of new entrants 
Stage length Distance from Tokyo to destination 
 
Unobserved, endogenous variable: Market development 
Unobserved, exogenous variable: Competition  
Residuals: e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8, e9, e10, e11, d1.  
8.5.3 Results and summary 
Figure 8.11 and Table 8.5 show the best modified model (Model 6) and the results of 
estimated standardised regression weights. They demonstrate the situation of the Tokyo 
routes market, where competition between air and high-speed rail has not affected and 
developed the market dramatically, even after deregulation (regression weight of 
competition: 0.081). The “New entrants” and “load factor” variables were eliminated 
                                                     
33 see http://toukei.mlit.go.jp/koukuu/koukuu.html 
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during the model modification process. The time index (regression weight: 0.355) is not 
a big factor in this model, which shows that the high-speed railway network is already 
well established in the Tokyo market and competition between air transport and HSR is 
already severe. The highest fares (regression weight: 0.98) and fully flexible fares 
(regression weight: 0.823) have affected the market rather than the discount fares 
(regression weight: 0.737) and lowest fares (regression weight: 0.585). The results of 
this analysis demonstrate the situation on the Tokyo routes where the market has been 
affected by high fares rather than discount and low fares even after deregulation. This is 
because of the lack of very low fares in the market. The fares in the markets with new 
entrants were increased and the average difference between the highest fares and lowest 
fares was only 35% (see Tables 6.18 and 6.19). In this SEM analysis, the results of 
chapters 4, 6 and 7 are confirmed: (1) the Tokyo route market was not developed 
significantly, (2) the highest fares decreased by only 10% and the discount fares 
increased, (3) New entrants did not affect demand in the market (see Tables 6.20, 6.21, 
7.11 and 7.12). 
 
Table 8.5: Model modification 
 2χ  DF Prob. GFI CFI RMSEA AIC 
Default model 467.2 43 0 .674 .471 .349 513.2 
Model 2 135.9 26 0 .771 .775 .228 173.8 
Model 3 80.9 19 0 .818 .859 .2 114 
Model 4 75.0 18 0 .83 .87 .198 111 
Model 5 26.7 17 .62 .931 .978 .094 64.7 
Model 6 12.1 16 .739 .965 1.0 1.0 52 
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Figure 8.12: Competition model of the Tokyo routes 
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Table 8.6: Summary of the results; Standard regression weights (model 6) 
 Market development Competition 
Squared multiple  
Correlations 
Market development  .081 .007 
frequency .944  .892 
timeindex  .355 .126 
fareindex  .823 .677 
fareindexpeak  .98 .961 
fareindexdisc  .737 .544 
fareindexlow  .585 .342 
demand .878  .771 
supply .846  .715 
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Chapter 9: Constraints for liberalisation of the air 
transport market in Japan 
9.1 Deregulated market outcomes 
In the previous chapters three remarkable outcomes of liberalisation in Japan were 
identified by using several internal factors which affect the market (see Figure 1.2 and 
8.4): (1) decreased demand, (2) increased fares and (3) new entrants’ failures.  
Investigations of the causal relationship between them reveal that these three results of 
liberalisation in the Tokyo route market are caused by several constraining factors. 
Figure 9.1 contrasts the different effects of liberalisation in the Intra-European market 
and the Tokyo routes market.  
Figure 9.1: Contrast of the effects of liberalisation between the intra-European market and the Tokyo route 
market 
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The market and fares of Tokyo routes, and competition between airlines and high speed 
rail were investigated in chapters 4, 5 and 6. In chapter 7 LCCs’ impact on the intra-
European market is compared with that on the Tokyo routes. These results show the 
three major differences between Japan and the intra-EU market: (1) Number of airports 
serving the routes, (2) competition with HSR, and (3) the levels of competition among 
airlines. In this chapter, the aim is to discover the factors which caused the different 
experiences in the Tokyo routes market and which acted as constraints even after 
liberalisation by analysing these external factors (see Figure 1.2 and 8.4) such as 
airports and airlines’ activities. The analysis demonstrates how these factors have 
affected each other in the Japanese air transport market. In the following sections, the 
airport system and its financial structures are analysed and the airline’s activities are 
discussed in order to discover the reasons of different experiences from those of the 
intra-EU market. 
 
9.2 Airports in Japan 
This section aims to discover the relationship between airport development and the 
results of liberalisation in the market. To this end, airports in Japan are investigated in 
order to understand the airport system in Japan and the relationship between 
Government policy and airport development. This analysis focuses on the management 
body and its structure, the way in which the airports in Japan have been developed and 
financed, and how Government policy has affected airport development.  
 
9.2.1 Airports in Japan and their management body 
The total number of airports with paved runways in Japan was 145 in 2006.34 Of these, 
57 airports are mainly for public air transportation in Japan, where the country area size 
is about 0.4 million sq km which is slightly smaller than the state of California in the 
United States and the Japanese population is about 127 million currently. 
 
                                                     
34 The total number of airports with paved runways in the following countries in 2006: UK 471, France 477, Italy 133, 
Germany 554 and the US 14,858.  
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In Air law in Japan, “Airport” is defined as “a Public airfield” for air transport and 
categorised mainly into three groups as follows in Article 2.1 of the Airport 
development law. 
 
Airport Development Law, Article 2.1 
 
1. Category 1 airport: Narita International Airport, Chubu International Airport, 
Kansai International Airport and other international airports which are 
essential for international air transport routes. 
2. Category 2 airport: Airports, which are essential for major domestic air 
transport routes. 
3. Category 3 airport: Airports, which are essential for securing regional air 
transport services. 
 
The major international Category 1 airports in Japan, such as Narita International 
Airport, Chubu International Airport and Kansai International airport, are managed by 
individual “Public corporations”35. Other airports, such as Haneda airport and Osaka 
International airport in Category 1 and some Category 2 airports are managed by the 
central Government authority (Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transportation). 
Other Category 2 and Category 3 airports are administrated by the local governments, 
where each airport is located. At several airports, such as Tokushima and Komatsu, 
which are controlled by the Ministry of Defence or the US Air Force, some parts of the 
facilities at these airports were constructed and managed by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure, Land and Transportation (MILT) (see Table 9.1). 
 
 
                                                     
35 It refers to the privatised organisation, which used to be owned by Government through “the social cooperation 
law”. In the case of Narita airport, when the Narita airport cooperation law was legislated in 2004, New Tokyo 
International Airport Authority was privatised and changed its name to the Narita International Airport cooperation. 
However, its capital is owned 100% by Government. 
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Table 9.1: Management bodies of airports in Japan 
Category 1 Airport 
 
 
Narita Kansai Chubu 
Category 2 Airport 
Category 3 
Airport 
Establishment NAA KIA Centrair Government (MILT) 
Local Public 
Body 
Management NAA KIA Centrair 
Government 
(MILT) 
Local 
Public 
Body 
Local Public 
Body 
Fundamental 
Facilities 
 ( Runway, 
Taxiway and 
Apron) 
Government 
(MILT) 
NAA KIA Centrair 
Government 
(MILT) 
Local 
Public 
Body 
Local Public 
Body 
Air Traffic 
control facilities 
Government 
(MILT) 
Terminal 
Buildings 
Private NAA KIA Centrair Private Private 
Local Public 
Body 
Private 
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2005) 
Notes: NAA (Narita International Airport Corporation), KIA (Kansai International Airport Co., LTD) and Centrair 
(Central Japan International Airport Co., Ltd) 
 
The specific information about airports in Japan including locations and the length of 
runways are referred to in the following appendices. 
Appendix E: Main airports in Japan 
Appendix F: Main airports in Japan (map) 
9.2.2 Airport development plan and financial structure of airports 
Airports in Japan have been developed and constructed under “the Airport Development 
Law” of 1956, which aimed to establish a domestic air transport network in Japan. The 
airport development plan was established under this law. 
 
“The first Airport Development Five year Plan” was launched in 1967 and “the Airport 
Development Special Account” was legislated in 1970 in order to separate the financial 
accounts for airport development from the Government general account. “The Airport 
Development Special Account” aimed to develop the domestic air transport network in 
Japan and this objective was accomplished by establishing at least one airport for each 
prefecture until the 5th Airport development five year plan in 1990.  
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The 6th Plan from 1991 set another objective to increase the total runway length at 
airports in Japan. It was represented by the Total Runway Length Index36, which aimed 
to increase this from 760 m to 800 m, compared to the 1,000 m average in the US and 
Europe at that time. This plan resulted in the development of the regional airports rather 
than the large airports in the metropolitan city areas.  
 
The 7th Plan from 1996 focused on the development of the Metropolitan airports more 
than any others. It included the investigation of a new airport in the Nagoya area 
(Chubu Centrea airport) and the future possibility of a third airport in the Tokyo 
metropolitan area. This policy was established in order to compete with other Asian 
airports, such as Incheon airport in South Korea, Kuala Lumpur airport in Malaysia and 
Changi airport in Singapore, and was enforced more by the 8th Airport Development 
Plan which was started in 2003 (see Table 9.2). 
 
                                                     
36 It is computed by the sum of the total length of runways / { population (millions)/ surface area (1,000 km²)} ½. 
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Table 9.2: The Airport Development Plans and their major objectives from 1967 to 2002 
Airport 
Development 
Plan 
Period Major objectives Number of jet airports /total 
1st 1967-1970 Development of TYO and OSA Development of regional airport 7/56 
2nd 1971-1975 
Construction of NRT and KIX 
Development of Major airports and regional airports 
Construction of aviation safety facilities 
Promotion of anti- noise measurements 
18/70 
3rd 1976-1980 
Promotion of airport environmental measurements 
Development of aviation safety facilities 
Development of NRT 
Investigation, planning and construction promotion of KIX 
Development of other airports 
28/76 
4th 1981-1985 
Development of NRT 
Promotion of TYO development 
Promotion of KIX investigation 
Promotion of other airports 
Development of aviation safety facilities 
Promotion of airport environmental measurements 
39/78 
5th 1986-1990 
Completion of NRT 
Opening of new runway at TYO 
Promotion of development of KIX 
Development of other airports 
Development of aviation safety facilities 
Promotion of airport environmental measurements 
48/82 
6th 1991-1995 
Completion of the 2nd period airport facilities at NRT 
Investigation for opening KIX 
Development of other airports 
Development of aviation safety facilities 
Promotion of airport environmental measurements 
54/90 
7th 1996-2002 
Completion of new runways at NRT and TYO 
Investigation for the 2nd development at KIX 
Investigation of NGO and new airports in metropolitan areas 
Development of other airports 
Development of aviation safety facilities 
Promotion of airport environmental measurements 
57/96 
 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (2005) 
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Figure 9.2 shows the total public investment of the Japanese Government’s general 
account and the proportion of expenditure for airport development, and rail and forest 
development in the total. Although the share of airport development among the public 
investments has been slightly increasing after 2002, the share of expenditure for airport 
development was rather small (less than 2%) in comparison with 4% for train and forest 
development. 
Figure 9.2: Expenditure for airport development compared with total public investments 
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Source: Author based on data of Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
 
The financial resources for airport development are supplied through “the airport 
development special account” from mainly five sources, which are (1) financial 
investment capital (the Japanese postal savings and pensions), (2) local government 
account, (3) airport charges (the landing charges and en-route navigation charges), (4)  
Government general account and (5) other resources including non-aeronautical revenue 
at  each airport. The financial structure is illustrated as follows (see Figure 9.3). The 
General Account includes 85% of the total aviation fuel tax, which is paid by airlines 
and other aviation sectors. The rest of the income from fuel tax is used to pay for airport 
management. 
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Figure 9.3: The structure of the airport development special account in Japan 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
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Figure 9.4 shows the evolution of the revenue structure of the Airport Development 
Special Account from 1995 to 2004. In 1995 and 1996 the proportion of capital 
investments from pensions and Japanese postal savings were very high at 24% (JYE 
133 billion), but decreased to just under 10% during the following ten years. This was 
caused by the recession and deficit financing of the Government Treasury after the 
“Bubble economic boom” in Japan. As a result, the percentages from aeronautical 
charges, landing charges and fuel taxes in the airport development special account 
increased dramatically from 51% in 1992, to 54% in 1996 and to 64 % in 2004 (see 
Figures 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7). Fuel taxes are imposed in only Japan and the US. In 2000, 
USD 234/kiloliter was charged in Japan compared to USD 12/kiloliter in the US.37 Fuel 
tax in Japan is extremely high compared to that of the US. These three costs are paid by 
airlines and aviation sectors, and are reflected in fares as a result. 
 
Figure 9.4: Revenue structure of the airport development special account 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
 
                                                     
37 Source: Association of airlines in Japan (2001)  
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Figure 9.5: The airport development special account revenue in 1992 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
Figure 9.6: The airport development special account revenue in 1996 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
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Figure 9.7: The airport development special account revenue in 2004 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
 
Figure 9.8 shows the expenditure structure of the airport development special account 
from 1992 to 2004, which reflects the major objectives of the airport development plans 
that were implemented during this period (see Table 9.2). Although Narita International 
airport, Haneda airport and Kansai International airport have been privatised, their 
capital investments for planning, construction and management have been supported by 
a part of the airport development special account. “Expenditure for air route 
development” is used for the establishment of aeronautical infrastructure and system, 
while “Airport environment expenditure” is allocated to the management and alleviation 
of environmental issues, including compensation for any kind of environmental loss and 
damage caused by airport construction and airport operations.  
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Figure 9.8: Expenditure structure of the airport development special account 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
 
Interestingly, Figure 9.8 shows the relative increase of expenditure for airport 
development, which covers construction and management of airports excluding NRT, 
KIX and NGO from 1992 to 1996. A total of 10 airports including new runways were 
constructed during this period, such as at Aomori (in 1990), Shonai (in 1991), Izumo (in 
1991), Iwami (in 1993), Hiroshima-nishi (in 1993), Niigata (new runway in 1996), 
Sapporo (new runway in 1996), Kansai international (in 1996), Tokyo international 
(new runway in 1997), and Odate-noshiro (in 1998). These airports and runways were 
established under the objectives of the 6th airport development plan from 1991 to 1995 
(c.f. supra, section 9.2 of chapter 9). This planning activity was reflected in the 
Government’s promotion policy for competition, which was started in 1996 with the 
new fare setting rules and the Phase I slot allocation system at Haneda airport in 1997 in 
order to promote competition between airlines and improve consumers’ convenience by 
expanding the air transport network serving the local regions (c.f. supra, section 2.2.2 
and Figure 2.7 of chapter 2 and Figure 5.2 of section 5.1 of chapter 5). Figure 9.12 
demonstrates the economic decline and the stagnation of air transport activities after 
1999. While this promotion policy was planned during the economic boom in Japan 
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from 1986 to 1993, it commenced during the following “lost decade in Japan” from 
1991 to the beginning of 2000 with the start of the Phase I slot allocation system.  
 
Figure 9.9: GDP deflator, the number of passengers and RPK in the Japanese domestic market 
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Source: Author based on data from Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office (2006) and Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation Statistics (1994 – 2004) 
 
The 8th airport development plan established in 2003 aimed at the development of the 
main international hub airports, such as Haneda airport (TYO), New Tokyo 
international airport (NRT), Chubu international airport (NGO) and Kansai international 
airport (KIX) rather than other airports (c.f. section 9.2.2). This policy was reflected in 
the structure of expenditures in 2003 (see Figure 9.10). It shows that USD 1.82 billion 
out of a total of USD 3.86 billion expenditure was appropriated to the development of 
the main international hub airports including Haneda airport. This accounted for 47% of 
the total expenditure; 29% of the total amount was used for the development of the 
seaside extension at Haneda airport, its redemption and re-extension which will be 
competed in 2009. 
 
 
Chapter 9: Constraints for liberalisation of the air transport market in Japan  
- 204 - 
Figure 9.10: Airport development special account expenditure in 2003 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport, Aviation statistics (2005) 
 
USD 1.12 billion was spent for the further development of Haneda airport 29% (USD 
1.12 billion), which had a different financial resource structure than other airports. “The 
Haneda seaside extension project” was started in 1983 and completed in 2006 after the 
completion of the new C runway in 1997, the new B runway in 2000 and the second 
passenger terminal building in 2004 (see Table 9.3). 
Table 9.3: Main scheme of the Haneda sea-side extension project 
 
1st  
project 
2nd 
project 
3rd project 
Main project A runway 
1st terminal 
building 
New C 
runway 
New B 
runway 
2nd terminal 
building 
Start of operation July 1983 Sep 1993 Mar 1997 Mar 2000 2004 
Runway 
A runway 
3,000 x 60 m 
A runway 
3,000 x 60 m 
A runway 
3,000 x 60 m 
Before this project 
B runway 
2,500 x 45 m 
B runway 
2,500 x 45 m 
B runway 
2,500 x 45 m 
New B runway 
2,500 x 60 m 
C runway 
3,150 x 60 m 
C runway 
3,150 x 60 m 
C runway 
3,150 x 60 m 
New C runway 
3,000 x 60 m 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2005) 
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Another project, “the Haneda re-extension project” was commenced in 2000 in order to 
expand the number of slots at Haneda airport by establishing a new runway. The 
completion of this runway in 2009 enables an increase in the number of daily slots from 
782 in 2007 to 1,114 in 2009.  This project is financed by different sources compared to 
other airport development by adopting the PFI (the Private Finance Initiative, see 
below) method for constructing the terminal building and apron areas which involves 
the private bodies (see Table 9.4). 
 
Table 9.4: Financial resource structure of the Haneda re-extension project 
Project 
Government  
(General account) 
Local public body 
(no interest loan) 
Financial investment 
capital fund  
(with interest loan) 
Runway  30% 20% 50% 
Terminal & apron 
areas 
PFI 100% 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2007) 
Note: PFI (The Private Finance Initiative) is a method to provide financial support for Public–Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) between the public and private sectors. The capital element of the funding enabling the authority to 
pay the private sector for these projects is given by central government in the form of what are known as 
PFI "credits". The loans are paid back over the period of the PFI scheme by the service provider who is at 
risk if the service is not delivered to standard throughout.The cost of this borrowing as a result is higher 
than normal government borrowing (but cheaper when better management of risks is taken into account) 
but does not all appear as borrowing in public accounts (source: The Cabinet office in Japan and 
Wikipedia). 
 
The financial structures of the development of other airports are summarised in Table 
9.5. Category 1 airports are fully financed by Government, while Category 2 (A) 
airports are funded 67% by the Government and 33% by local public bodies. In case 
category 2 airports re-develop facilities in order to promote public utility such as a new 
runway, they are categorised as Category 2 (B) airports to enable them to obtain 55% of 
Government financing. Category 3 airports are financed 50% by Government and 50% 
by local public bodies (see Table 9.5). 
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Table 9.5: Financial resources structure of airport development 
Category of airport Airport Government Local public body 
 1  Haneda* and Osaka 100% 0% 
2 (A) 21 airports incl. Sapporo, Fukuoka 67% 33% 
2 (B) 5 airports incl. Akita 55% 45% 
3 5 airports incl. Aomori, Okayama 50% 50% 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2007) 
Note1: The financial resources for the Haneda re-extension development (the Re-extension project at Tokyo 
international airport) is excluded because it has a different policy adopted. 
 
Most airports in Japan were constructed before the 45 and 47 system in 1970 and 1972 
and developed their facilities in order to accept large aircraft by extending runways in 
line with the 1st to 6th (1967-1995) airport development plans. From the 7th Plan, the 
development of large hub airports was mainly envisaged with the process of air 
transport liberalisation of the domestic market. The following findings result from the 
analysis in this section. 
 
• The proportion for airport development (less than 2%) of total public 
investments in Japan is small compared with that of railways (4%). 
• The financial resource for airport development and management is “the airport 
development special account”, which enables the subsidisation of unprofitable 
airports. 
• 64% of the financial resource was covered by aeronautical charges, landing 
charges and fuel tax, which were paid by airlines and aviation sectors.  
• 60% of the airport development special account expenditure was used for 
airport development. 
• Many airports in the local regions were developed and secondary airports 
constructed during the 6th airport development plan from 1991 to 1995. 
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• These airport developments and the competition promotion policy of 
Government were established during the economic boom, but started in the 
recession. 
• In order to compete with other Asian hub airports, the development has focused 
more on Metropolitan airports (TYO, NGO, KIX, NRT and the 3rd Tokyo area 
airports) than on other airports since 2003. 
9.3 High yield products lift the costs in Japan 
In the findings of the previous section, it was shown that more than 64% of the financial 
resource was covered by aeronautical charges, landing charges and fuel taxes which are 
paid by airlines. Figure 9.11 contrasts the aeronautical charge per ASK in 2004 between 
Japanese airlines and selected airlines in the UK. Especially it highlights the expensive 
landing charges of Japanese airlines. The proportion of landing charges of total 
aeronautical costs of easyJet is smaller because they make efforts to reduce these costs 
by negotiating with airports and reducing MTOW of aircraft, while en-route and air 
navigation charges are out of their control as they are charged based on fixed unit rates. 
Figure 9.11: Aeronautical charge/ASK (US cents) in 2004 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Air 2000
British Airways  
British Midland
EasyJet Airline Company Ltd
KLM UK
Monarch Airlines
Virgin Atlantic Airways
ANA
JAL
L/D and departure fee (USCents) En-route & other navigation service charge(USCents)  
Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (2004) and ICAO (2004) 
Note: British Airways‘s aeronautical charge is lower than others because of their longer sector length. 
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Examples of landing charges on Japanese domestic routes in 2005 are given in Table 
9.6. Landing charges for a B-747-400, an aircraft widely used by Japanese network 
carriers, amount to USD 2,964 for a typical domestic flight and USD 4,747 for an 
international flight. En-route navigation charges for a B-747-400 on the Tokyo-Fukuoka 
route (881 kms) amount to USD 4,261 per sector and USD 827 for a B-737-500.  
 
Table 9.6: Examples of landing charges on domestic routes in Japan (2005) 
Type of aircraft MTOW (ton) L/D charge(JYE) 
En-route navigation 
charge( TYO-FUK) 
 per sector 
B-737-500 53 61,600 88,510 
B-747-SR100 273 324,275 455,910 
B-747-400 273 317,135 455,910 
B-767-200 127 144,095 2120,90 
B-777-200 203 235,200 384,100 
DC9-81 64 229,145 106,880 
DC10-40 202 74,760 337,340 
Airbus A300 B2K 137 237,510 228,790 
Airbus A320-200 67 77,700 123,580 
DHC-8-400 25 9,989 41,750 
DHC-6-300 6 700 720 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2005) 
Note: The exchange rate, 1UD = JYE 107 in 2005 
 
Figure 9.12 shows airport charges per passenger on domestic routes for selected airports 
in the world. It can be seen that the proportion of passenger charges for Japanese 
airports is clearly lower than those of others. It is higher for international flights. 
Particularly, the landing charges are expensive at Japanese airports, which are 1.5 to 7 
times higher than those of other airports. The total airport charges including passengers 
charges at other Asian main hub airports are very low. The main international hub 
airports in Japan face competition from these Asian hub airports, which are 1,000-5,000 
km away from Japan (see Figure 9.13). 
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Figure 9.12: Airport charges per passenger on a typical domestic flight (USD) 
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Source: MILT, Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2006) 
Note: Calculations for a B-767-300 (MTOW 131t, 288 seats, 70% load factor and 1 hour parking time) by MILT based 
on the IATA airport and air navigation charges manual (2006) 
Figure 9.13: Airport charges per passenger on a typical international flight (USD)  
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Source: MITL, Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2006) 
Note: Calculations for a B-747-400 (MTOW 395t, 430 seats, 70% load factor and 3 hours parking time) by MILT 
based on the IATA airport and air navigation charges manual (2006) 
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Japanese airlines are mainly operating large aircraft, resulting in higher aeronautical 
charges compared to small-sized aircraft. The difference is especially marked when 
comparing landing charges with international hub airports in other regions. These costs 
are directly reflected in fares.  
Figure 9.14 contrasts the difference in unit costs (US cents) of airlines in 2004. 
 
Figure 9.14: Comparison of Unit cost per ASK (US cents) in 2004 
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Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (2004), MILT (2004) and annual reports of airlines 
 
The unit costs of new entrants in Japan are around 8.3 US cents per ASK compared to 
13 cents for JAL and 10.6 cents for ANA. In Europe, Ryanair’s unit costs are 4.3 cents 
per ASK compared to 7.4 US cents for easyJet and 8.9 US cents for British Airways. 
AirAsia’s costs are only 2.5 US cents per ASK based on low capital investment and 
very low labour costs. The labour costs of Japanese airlines are extremely high; Figures 
9.15 and 9.16 show the crew costs of selected airlines in 2000. Average annual 
expenditure per cockpit crew of Japan Airlines in 2000 was USD 201,700. It was 
reduced from the 1996 level of USD 270,000. Moreover, the cabin crew costs of Japan 
Airlines are very high, which rose to USD 79,400 per head in 2000. The total costs of 
flight crew and cabin crew of Japan Airlines accounted for more than 40% of the total 
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operating costs in 1999. These high expenditures are caused by the relatively higher 
seniority of Japan Airlines’ cabin crew compared to other Japanese airlines, whose 
incomes have been raised annually and protected by strong unions. The same applies to 
cockpit crew. Moreover, many working conditions of JAL and ANA, such as 
transportation by taxi, uniform cleaning, expensive allowances and overtime charges, 
and fringe benefits are very different from airlines in Europe. This also helps to explain 
this high expenditure for flight and cabin crew, which directly affect unit costs. 
 
Figure 9.15: Average expenditure per cockpit crew in 2000 
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Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (2000) and ICAO (2000) 
 
Average expenditure per maintenance employee of ANA was USD 69,400 in 2004, 
which is similar to sales and other staff of the airline. In the case of Japan Airlines, 
combined average expenditure per head for maintenance and other staff was USD 
79,500 in 2004, which was a decrease from USD 95,000 in 2003 and USD 187,000 in 
1999. Historically, the labour cost of Japan Airlines has been extremely high with its 
peak around 1994-1996. Since 1997, all Japanese airlines have tried to reduce labour 
costs but this has been very difficult for them because of strong crew unions. ANA 
successfully reduced the cabin crew cost to USD 42,4000 in 2000 compared to the USD 
63,800 per head in 1994, by utilising parttime contract cabin crew.  
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Figure 9.16: Average expenditure per cabin crew members in 2000 
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Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (2000) and ICAO (2000) 
 
These higher costs have been covered by higher yields compared to other airlines (see 
Figure 9.17). Average yield per RPK of ANA and JAL in 2004 was around 15 US cents 
and that of Skymark 14 US cents. For selected deregulated airlines in other regions, 
yield per RPK varied from 5 to 9 US cents. This higher yield of Japanese airlines is 
especially significant on domestic routes. Figure 9.18 demonstrates the evolution of 
yield/RPK for Japanese airlines from 1999 to 2004. Although yields on the domestic 
routes were down at the beginning of deregulation (Phase I from 1997), they increased 
to 16 US cents in 2000. Since the second slot allocations at Haneda airport in 2000 
(Phase II), average yield decreased to 12 US cents in 2002. However, it rose again to 15 
US cents in 2003 when the final slot allocation of Phase II was implemented. 
Interestingly, yield on the domestic routes was higher after liberalisation. 
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Figure 9.17: Yield / RPK (US cents) by airline in 2004 
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Source: Author based on data from UK CAA (2004), MILT (2004) and annual reports of airlines 
 
Figure 9.18: Yield / RPK (US cents) in the domestic market from 1999 to 2004 
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Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport in Japan (1999-2004) 
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9.4 New entrants failure in Japan 
Prior to the start of the Phase I slot allocation in 1997, several new entrants were 
established to start operation taking advantage of the new market opportunity. Table 9.7 
presents an overview of the new entrants which started their operations during the 
process of liberalisation in Japan. The routes and fares they have offered were analysed 
in chapter 6 and the results show the insignificant growth or in some cases decline on 
several markets, such as the Tokyo-Aomori and Tokyo-Tokushima routes as well as 
increased fares and unremarkable differences between the highest fares and the lowest 
discounted fares. The results are very different from the effects of liberalisation in other 
regions. 
Table 9.7: Overview of new entrants in Japan 
 
Date of 
establishment 
Start of 
operation 
and operation 
base 
Main fleet and 
number of 
aircraft in 2007 
Remarks 
Skymark 
Airlines 
Nov 1996 
Sep 1998 
Tokyo 
B-767 ER/6 
B-737-800/3 
Taken over in 2003 by Internet 
providing company 
Hokkaido 
international 
Airlines 
(Air Do) 
Nov 1996 
Dec 1998 
Sapporo 
B-767 ER/2 
B-737-400/2 
In 2000, the airline was under the 
Industrial Revitalisation 
Cooperation Act with management 
support of ANA which was 
completed in 2005. 
JAL Express Apr 1997 
July 1998 
Osaka 
B-737-400 
MD-81 
JAL’s LCC subsidiary 
Skynet Asia 
Airways 
July 1997 
Aug 2002 
Miyazaki 
B-737-400/8 
In 2004, the airline was under the 
Industrial Revitalisation 
Cooperation Act with management 
support of ANA which was 
completed in 2007. 
Starflyer Dec 2002 
Mar 2006 
Kitakyushu 
A320/4 ANA’s support and cooperation 
Source: Author based on company information 
 
In addition, all of these new entrants have been under the de facto management control 
of JAL and ANA. Indeed, Hokkaido International Airlines (Air Do) and Skynet Asia 
Airways were managed by ANA while they were under the Industrial Revitalisation 
Cooperation Act (cf. supra, chapter 6). Moreover, ANA and JAL had codeshare 
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agreements with Air Do and Skymark Airlines on several routes. The most recent new 
entrant, Starflyer had an agreement for operational support and sales with ANA before 
the start of operation under Starflyer’s company policy of “cooperation and co-
existence” with competitors. The effects of new entrants in Japan on the market are very 
different from that of the EU. In this section, the reasons for this experience are 
investigated using Skymark as a case study. 
 
Skymark Airlines was founded in 1996 by entrepreneur Mr. Hideo Sawada, who had 
established a successful travel agency in Japan, and started flight operations in 1998 
offering half the fares of incumbent airlines on the Tokyo-Fukuoka route, achieving 
more than 80% load factors in the first year. However, load factors dropped to less than 
65% in 1999 as JAL and ANA matched Skymark Airlines’ fares on competing flights. 
The business and traffic results of Skymark are outlined in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8: Business and traffic results of Skymark Airlines from 1999 to 2005 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Operating Revenues 
(JYE millions) 13,737 13,472 15,401 22,554 31,778 10,290 35,094 
Operating Expenses 
(JYE millions) 16,655 14,311 16,473 22,845 30,405 12,964 37,565 
Operating income 
(loss)(JYE millions) -2,918 -839 -1,072 -291 1,372 64 -1,870 
Net profit 
(loss)(JYE millions) -3,044 -988 -1,090 -794 1,355 1,677 -701 
        
RPK 932,255 926,988 1,127,157 1,58,714 1,790,164 1,924,380 2,222,446 
ASK 1,328,238 1371274 1,703,410 2,318,848 2,901,400 3,270,530 3,972,792 
Average load factor 70% 68% 66% 68% 62% 59% 56% 
Unit cost /ASK (JYE) 12.5 10.4 9.7 9.9 10.5 - 9.5 
Yield /RPK (JYE) 14.7 14.5 13.7 14.2 14.5 15.3 15.2 
Yield /ASK (JYE) 10.3 9.8 9.0 9.7 11.0 9.0 8.8 
Breakeven load factor 85% 72% 71% 69% 72% - 62% 
Source: Author based on the data of Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transportation and annual report (1999-
2005) 
Note: The fiscal year of Skymark Airlines was changed in 2004 from November–October to April-March because of 
the takeover of Zero company. Therefore, the financial report in 2004 was for only six months. 
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Table 9.8 shows their financial struggle and the decline of their business even after 9 
years of operation and using 10 aircraft in 2007. Skymark had been troubled with a 
huge cumulative deficit since its establishment despite several capital injections from 
the founder’s private equity capital. According to JCAB’s regulation, all new entrant 
airlines need to have technical and operational support, such as several kinds of 
maintenance, training for flight crew and cabin crew, and operating manuals, provided 
by an incumbent airline, when they start up. Figure 9.19 shows the operating 
expenditure of Skymark Airlines in 2000 and highlights the expensive cost for these 
technical supports from ANA. It accounted for 34% of the total expenditure in this year. 
These costs would never be as high if new entrants could manage by themselves. 
However, this was a condition imposed by the Government when Skymark applied for 
its AOC in 1998. 
Figure 9.19: Operating Expenditure of Skymark airlines in 2000 
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Source: Author based on company data in 2000 
 
The sums payable to ANA proved big financial and operational obstacles for Skymark. 
For example, as Skymark needed to use ANA’s maintenance staff in the beginning of its 
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operations, sometimes the departures of Skymark were delayed because of lack of 
manpower at ANA. 38 
 
Although new entrants commenced their operations under the policy of promotion of 
competition resulting from the Phase I slot allocation system, they had to source 
technical support from competitors (incumbent airlines) and pay huge outsourcing costs 
to them. Air Do also bought technical support from JAL according to the regulations. 
The rationale for these regulations was that the JCAB feared many kinds of problems 
and wanted to prevent any safety issues, in order to avoid any concerns about the new 
entrants from the travelling public. 39  In addition, this policy was derived from the 
fundamental Government policy continued in the 45 and 47 systems in 1970, which 
requested incumbent airlines to support Toa Domestic Airlines when they started. Thus, 
competition was not fully introduced even though it was considered as the start of 
liberalisation.  
 
In 2004, when Skymark Airlines was merged with Zero, a Japanese internet providing 
company, their capital crisis was resolved for a while. However, average load factors 
never reached the breakeven level even though they tried to significantly decrease costs. 
The operating loss and net loss resulted in financial problems for them once again. 
There are mainly three reasons for Skymark’s unstable management: (1) Route strategy 
(2) Human resources, and (3) Fleet. 
 
(1) Route strategy: as analysed in chapter 6, Skymark focused on the Tokyo-
Fukuoka route and added frequency despite the market saturation. They opened 
routes from Osaka to Sapporo and Fukuoka in 1999, closing them after only one 
year. They also opened Tokyo-Aomori and Tokyo-Tokushima routes in 2003 
instead of ANA by leasing ANA’s aircraft (one B-767) and stopped services on 
these routes in 2004, then switched to the Tokyo-Kansai route codesharing with 
JAL. Although they opened several routes, they could not continue operations 
                                                     
38 ANA officially mentioned this reason for the delay, however, it was also considered as a kind of competitive 
strategy which delayed Skymark’s departures. Later, Skymark set up their own maintenance and ground handling 
operation. 
39 They were the first new entrants in 32 years since Kokunai Airlines was established in 1964. 
Chapter 9: Constraints for liberalisation of the air transport market in Japan  
- 218 - 
until they achieved favourable results. Indeed, opening new routes is expensive 
and takes time in Japan because airlines are subject to strict investigations and 
require certification by JCAB every time. Therefore, new entrants need to 
carefully consider when entering new markets. However, Skymark has not 
always done so and their route strategy has never been stable. These actions 
resulted in a rising deficit.  
(2) Human resources: The people side of Skymark has not been stable either. The 
average age of employees in 2003 was relatively young compared to other 
Japanese airlines: 32 years old. In order to reduce labour costs, non-Japanese 
flight crew, in-house trained co-pilots and retired flight crew were adopted, 
which resulted in more than 50% cost reduction compared with ANA and JAL. 
Part- time contract cabin crew achieved more flight hours per day at lower 
salary compared to other airlines and cabin cleaning formed part of their duty. 
However, the average service period per Skymark employee was only 2 years in 
2003. Moreover, in 2005 many flight crew and maintenance staff retired at once 
because of a considerable amount of friction with management. As a result, 
operational problems arose. 
(3) Fleet: Not only human resources but also aircraft have not been managed 
efficiently. In 2003, a significant maintenance problem occurred when several 
cracks were found in aircraft structures, leading to the cancellation of a total of 
115 flights, resulting in more than USD 1.7 million loss. Several delays in 
aircraft delivery required new routes to be postponed (e.g. in 2004, two months 
delay on Tokyo-Okinawa). In 2006, a fundamental maintenance problem, which 
had been left for 9 months without any action, was revealed by a whistleblower. 
This triggered a conduct warning by the Government authority. This problem 
was debated at Congress and the CEO and vice chairman of Skymark were 
summoned to attend and explain Skymark’s maintenance problems and 
countermeasures taken. These continuous fundamental maintenance problems 
directly affected traffic results and it became extremely difficult to attract 
demand and increase load factors even though Skymark made efforts to decrease 
costs and breakeven load factor. 
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Although Skymark Airlines has been struggling very much since they commenced 
operation in 1998, yield in the Japanese market is quite high compared to other regions 
(see Figure 9.20). While Skymark had enough opportunity to use allocated slots at 
Haneda airport, they could not utilise them effectively by managing their capital 
resources, human resources and aircraft. If they could have managed and utilised these 
resources and slots, and did not have to pay huge sums for contracting technical and 
operational support from competing incumbent airlines, they could have had more 
chance of success in the domestic market where average yield/RPK was 14 US cents in 
2004.  
9.5 Summary 
Key elements of high yield products in Japan which result in increased costs and fares 
were discussed in this chapter. High operating costs are caused by excessive fuel taxes 
and by high airport charges, which subsidise airport development, but also result from 
the use of large aircraftand by Japanese high yield products and high labour costs 
compared to airlines in the EU also increase operating costs. Thus, airlines need higher 
yields to compete with other airlines on the international routes.  
In addition, new entrants have not been able to effectively utilise opportunities and 
resources including capital, aircraft, labour resources and slots. Most of them are now 
operating under the de facto management control of ANA in the name of cooperation. 
This has resulted in increased fares even after liberalisation, especially on the low 
demand routes. High fares cause market stagnation as a result, particularly on the low 
demand routes involving many category 4 and 5 airports in the local regions, which 
were developed based on overly ambitious economic boom estimations. The airports’ 
financial resources are used to subsidise all airports in Japan, with a significant 64% 
covered by aeronautical charges paid by airlines, which directly affects costs and fares. 
These elements are linked with each other and cause the negative circulation in Japan, 
resulting in constraints for liberalisation (see Figure 9.20).  
 
The deregulation process started in 1986 to promote competition between airlines. The 
process of liberalisation began in 1996 and was completed in 2000 along with the slot 
allocation system at Haneda airport. However, in this chapter, it was demonstrated that 
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the market has not been fully liberalised yet because of constraints, which are 
demonstrated as elements of negative circulation in the domestic market in Japan.  
 
Figure 9.20: Negative circulation of the Tokyo routes market caused by constraints  
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter aims to summarise the thesis conclusions and provide recommendations 
for future policy. In addition, recommendations for further academic research are 
provided along with the contributions and limitations of this research. 
10.1 Conclusions 
The core aim of this thesis is to analyse the characteristics and effects of liberalisation in 
the Tokyo domestic market compared to the intra-EU market in order to identify the 
important issues during the process of liberalisation and the constraints for further 
liberalisation in order to provide recommendations for future policy-making. 
 
The domestic air transport market in Japan has been developed in line with the economy 
since World War II under the regulations of Government. The fundamental structure of 
civil aviation in Japan was established in 1970 and 1972 under the 45 and 47 aviation 
system when the air transport market was carved out to particular airlines by the 
Government. The development planning of airports was started in 1967 and was 
followed by the Airport development special account, which was legislated in 1970. 
Both these government policies aimed to establish and develop the domestic air 
transport network in Japan. In the 45 and 47 system, excess competition was avoided 
and the market was controlled by the Government in order to promote “co-prosperity” 
of airlines. The Airport development special account aimed to construct and develop 
airports by subsidising non-profitable local airports. 
After the rapid economic growth through the 1970s and up to 1985, the year when the 
Plaza accord40 was signed, the transition from “tight regulation” to “liberalisation” of air 
                                                     
40 The Plaza Accord was an agreement signed on September 22, 1985 by 5 nations - France, West Germany, Japan, 
the United States and the United Kingdom. The five agreed to, amongst other things, depreciate the US dollar in 
relation to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark by intervening in the currency markets. It was aimed at 
alleviating the trade deficit with Japan and the exchange rate between JYE and USD changed from 1USD =JYE 235 
to 1 USD = JYE 120 in a year. The signing of the Plaza Accord was significant in that it reflected Japan's emergence 
as a real player in managing the international monetary system. The recessionary effects of the strengthened yen in 
Japan's export-dependent economy created an incentive for the expansionary monetary policies that led to the 
Japanese asset price bubble of the late 1980s. Therefore, it is also considered as one of reasons to cause “the lost 
decade in Japan” after the economic boom in 1985-1992. 
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transport in Japan was started and considered to be completed in 2000. Several steps 
were taken on the way to achieving liberalisation in 2000: (1) the promotion of 
competition policy in 1986-1995 eased market control through double and triple 
designation rules, (2) the further promotion of competition policy in 1996-1999 eased 
the fare setting rules, and (3) further liberalisation in 2000 enabled the freedom to set 
fares with advance notice and the approval rule for routes was repealed (see table 10.1). 
 
Table 10.1: Summary of the process of liberalisation in Japan 
 
Government policy 
The slot 
allocation 
system at TYO 
HND 
Runway 
extension 
Airport 
Development 
Plan 
Period 
Number of 
airports 
Jet airports 
/total 
 
 
1st 1967-1970 7/56 
 
2nd 1971-1975 18/70 
 
3rd 1976-1980 28/76 The 47 and 47 system 
 
 
4th 1981-1985 39/78 
 1st  
Sea side 
extension 
 
5th 1986-1990 48/82 The promotion of competition 
in 1986 
(1986-1995)  2nd 
Sea side 
extension 
6th 1991-1995 54/90 
The further promotion of 
competition 
(1996-1999) 
Liberalisation in 2000 
3rd 
Sea side 
extension 
7th 1996-2002 57/96 
 
Phase I 
(1997-1999) 
Phase II 
(2000-2004) 
Phase III 
(2005-2008) 
Re-
extension 
in 2009 
New Airport 
Development 
Plan 
2003-  
Source: Author based on data from Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (2005) 
 
The thesis is concentrated on the study investigates the Tokyo domestic routes, being 
the major market in Japan, in order to analyse the features and effects of liberalisation 
along with the Slot allocations system from 1997 to 2005. The Tokyo routes market has 
seven significant characteristics as follows: (1) high volume of demand, (2) influence of 
slots is prominent, (3) different features of each route category, (4) relatively low load 
factors, (5) significant market seasonality with peaks occurring during a short period, 
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(6) competition with high speed rail is more severe compared to other regions, and (7) 
high fares in the market. These characteristics, which are listed below, particularly stand 
out when compared to intra-European routes serving the UK, including domestic 
services (cf. supra, chapter 7). 
 
• The size of the Tokyo routes is larger than the largest UK routes. 
• Despite this fact, these Tokyo routes are operated at lower frequency by larger 
aircraft. 
• This can be explained by the scarcity of slots at Haneda airport and the non-
existence of secondary airports serving Tokyo. 
• The Tokyo routes have a strong competion high speed rail, which has already 
developed a large network with competition intensifying as speeds as increase.  
 
In addition, in this comparative analysis, the growth of the intra-EU air transport market 
serving the UK and the substantial impact of LCCs has been apparent. Competition 
between airlines in these markets is more severe than in Japan. The number of airlines 
operating on the busiest UK domestic and UK-EU routes is typically 4 to 6 compared to 
1 to 4 in Japan, including network carriers’ subsidiaries. In these route pairs, the 
numbers of airports serving at each destination are significantly different from Japan. 
For example, the London airport system consists of 5 airports, which has presented 
great opportunities for LCCs to compete with incumbent airlines and stimulate demand.  
 
Both Japanese and EU airlines focused on the busy category 1 markets in the early 
stages of deregulation. The category 1 market in the EU was developed very much by 
the entry of LCCs. When the category 1 market in the EU matured around the year 2000, 
the focus of competition shifted to the category 2 market. Subsequently, competition 
expanded into category 3, 4 and 5 markets in order to develop new areas and to keep 
increasing market share in the intra-EU market as the EU continued to grow. When the 
competitive intensity is stronger, airlines need to optimise their resources and maximise 
possibilities to survive when competing with high productivity products. By reducing 
costs and offering lower fares, this positive flow leads to increased demand. 
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During the process of liberalisation of the Japanese domestic market between 1997 and 
2003, the number of slots at Haneda airport was increased five times. These slot 
allocations aimed to promote competition and improve consumers’ convenience by the 
formation of a diverse air transport network developing the routes serving local regions. 
In the first slot allocation, 80 slots were added including 12 for new entrants and 12 for 
the routes serving the newly opened airports as public obligation slots. The Phase III 
allocation from 1997-2003 involved a total of 174 slots in four steps, including 82 for 
new entrants and 12 as public obligation slots. In 2004, the total number of slots for 
airlines at Haneda airport was 774, consisting of 364 for JAL, 316 for ANA, 34 for 
Skymark, 20 for Air DO, 24 for Skynet Asia and 16 reserved for Starflyer and other 
new entrants. In 2006, these 16 reserved slots were used by above new entrants. 
 
The results of the analysis in chapter 6 clearly demonstrated three prominent different 
experiences compared to the UK domestic and UK-EU markets as a result of 
liberalisation: (1) decreased demand, (2) increased fares, and (3) new entrants’ failures. 
These results of liberalisation in the Tokyo routes market were demonstrated and 
verified statistically using Structural Equation Modelling in chapter 8. 
 
In chapter 9, the factors which caused the different experiences and acted as constraints 
in the development of the domestic air transport market even after liberalisation were 
investigated. This analysis revealed that the results of liberalisation in Japan have the 
negative direction flow, as airlines provide “high yield products” compared to the “high 
productivity products” of EU carriers. The high yield products in Japan require and are 
a result of high costs, including landing charge, aeronautical charges, fuel taxes, 
sourcing of services from competitors and labour costs. New entrants in Japan have not 
been able to seize the opportunities and make full use of their resources such as routes, 
aircraft, human resources, slots, etc. Thus, the Japanese domestic market has become a 
de facto duopoly market by JAL and ANA as a result of liberalisation even though 
several new entrants (Skymark, Air Do, Skynet Asia and Starflyer) are operating. All of 
them except Skymark are operating under the de facto management control of ANA.  
These outcomes enable airlines to increase fares so maintaining high yield in the 
domestic market in order to cross-subsidise routes where they compete with HSR and 
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other airlines on international routes. Fares are increased, particularly on the low 
demand routes (categories 4 and 5 markets), where frequency and demand dropped 
significantly. Most of these routes are serving airports which were constructed during 
the economic boom in the 1980s. As a result of the slot allocation system at Haneda 
airport and liberalisation, the supply of air services has shifted and has focused on the 
high demand routes (categories 1 and 2). The differences between routes epitomises the 
economic situation in Japan, which has witnessed a gap between Tokyo and local cities 
in terms of economic activity, especially in the ten years after the collapse of the bubble 
economy in the early 1990s. Moreover, in order to subsidise these local airports and 
develop international hub airports (Tokyo, Narita, Kansai and Chubu) in order for these 
to compete with other Asian international hub airports, the financial resources for these 
projects are supplied by high aeronautical charges, which have affected airlines’ costs 
and fares. Thus, this negative direction flow was caused by constraints for liberalisation 
in the domestic market.  
 
10.2 Policy recommendations 
Important suggestions for competition policy making can be derived from the results of 
the analysis. 
In order to change the negative direction flow in Japan to the positive direction by 
removing constraining factors, the reasons why LCCs in Europe achieved such a 
significant impact on the market is investigated. This mechanism is analysed and 
compared with the results of the Tokyo routes market after liberalisation. Extensive 
literature is available about the product features of LCCs, which have been successfully 
developed during deregulation, with the deregulated market affected by those airlines’ 
products. Barrett (2006) explained the differences between airlines which are suffering 
“distressed airline syndrome”41  and “deregulated airlines”, which have much higher 
productivities to develop the market. He explains that the high productivity is achieved 
by reducing cost, simplifying the product, using a single aircraft type in order to 
maximise pilot utilisation and maintenance productivity, reducing the aircraft 
                                                     
41 Doganis (2001) illustrated the “distressed state airline syndrome”, which had essential features as follows: substantial losses, 
over-politicisation, strong union, overstaffing, no clear development strategy, bureaucratic management and poor service quality. 
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turnaround time at airports and outsourcing services like passenger and baggage 
handling, maintenance and catering.  
 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the difference of “the deregulated market flow” between the 
intra-European market and Japan, which is based on Barrett’s “deregulated airline 
products” concept compared with those of Japanese airlines. Interestingly, different 
products resulted in opposite outcomes, which affected the market in a different way. In 
the Tokyo routes market, airlines’ operation products and distribution systems are 
expensive and there are no secondary airports in Tokyo. This results in high fares which 
affect the market negatively, decreasing demand, frequency and load factors. This 
market response resulted in higher costs for airlines, which were passed on to 
airlines’customers through higher fares. In order to increase yield in the domestic 
market high yield products were provided, such as business class and premium 
economy class on the domestic routes, and advanced check in and reservation system 
using mobile phones.  
The flow in the case of the Tokyo market circulates in a different direction from that of 
the European case (see Figures 10.2 and 10.3). In these flows, airline products and the 
existence of secondary airports are major differences and are expalnations to enable 
airlines cost reductions and low fares, which stimulate demand by a result of 
competition among airlines. Thease are important keys in order to improve the positive 
results by the further liberalisation in Japan. 
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Figure 10.1: Deregulated market flow and its mechanism of the intra-European market and the Tokyo route 
market 
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Figure 10.2: Deregulated market flow in the intra-European market (Left figure) 
Figure 10.3: Market flow in the Tokyo routes market after liberalisation (Right figure) 
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The slot allocation policy of 2005 (Phase III) was implemented in 2006. In 2009, the 
number of slots at Haneda airport will be increased to 1,114 a day, which will be about 
40% more than in 2005 (782 slots a day). One of the main constraints for liberalisation, 
which is the limitation of slots at Haneda, will thus be eased in 2009, enabling small-
sized aircraft operation. However, this is not a comprehensive solution. 
 
It is very difficult to promote a real basis for competition among airlines and HSR in 
Japan. Governments have been developing the transportation network of both rail and 
air in line with the growth of the Japanese economy under the name of competition 
policy since 1960s. The overestimated airport planning and demand based on the bubble 
economy in Japan were misestimations by the governmet.  
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The Japanese Government has been reluctant to implement significant changes and face 
the impacts of deregulation in order to avoid the bankrupted of airlines experienced in 
the US market. Therefore, the intensity of competition in Japanese air transport is 
interpreted and implemented differently from those of other areas as a result of this 
protective policy to Japanese airlines. The standard of competition has not reached the 
level of other industries like manufacturing, which have been competing in the global 
market. It seems that Japanese government policy has accomplished its objective which 
forced two network carriers (JAL and ANA) to change the structure of organisations, 
labour cost and their companies’ hieratical cultures, although the intensity of change is 
not enough compared with other airlines outside Japan as a result of liberalisation. 
The question is whether those Japanese airlines can compete with lower cost basis 
airlines in Asian countries when the air transport market is opened to others in the future.  
How do we need to utilise in the future the local airports which have been built and 
maintained with taxpayers’ money in order to improve demand and economic activities 
in those areas? 
 
Lower fares are crucial in order to stimulate demand and switch the direction of the 
market flow in Japan. To accomplish this, airlines need to offer high productivity 
products by reducing costs, as evidenced in the intra-EU market. The following 
recommendations are made in order to change the flow direction of the Japanese market 
to a positive circulation, with a market stimulated more by real competition between 
airlines and HSR. 
 
(1) Fare setting rule 
Following liberalisation in 2000 airlines can freely set fares. However, the 
regulation still requires advance notice in order to avoid excess competition. 
Moreover, flight schedules are determined at meetings of airlines, which are 
held every two months. Essentially, fares are fixed and announced in public by 
airlines two months before flight departure as a result of this regulation and 
customs among airlines. Although low discount fares are available they are very 
limited. Both airlines and HSR have not exercised yield management of their 
products on the domestic market in Japan (unlike in the intra-EU market) 
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because they prefer to keep high yield and this situation is maintained by the so-
called “Huddling culture” among them, which has been a big obstacle for 
competition in Japan. The full abolition of this fare setting rule would reduce 
these constraints and stimulate competition. 
 
(2) Airports 
• Secondary airports are needed which would be able to offer flexible 
landing and aeronautical charges to airlines in Metropolitan areas of 
Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka. 
• The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has the responsibility 
and power to set the landing charges at airports in Japan. Therefore, they 
need to implement the flexible landing charge and incentives in order to 
simulate demand. Specifically, landing charges should be set or 
incentives should be provided to airlines according to demand on the 
routes. A range of charging brackets, varing according to demand will 
allow for lower fares on the low demand routes such as categories 4 and 
5 as long as there is only one airport in Tokyo. 
• For real competition to happen, the structure of the airport development 
special account should be fundamentally reconsidered in order to provide 
flexible management at each airport management body. It also requires 
an airport system where profitable airports are able to subsidise non-
profitable airports, with its own financial resource rather than a single 
common financial resource by Government. This would provide more 
focus on non-aeronautical revenues at airports enabling them to develop 
and manage airports, by themselves. Soeda (2001) suggested this as one 
requirement for airport privatisation in Japan.  
• The need to best utilise the capacity at Haneda airport has promoted the 
high-demand and profitable routes, not only domestic sectors but also 
scheduled international routes.42 It is expected that from 2009 many more 
                                                     
42 A new policy concerned with the usage of Haneda airport was adopted in Cabinet on 25th June, 2002 that several 
scheduled international flights will be operated at Haneda airport after the completion of the improvement project in 
2009. 
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airlines will focus on profitable medium range international routes rather 
than non-profitable domestic categories 4 and 5 routes. This will increase 
the gap between Tokyo and local cities in terms of economic activity as a 
result. The 2009 slot allocation exercise should take these negative 
effects into consideration in order to promote demand on the routes 
serving categories 4 and 5 destinations until secondary airports in Tokyo 
are established. 
• It should be reconsidered whether or not to continue the operation of 
several very low demand secondary airports in categories 4 and 5 
markets. The result of the analysis demonstrates their economic and 
demographic scales are too small to maintain two or three airports, 
especially when compared with the intra-EU case and it places a big 
burden on the local economy. If they depend on only domestic routes, it 
is very doubtful that it will be possible to keep all these airports open for 
local economic activities. 
 
(3) Labour cost reduction 
• It is a fundamental requirement for Japanese airlines to reduce labour 
costs, especially the costs of flight and cabin crew. JAL already aims to 
reduce these costs as part of their restructuring project from 2007. Since 
the yield in the domestic market started dropping in 1993, both JAL 
(JAS) and ANA have tried to solve these problems, which are partly due 
to strong unions and bureaucratic cultures. This solution is essential for 
survival in the competitive liberalised market with competition not only 
from Japanese airlines, but also from other Asian airlines. 
• The requirements imposed on non-Japanese flight crew should be 
reasonably eased in order to promote the number of qualified low cost 
flight crew. The current requirement is relatively strict in terms of flight 
hours and the medical requirement. However, it is the biggest alternative 
possibility to enable cost reductions. Further specific work of 
Government is necessary regarding this matter. 
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(4) Strong new entrants 
• The results of this study demonstrated the insignificant impact of new 
entrants on the market and their failure in Japan compared to new 
entrants in the EU. If they could have managed their projects as 
independent airlines, they would have had more possibilities to succeed 
in the high yield domestic market. Most of them are operating as de facto 
subsidiary LCCs of Japanese network carriers. Despite this, there was 
some impact on network carriers and the airline industry as a whole, 
although it was not as strong as in the EU. However, strong and steady 
LCCs are a prerequisite for real liberalisation. 
• The system for acquiring an AOC in Japan has been established since 
Skymark Airlines applied in 1997. Although strict safety regulations are 
required for a Japanese AOC, the financial fitness requirement is not as 
strict as that for obtaining a UK AOC. The UK regulations require 
monitoring of the financial fitness investigations by the authorities for 
three years after the initial operation. In case of unsatisfactory results, a 
new entrant could ultimately be forced to cease its operation. No 
Japanese new entrant would have satisfied this regulation. Thus, the strict 
financial fitness requirement is important to produce stable new entrants. 
• Not only changes of the AOC system, but also the wider business 
environment are required for producing strong new entrants, such as a 
low cost maintenance company and flight crew and cabin crew training 
facilities certified by the JCAB. It was demonstrated in chapter 9 that the 
outsourcing cost of Skymark Airlines proved a big burden for the airline. 
• Experienced professionals for start-up airlines: Most of the new entrants’ 
staff consist of former JAL, JAS and ANA employees. Their sometimes 
strong loyalty to former companies often causes frictions among 
employees and means that in some cases confidential information has 
been leaked to competitors. Moreover, new entrants have adopted the 
same strategies and organisational structures as incumbent airlines. As a 
result, they have not been able to reinvent practices, because business 
customs, operational methods, marketing and distribution, etc were 
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adopted from the incumbent airlines. By contrast, experienced 
international managers in the organisation could break through this kind 
of solid traditional Japanese cooperative culture, examples of which are 
found in the manufacturing industry such as Nissan and Sony, in order to 
implement innovation. 
10.3 Originality and contribution to knowledge 
This research analyses the Tokyo domestic routes in order to identify their key 
characteristics and the main factors that have influenced the situation pre-and post-
deregulation. The key aim of this study is to demonstrate the different experiences in the 
Japanese domestic market compared to those of other regions as a result of liberalisation 
and to identify the constraints for air transport liberalisation in Japan. Although 
academic literature has analysed the effects of air transport liberalisation, previous 
researchers have not compared the Japanese domestic market to the intra-EU market. In 
Japanese literature (Chujyo, 2001, Endo, 2001 and Shiomi, 2001) the positive effects of 
liberalisation were highlighted by analysing long term periods from 1985 to 2000 to 
compare the situations in 1985 and 2000. 
 
This research attempts to investigate the changes in the domestic market in Japan by 
considering the key factors influencing the market change, namely: demand, supply, 
market share and airlines’ productivity, and by focusing on the differences pre-and post-
liberalisation in 2000. In addition, the relationship between these factors is analysed by 
identifying the key elements affecting the air transport market, such as Government 
policy, the airlines’ reactions and the economic activity in Japan since the 1950s. In this 
way, the characteristics of the Japanese market are described and the reasons for the 
different experiences compared to the intra-EU market are explained, so as to identify 
the constraints for liberalisation. 
 
This comprehensive study about the Japanese domestic market which covers extensive 
data is the first of its kind in literature. The main contribution of this study is the 
demonstration of the results of liberalisation in the domestic market in Japan using both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques and the provision of an analytical approach to 
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explain the constraints for liberalisation. Moreover, this research is considered original 
because the results of air transport liberalisation in Japan are verified and confirmed by 
Structural Equation Analysis, demonstrating the importance of each factor which affects 
the market. 
The specific contributions are as follows: 
 
a. An analysis of the effects of air transport liberalisation in Japan using extensive 
types of data over a long time period, which has never before been undertaken. 
b. The different experiences in Japan compared to the EU are analysed and 
important issues regarding the process of deregulation are identified in order to 
contribute to future policy making. 
c. Structural Equation Modeling analysis of the air transport market has never 
before been undertaken. This modeling analysis seeks to verify the total effects of 
deregulation on the market to provide an evaluation of the importance of each 
key determinant and to test the overall fit of the model to the data, in the process 
demonstrating the structure of the deregulated air transport market in Japan. 
10.4 Limitations of the research and suggestions for further 
research 
In spite of every effort to pursue the objectives of this research, there are some 
limitations of this study. 
 
The study is focused on the Tokyo routes market in order to reveal the effects of slot 
allocation at Haneda airport as one of the key factors affecting the market during the 
process of liberalisation. Therefore, there are some limitations with respect to the effects 
of liberalisation on the whole domestic market, especially with regards to other routes 
serving other congested airports such as Osaka, Nagoya and Fukuoka. Research 
investigating the impact on these markets serving other congested airports and the 
relationship between them could demonstrate clearly the effects of liberalisation on the 
routes serving local regions. 
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Competition between air transport and HSR has been analysed mainly using 2003 and 
2005 data because of the limitations of Japanese HSR fare data. The results demonstrate 
that the high fares affect the Japanese market more than discounted fares. Further study 
which covers longer periods before and after liberalisation (e.g. from 1996 to 2007) 
could identify any change of high yield products of both airlines and HSR.  
 
Comparative analysis with the HSR in France was adopted in order to show the LCCs 
impact and reaction on those routes. It revealed the differences in competition between 
the Japanese and French domestic markets. However, it has certain limitations 
compared with the Tokyo routes market in respect of demographics and economic scale. 
The study about the shorter sectors like Eurostar and their products and the effects on 
the air transport market could cover the gap caused by this limitation and demonstrate 
the differences between HSR in Japan and Europe more clearly. 
 
The results of this study reveal the key elements affecting high cost products in Japan 
which are constraints for liberalisation. The airport system is particulary pointed out as 
one of the biggest constraints. The reasons and effects of the airport system on the high 
yield products of Japanese airlines have been analysed using existing data and literature. 
However, it was considered outside the scope of this thesis to discuss and demonstrate 
specific solutions regarding the airport issues, such as privatisation of airports in Japan 
and financial resourcing. A further study is needed to provide specific solutions for 
policy making. 
 
This research analyses the Tokyo routes market by focusing on the period from 1997 to 
2005 (Phase I to II). Phase III slot allocation was executed in 2006 based on the results 
of the Phase II allocation. Phase III slot allocation already impacts on the market clearly, 
particularly in the categories 4 and 5 markets. Airlines including new entrants have 
shifted their flights to more profitable routes. For example, JAL announced they were 
dropping a total of 11 unprofitable routes in January 2007. Low demand airports and 
local governments have been nervously following airlines’ network changes. JAL 
introduced a discount ticket on the Tokyo-Nankishirahama route (category 5) following 
the strong request of local government in order to promote demand using subsidies from 
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the local government account. JAL provides the new discount ticket on this route as a 
trial only for three months from March to June 2007. The gap among routes is expected 
to be larger as a result of the Phase III allocation. A further study covering the period 
2003-2009 could provide clear evidence and suggestions for the 2009 slot allocation by 
demonstrating the results of the Phase III slot allocation.  
 
Several local airports increased demand on international charter routes. The Noto-
 Taipei route increased the number of departures per year to 109 in 2005 from only 4 in 
2003 and 39 in 2004. More than 20,000 passengers were carried on the route over a 
period of three years. The restrictions of the international charter flights were widely 
eased in May 2007 under the government policy to promote international demand from 
outside Japan and to encourage the tourism industry and air transport in Japan. The 
analysis of the international charter and scheduled markets serving local airports in 
Japan could suggest possibilities to utilise and revitalise the airports and local regions 
and ease the constraints for liberalisation. 
 
The open skies agreement between the EU and the US has been concluded and will be 
implemented in March 2008. In Japan, the possibility of open skies with other countries 
has been discussed in Government since the Abe administration started in 2007. It is 
expected that the waves of open skies are going to reach the market in Japan much 
quicker than Japanese airlines and the Government expect, although they are not ready 
yet as a result of the imperfect domestic market liberalisation. However, a real basis for 
competition in the domestic market is expected when the number of slots is increased at 
Haneda airport in 2009. Moreover, further severe competition is waiting for Japanese 
airlines as they face rival Asian airports and airlines which possess extremely low cost 
products on a global scale. In order to prepare for the next step of liberalisation and the 
competition which is expected to enter the Japanese air transport market, a fundamental 
change and innovation of liberalised Japanese air transport system is needed by 
drastically removing constraints. The ultimate results will be that the air transport 
system in Japan will change itself. 
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“The wave is coming soon to Asia and Japan, whether we want it or not. We can’t 
wait for it to happen without any preparation. We need to be ready to change 
ourselves.”43 
(ANA CEO Mr. Mineo Yamamoto) 
                                                     
43 During the interview by the Japanese press in Copenhagen about the open skies agreement between the UK and 
the US in May, 2007 ( source: Jiji-press, 2007) 
Chapter 10: Conclusions and recommendations  
- 238 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page is intentionally left blank 
 
 - xxv - 
References and bibliographies 
References 
Abeyratne, R.I.R. (2000). Management of airport congestion through slot allocation, 
Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 29-41.  
Ablrecht, K. & Zemke, R. (1985). Service America: Doing Business in the New 
Economy, Dow Jones-Irwin, USA.  
Airline Business, vol. 20, no. 3. 
Airline Business, vol. 20, no. 4. 
Airline Business, vol.20, no. 5. 
Barrett, D. (2004). How do the demands for the airport services differ between full-
service carriers and low-cost carriers?, Journal of Air Transport Management, 
vol. 10, pp. 33-39. 
Bhadra, D. (2002). Demand for air travel in the United States: Bottom-up econometric 
estimation and implications for forecasts by origin-destination pairs, American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2002-5861. 
Blayac, T. & Causse, A. (2001). Value of travel time: a theoretical legitimization of 
some nonlinear representative utility in discrete choice models, Transportation 
Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 391-400.  
Briginshaw, D. (2005). The complexities of high-speed rail, International Railway 
Journal, vol. 45, no. 11, pp. 19.  
Chang, Y. & Williams, G. (2001). Changing the rules- amending the nationality clauses 
in air services agreements, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 7, pp. 
207-216. 
Chujyo, U. (2001). Jiyukago No Kokunaikoukuseisaku No Kadai, Transportation & 
Economy, vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 12-18. 
Clougherty, J.A., Dresner, M. and Oum, T.H. (2001). An empirical analysis of 
Canadian international air policy: Effects of dual carrier designation and partial 
liberalisation, Transport Policy, vol. 8, pp 219-230 
Dresner, M & Tretheway, M. (1992). Modelling and testing the effect of market 
structure on price, the case of international air transport, Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, vol.26, no.2, pp.171-184. 
 
References and bibliographies 
- xxvi - 
Endo, N. (2001). Koukukiseikanwa to Shijyou No Hensen, Transportation & Economy 
(Unyu to Keizai), vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 43-39. 
Eurocontrol, (2004). Case Innovative Action Project "Innovative Route Charging 
Schemes" Work package 3, "Analysis and modeling of passenger choice between 
air and rail transportation modes", Eurocontrol.  
Feldhoff, T. (2002). Japan's regional airports: conflicting national, regional and local 
interests, Journal of Transport Geography, vol. 10, pp. 165-175. 
Forsyth, P. (1997). Price regulation of airports: principles with Australian applications, 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, vol. 33, no. 
4, pp. 297-309.  
Gilbert, D. & Wong, R. (2002). Passenger expectations and airline services: A Hong 
Kong Based Study, Tourism Management. 
Gonzalez-Savignat, M. (2004). Competition in air transport The case of the high speed 
train, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, vol. 38, no. Part 1, pp. 77-108.  
Heskett, J., Sasser, W. & Schlesinger, L. (1997). The Service Profit Chain: How 
Leading Companies Link Profit and Growth to Loyalty, Satisfaction and Value, 
The free press, New York.  
Hansjochen, E. (2001). Liberalization in German air transport—analysis and 
competition policy recommendations: Summary of a German study, Journal of Air 
Transport Management, vol.7, no.1, pp.51-55. 
IATA (2000). Ensuring an effective and globally compatible slot allocation system, 
IATA policy paper. 
JCAB (1970). The Cabinet Meeting Resolution of 1970, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (1972).The Notification by the Minister of Transportation on 1st July 1972, 
JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (1986). The transport policy meeting report of June 1986, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (1997). The slot allocation at Haneda airport, March 1997, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2000). The new slot allocation at Haneda airport, March 2000, Advisery 
circular no. 80, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2002a). The slot allocation at Haneda airport, January 2002, Advisery circular, 
no. 249, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2002b). The new slot allocation at Tokyo international airport, May 2002, 
Advisery circular, no. 53, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2002c). The new slot allocation at Tokyo international airport, May 2002, 
Advisery circular no. 54, JCAB, Tokyo. 
References and bibliographies 
- xxvii - 
JCAB (2003a). The slot allocation at Haneda airport, January 2002, Advisery circular 
no. 429, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2003b). The slot allocation at Tokyo international airport, April 2003 Advisory 
circular no. 46, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2003c). The international charter flight at Tokyo International airport, Advisory 
circular, Octover 2003, Advisery circular no. 2488, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2003d). The international flight on the Haneda-Kinpo routes, October 2003, 
JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2004a). The slot allocation at Tokyo international airport, September 2004, 
Advisory circular no. 301, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2004b). The slot allocation at Tokyo international airport, September 2004, 
Advisory circular no. 302, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2004c). The usage of the Haneda airport, September 2004, JCAB Report, 
JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2005a). The slot allocation at Haneda airport, August 2005, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2005b). The slot re-allocation at Haneda airport, August 2005, JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2005c). The slot allocation at Haneda airport Report, August 2005, JCAB, 
Tokyo. 
JCAB (2005d). The slot allocation for new entrants at Haneda airport, Octover 2005, 
JCAB, Tokyo. 
JCAB (2005e). The slot allocation for new entrants at Haneda airport, Decemver 2005, 
JCAB, Tokyo. 
Jorge-Calderon, J. (1997). A demand model for schedules airline services on 
international European routes, Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol. 3, 
pp. 23-35. 
Kano, Y. and Miura, A. (2003). Graphical Multivariate Analysis, Gendaisugakushsa, 
Japan. 
Kawaguchi, M. (2000). Gendai kouku Seisakuron, 2nd ed. Seizandoshoten, Tokyo. 
Kojima, T. (2004), Covariance Structural Modelling and Graphical Modelling by 
Excel, Ohmsha, Japan. 
McDermott, P. (2002). New Frontier Is ready for the Southwest clones, the AVMARK 
Aviation Economist, London. 
References and bibliographies 
- xxviii - 
Madas, M.A. & Zografos, K.G. (2006). Airport slot allocation: from instruments to 
strategies, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 53-62.  
Maillebiau, E. and Hansen, M. (1995). Demand and consumer welfare impacts of 
international airline liberalisation, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
vol.24, no.2, pp. 115-136. 
Mandel, B., Gaudry, M. & Rothengatter, W. (1994). Linear or nonlinear utility 
functions in logit models? The impact on German high-speed rail demand 
forecasts, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 91-
101.  
Nero, G. (1998). Spatial multiproduct pricing: empirical evidence on intra-European 
duopoly Airline markets, Applied Economics, vol.30, pp. 465-475 
Oum, T. and Lee, Y. (2002). The North Asian air transport network, Is there a 
possibility of creating Open skies in the region?, Journal of Air Transport 
Management, vol. 8, pp. 327-337. 
Pallant, J. (2003). SPSS Survival manual, Open University Press. 
Parashraman, A., Zeithaml, A. & Berry, L. (1985). A conceptual model of service 
Quality and Its Implications for Future Research, Journal of Marketing, vol. 49, pp. 
41-55.  
Parasuraman, A., Zeithaml, A. & Berry, A. (1988). SERVQAL: A multiple-item scale 
for measuring consumer perceptions of service quality, Journal of Retailing, vol. 
64, pp. 12-40.  
Park, Y. & Ha, H. (2006). Analysis of the impact of high-speed railroad service on air 
transport demand, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation 
Review, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 95-104.  
Schipper, Y., Rietveld, P. and Nijkamp, P. (2002). European airline reform, an 
empirical welfare analysis, Transport Economics and Policy, vol.36, Part.2, pp. 
189-209. 
Schumacher, R.E. & Lomax, R.G. (2004). A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation 
Modelling, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Shiomi, E. (2001). Kaiseikoukuuhou to Kyousousokushin no Kadai, Transportation and 
Economy, vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 27-34.  
Soeda, S. (2000). Kukokeiei-Kokusaihikaku to Nihon No Kukou No Arikata, 
Unyuseisakukikou, Tokyo. 
Starkie, D. (1998). Allocating Airport Slots: a Role for the Market?, Journal of Air 
Transport Management, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 111-116.  
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidel, L.S. (2006). Using multivariate statistics, International 
edtion, Pearson Education, Inc., Boston.  
References and bibliographies 
- xxix - 
Takahashi, T. (1995), System Enginnering Design, Hakutoh Shobou, Tokyo.  
Tam, R. and Hansman, R. J. (2002), Impact of air transportation on regional economic 
and social connectivity in the United States”, American Institute of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, 2002-5863 
Terabe, S., Kato, W., Kouno, H. & Mizoguchi, M. (2000). Modal choice modeling of 
inter-city tranportation passengers: competition between high speed railway and air 
transportation. In: 25th Doboku keikakugaku Kenkyu Happyoukai, Nagoya 
University, Japan. 
Toyoda, H. (2004). Covariance Structural Analysis (Introductions), Asakura, Japan. 
Toyoda, H. (2004). Covariance Structural Analysis (Advanced), Asakura, Japan. 
Williams, G. (1994). The Airline Industry and the Impact of Deregulation, Ashgate, 
London. 
Williams, G. (2002). Airline Competition: Deregulation's Mixed Legacy, Ashgate, 
London. 
Yamauchi, H. & Ito, T. (1996). Air transport policy in Japan. In: Flying High 
Liberalizing Civil Aviation in the Asia Pacific, edited by Hufbauer, G.C. & 
Findlay, C. Institute for International Economics and Australia-Japan Research 
Centrer, Washington, DC & Canberra, Australia, pp. 33-62. 
Yao, E., Morikawa, T. & Kurauchi, T., S. (2002). A study on nested logit mode choice 
model for intercity high-speed rail system with combined RP/SP data, Traffic and 
Transportation Studies, vol. 1, pp. 612-619.  
 
References and bibliographies 
- xxx - 
Bibliographies 
Air Transport Group School of Engineering Cranfield University. (2002). Study on 
competition between airports and the application of state aid rules, European 
Commission Directorate F- Air Transport, Final report, vol. 1. 
Alam, H. (2002). Low-cost revenue management- Easyjet vs Ryanair, The AVMARK 
Aviation Economist, London. 
Alamdari, F. (2002). Regional development in airlines and travel agents relationship, 
Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 8, pp. 339-348. 
Alamdari, F. & Morrell, P. (1997). Airline labour cost reduction: post-liberalisation 
experience in the USA and Europe, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 3, 
no. 2, pp. 53-66.  
Ashley, D.J., Hanson, P. & Veldhuis, J. (1995). A policy-sensitive traffic forecasting 
model for Schiphol airport, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 
89-97.  
Aurisicchio, G. & Pascoschi, G.(2005). Advances in high-speed measuring trains, 
International Railway Journal, vol. 45, no. 11, pp. 40.  
Balfour, J. (2004). EC competition law and airline alliances, Journal of Air Transport 
Management, vol. 10, pp. 81-85. 
Barbot, C. (2006). Low-cost airlines, secondary airports, and state aid: an economic 
assessment of the Ryanair–Charleroi airport agreement, Journal of Air Transport 
Management, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 197-203.  
Barrett, S.D. (1997). The implications of the Ireland-UK airline deregulation for an EU 
internal market, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 67-73.  
Barrett, S.D. (1999). Peripheral market entry, product differentiation, supplier rents and 
sustainability in the deregulated European aviation market - a case study, Journal 
of Air Transport Management, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 21-30.  
Barrett, S.D. (2001). Market entry to the full-service airline market-a case study from 
the deregulated European aviation sector, Journal of Air Transport Management, 
vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 189-193.  
Barrett, S.D. (2004). How do the demands for airport services differ between full-
service carriers and low-cost carriers?, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 
10, no. 1, pp. 33-39.  
Barrett, S.D. (2006). Commercialising a national airline—the Aer Lingus case study, 
Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 159-167.  
Bhadra, D. (2002). Demand for air travel in the United States: bottom-up econometric 
estimation and implications for forecasts by origin-destination pairs, American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2002-5861. 
References and bibliographies 
- xxxi - 
Bonnasseies, O. (1998). Japanese market, fundamental changes ahead, The Avmark 
Aviation Economist, pp. 2-7. 
Briginshaw, D. (2005). Europe, Asia: A showcase for high speed rail, Railway Age, vol. 
206, no. 11, pp. 56.  
Buttle, F. (2004). Customer Relationship Management Concepts and Tools, Elsevier, 
Oxford. 
Caves, R.E. (1995). Slot allocation: A proposal for Europe's airports: Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) CAP 644, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 2, no. 1, 
pp. 52-53.  
Cole, S. (1998). Applied Transport Economics, 2nd ed. Kogan Page Limited, London 
Colin, H. (2001). Cost control: first know your enemy, The AVMARK Aviation 
Economist, London. 
Cordle, V. (2002). What is fair pay for airline labour?, The AVMARK Aviation 
Economist, London. 
Danaher, P. (1997). Using conjoint analysis to determine the relative importance of 
service attributes measured in customer satisfaction surveys, Journal of 
Retailing, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 235-260. 
Doganis, R. (1994). The Impact of Liberalization on European Airline Strategies and 
Operations, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 15-25.  
Doganis, R. (2003). Flying Off Course, Routledge, London. 
Draper, N. & Smith, H. (1998). Applied Regression Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
New York.  
Dresner, M. & Windle, R. (2001). Resource availability and new entry in the US airline 
industry, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 231-239.  
Fanke, M. (2004). Competition between network carriers and low-cost carriers- retreat 
battle or breakthrough to a new level of efficiency, Journal of Air Transport 
Management, vol. 10, pp. 15-21. 
Feldhoff, T. (2003). Japan’s capital Tokyo and its airports: problems and prospects from 
subnational and supranational perspectives, Journal of Air Transport 
Management, vol. 9, pp. 241-254. 
Forsyth, P. (2001). Total factor productivity in Australian domestic aviation, Transport 
Policy, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 201-207.  
Fosgerau, M. (2006). Investigating the distribution of the value of travel time savings, 
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 688-707.  
References and bibliographies 
- xxxii - 
Fujii, S. & Kitamura, R. (2000). Evaluation of trip-inducing effects of new freeways 
using a structural equations model system of commuters’ time use and travel, 
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 339-354.  
Gerber, P. (2002). Success factors for the privatisation of airports-an airline perspective, 
Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 29-36.  
Goulias, K.G. & Kitamura, R. (1993). Analysis of binary choice frequencies with limit 
cases: comparison of alternative estimation methods and application to weekly 
household mode choice, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 27, 
no. 1, pp. 65-78.  
Greene, W, H. (2003). Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Gudmundsson, S.V. & Van Kranenburg, H.L. (2002). New airline entry rates in 
deregulated air transport markets, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review, vol. 38, no. 3-4, pp. 205-219.  
Gudmundsson, S.V. (1997). The difference between European and us airline 
management practice: the case of new-entrant airlines, Journal of Air Transport 
Management, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 75-82.  
Hanaoka, S. (2003). Evaluation of air traffic distribution policies in multiple-airport 
systems-case of Tokyo metropolitan area, Transport Policy Studies’ Review in 
Japan, vol. 5, no. 4, pp.2-13.  
Hayes, B. (1998). Measuring Customer Satisfaction: Survey Design, Use, and 
Statistical Analysis Methods (2nd edition), ASQC, Milwaukee. 
Huber, P. (2006). Who pays for speed?, Forbes, vol. 177, no. 4, pp. 56.  
Ide, H. (2001). Koukuujigyou No Seidokaikaku to Kyousokankyou No Seibi, 
Transportation & Economy (Unyu to Keizai), Vol. 61, No. 8, pp. 35-39. 
Inglada, V., Rey, B., Rodriguez-Alvarez, A. & Coto-Millan, P. (2006). Liberalisation 
and efficiency in international air transport, Transportation Research Part A: 
Policy and Practice, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 95-105.  
Ionidos, N. (2004). Domestic Union, Airline Business, Vol. 20, No. 5. 
Jiang, M. & Morikawa, T (2004). Theoretical analysis on the variation of value of travel 
time savings, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, vol. 38, no. 8, 
pp. 551-571.  
Kagiyama, R (2000). Japan’s high-speed rail system between Osaka and Tokyo and 
commitment to maglev technology: a comparative analysis with California’s high 
speed rail proposal between SanJose/San Francisco bay area and Los Angeles 
metropolitan area, Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface 
Transportation Policy Studies, USA.  
References and bibliographies 
- xxxiii - 
Kangis, P. & O'Reilly, M.D. (2003). Strategies in a dynamic marketplace: A case study 
in the airline industry, Journal of Business Research, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 105-111.  
Kitamura, R. (1984). A model of daily time allocation to discretionary out-of-home 
activities and trips, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 18, no. 
3, pp. 255-266.  
Kitamura, R. (1984). Incorporating trip chaining into analysis of destination choice, 
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 67-81.  
Kitamura, R., Yamamoto, T. & Fujii, S. (2003). The effectiveness of panels in detecting 
changes in discrete travel behavior, Transportation Research Part B: 
Methodological, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 191-206.  
Kuppam, A.R. & Pendyala, R.M. (2001). A structural equations analysis of commuters' 
activity and travel patterns, Transportation, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 33.  
Kurita, Z. (2004), Kokunaikoukusangyou No Kiseikanwa to Shijyousaihen, vol. 64, no. 
1, pp. 43-47. 
Lenoir, N. & Laplace, i. (2006). Rail deregulation in Europe, and prospects of air-rail 
integration, ATRS, USA.  
Lu, C. (2003). The impact of carrier service attributes on shipper-carrier partnering 
relationships: a shipper's perspective, Transportation Research Part E, Logistics & 
Transportation Review, vol. 39E, no. 5, pp. 399.  
Marcoulides, A. & Schumacker, E. (1996). Advanced Structural Equation Modeling, 
Issues and Techniques, Lawrence Erlbaum associates, Inc. 
Mason, K. (2001). Marketing low-cost airline services to business travellers, Journal of 
Air Transport Management, vol. 7, pp. 103-109. 
McHardy, J. & Trotter, S. (2006). Competition and deregulation: Do air passengers get 
the benefits?” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, vol. 40, no. 1, 
pp. 74-93.  
Nakajima, K. (2003). Branding strategy of ANA, Transportation & Economy (Unyu to 
Keizai), vol. 63, no. 11, pp. 46-54. 
Nikkei (1st March, 2004). KIX Landing Fee Decreased, Nihonkeizaishinbun, Japan.  
Nyathi, M., Hooper, P. and Hensher, D (1993). Compass Airlines: 1 December 1990 to 
20 December 1991, What went wrong? - Part 1, Transport Reviews, Vol. 13, No. 
2, pp. 119-149. 
Nyathi, M., Hooper, P. and Hensher, D. (1993), Compass Airlines: 1 December 1990 to 
20 December 1991, What went wrong? - Part 2”, Transport Reviews, vol. 13, no. 
3, pp. 185-206. 
References and bibliographies 
- xxxiv - 
O’Connell, F. & Williams, G. (2005). Passengers’ perceptions of low cost airlines and 
full service carriers: A case study involving Ryanair, Aer Lingus, Air Asia and 
Malaysia Airlines, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 259-
272.  
O'Connor, K. (2003). Asia's Emerging Low Cost Carriers, Aviation Strategy, pp. 3-5. 
Okada, A., Tanabe, K., Noguchi, T. & Moriuchi, S. (2006). A time series study on the 
effects of airport opening and deregulations in Japanese domestic air passenger 
transport". In: ATRS conference, Nagoya, June 2006. 
Ono, Y. (1993). Japan's sustainable transport policy towards the 21st century, Transport 
Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 32-42.  
Pilat, D. (1996). Competition, productivity and efficiency, OECD.  
Pilling, M. (2005). Turning the screw, Airline Business, vol.21, no. 10, pp. 44-46. 
Reichheld, F. and Sasser, E. (1990), Zero defections: Quality comes to services, 
Harvard Business Review, pp. 105-111. 
Rencher, A, C. (1995). Methods of Multivariate Analysis, John Wiley and Suns, Inc, 
Canada. 
Reynolds-Feighan, J. (1995). European and American approaches to air transport 
liberalisation: Some implications for small communities, Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 467-483.  
Sakakibara, Y. (2001). Jiyuka Ichinengo No Koukuyusou, Transportation & Economy, 
Vol. 61-8, No. 8 , pp. 19-25. 
Sharma, S. (1996). Applied Multivariate Techniques, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New 
York. 
Swan, W. (2002). Airline route developments: a review of history, Journal of Air 
Transport Management, Vol. 8, pp. 349-353. 
Takebayashi, M. & Kuroda, k. (2006). Multiple airport system and management policy: 
case of Osaka metropolitan area". In: ATRS International Conference, Nagoya 
Japan. 2006. 
Tak-Kee, H. and Chi Ching, Y. (2002). A study in the seasonal variation of Japanese 
tourist arrivals in Singapore, Tourism Management, vol. 23, pp. 127-131. 
Teas, K. (1993). Expectations, performance evaluation, and consumers' perceptions of 
quality, Journal of Marketing, vol. 57, pp. 18-34. 
Williams, G. (2001). Will Europe's charter carriers be replaced by “no-frills” scheduled 
airlines?, Journal of Air Transport Management, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 277-286.  
References and bibliographies 
- xxxv - 
Williams, G. and Pagliari, R. (2004). A comparative analysis of the application and use 
of public service obligations in air transport within the EU, Transport Policy, 
vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 55-66. 
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (2003). WCP STATUS REPORT: AVIATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION Part I: Current Proceedings November 2003, Wilmer, 
Cutler & Pickering, Brussels 
Windle, R. & Dresner, M. (1999). Competitive responses to low cost carrier entry, 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, vol. 35, no. 
1, pp. 59-75.  
Windle, R.J. & Dresner, M.E. (1992). Partial productivity measures and total factor 
productivity in the air transport industry: limitations and uses, Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 435-445.  
Yamaguchi, K. (2007). Inter-regional air transport accessibility and macro-economic 
performance in Japan, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 247-258.  
Yamamoto, K. & Onodera, T. (2002). Covariance Structural Analysis and Case study 
by AMOS, 1st ed, Nakanishiya, Japan.  
Zhou, X. & Zhong, M. (2005) Bicriteria train scheduling for high-speed passenger 
railroad planning applications, European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 
167, no. 3, pp. 752.  
References and bibliographies 
- xxxvi - 
In addition, the following internet resources were used for collecting data in this thesis: 
 
Statistic Bureau of Japan: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/ssds/5a.htm 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transportation: http://toukei.mlit.go.jp/ 
Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan: http://www.ircj.co.jp/english/index.html 
Central Japan Railway: http://jr-central.co.jp/eng.nsf/english/report 
Eurostat:. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_330765
76&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
ICAO: http://www.icao.int/ 
OECD: 
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3025,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
The Airline Group of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies 
(AGIFORS): http://www.agifors.org/index.jsp 
IATA airline analyser: 
http://www.airlineplanning.com/srs/authentication/index.jsp?frm=logout&rnd=1170343
674822 
The International Monetary Fund Exchange Rate Archives by Month: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx 
Civil Aviation Authority Aviation statistics:  
http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=80&pagetype=90 
 
Air transport association, Annual reports of US airline industry: 
http://www.airlines.org/economics/review_and_outlook/annual+reports.htm 
Directions de l'Aviation civile (DAC) statistics: 
 
http://www.aviation-civile.gouv.fr/html/prospace/stats/commerc.htm#archives 
 
 
 - xxxvii - 
Appendix 
 - xxxviii - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page is intentionally left blank 
 
 
Appendix A: Variables in demand equation modelling for selected studies 
- xxxix - 
Appendix A: Variables in demand equation modelling for selected studies 
 
Factors 
Authors 
(year of publication) 
Areas 
Data 
period Fare Frequency Income Demographic Distance Airport 
New 
entrant 
Others 
Dresner and Tretheway 
(1992) 
North Atlantic routes 1976-1981   X X X    
Mallebiau and 
Hansen(1995) 
North Atlantic routes 1969-1989 X X      
The sum of annual exports 
and imports 
Jorge- Calderon(1997) 
Intra European international 
routes 
1989 X X X X X X   
Nero(1998) 
Intra European city-pairs, 
operated by two carries 
1993 X X  X    
Trade 
The ratio of train to flight 
journey time on the route 
Clougherty et al (2001) 
Canadian international 
routes 
1982-1994 X X  X     
Schipper et al (2002) European interstate routes 1988-1992 X X X X X X   
Bhadra (2002) North American regions 1999 -2000 X  X X X X X 
Intensity of economic 
activities 
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Factors dummy dummy 
Authors 
(year of 
publication) 
Areas 
Data 
period 
Pax Cost Frequency Income Demographic Distance Others Liberalisation  
Nero(1998) 
Intra European city-
pairs, operated by 
two carries 
1993 X X  X X X  XX 
A 
neighbouring 
configuration 
Clougherty et al 
(2001) 
Canadian 
international routes 
1982-
1994 
 X     
Number of 
carriers 
XX 
Dual 
operation 
Schipper et al 
(2002) 
European interstate 
routes 
1988-
1992 
X  X       
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Appendix C: Legal articles 
 
(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of January 1993, Article 6  
Article 6 Airport capacity 
1. At an airport where slot allocation takes place, the competent authorities shall 
determine the capacity available for slot allocation twice yearly in cooperation with 
representatives of air traffic control, customs and immigration authorities and air 
carriers using the airport and / or their representative organisations and the airport 
coordinator, according to the airport authority it shall also be consulted. 
 
(2) Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of January 1993, Article 8 
Article 8 Process of slot allocation 
1. (a) A slot has been operated by an air carrier as cleared by the coordinator shall 
entitle that air carrier to claim the same slot in the next equivalent scheduling 
period. 
(b) In a situation where all slot requests cannot be accommodated to the satisfaction 
of the air carriers concerned, preference shall be given to commercial air services 
and in particular to scheduled services and programmed non-scheduled services. 
(c) The coordinator shall also take into account additional priority rules established 
by the air carrier industry and if possible additional guidelines recommended by the 
coordination committee allowing for local conditions, provided such guidelines 
respect Community law. 
 
4. Slots may be freely exchanged between air carriers or transferred by an air carrier 
from one route, or type of service, to another, by mutual agreement or a result of a 
total or partial takeover or unilaterally. Any such exchanges or transfers shall be 
transparent and subject to confirmation of feasibility by the coordinator that: 
(a) airport operations would not be prejudiced; 
(b) limitations imposed by a Member State according to Article 9 are respected; 
(c) a change of use does not fall within the scope of Article 11. 
 
(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of January 1993, Article 2 
Article 2  
(b) “new entrant” shall mean: 
(i) an air carrier requesting slots at an airport on any day and holding or having 
been allocated fewer than four slots at that airport on that day, or, 
(ii) an air carrier requesting slots for a non-stop service between two Community 
airport where at most two other air carriers operate a direct service between 
these airport or airport systems on that day and holding or having been allocated 
fewer than four slots at that airport on that day for that non-stop service. 
An air carrier holding more than 3% of the total slots available on the day in 
question at a particular airport, or more than 2% of the total slots available on 
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the day in question in an airport system of which that airport forms part, shall not 
be considered as a new entrant at that airport. 
 
(4) The Cabinet Meeting Resolution of 1970 in Japan 
Regarding the management system for airline industries in Japan, the following policies 
and procedures shall be promoted with respect to the achievement of the promotion of 
consumers’ convenience and ensure safety in accordance with the rapid development of 
mass air transportation. 
 
Article 1  
2. Domestic airlines 
(1) The transformation to large-sized, jet airplanes’ operation shall be promoted on 
the basis of safe operation in order to reinforce stable airline activities. 
(2) It shall be promoted to establish a new airline by the merger of Japan Domestic 
airlines and Toa airline at the earliest opportunity. This new company shall have 
the technical support and capital involvement by Japan Airlines and be expected 
to acquire private capital. In addition, All Nippon Airways’ cooperation with this 
company is preferable. This new airline shall operate on local routes until it 
acquires the permission by the Government to operate on trunk routes. 
(3)  Japan airlines and Japan Domestic Airlines shall discuss any issues, which might 
be caused by non-consolidation of these two airlines. These decisions shall be 
approved by the Government. 
(4) Regarding the local routes with high air transport demand, double designations 
shall be taken on a route in order to improve further air transport service. 
Moreover, route selection and airline cooperation shall be considered, in order to 
avoid the negative effects caused by excessive competition. 
 
Article 2 
3. International airlines 
(1) Japan Airlines shall unitarily operate as a scheduled International airline as a 
general rule. They shall endeavour to establish the company structure, which will 
satisfy demand in Japan as well as avoid the negative effects of excessive 
competition. 
(2) Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways shall operate international charter flights 
to utilise surplus aircraft in order to improve the productivity among the 
international air transport industry in cooperation with each other. 
(3) Regarding cargo airlines, effective measures shall be considered immediately for 
establishing an airline structure, which can satisfy rapidly growing demand for 
international cargo air transport. Furthermore, the cargo handling system shall be 
established immediately. 
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(5) The Notifications by the Minister of Transport on 1st July 1972 
 
Article 1 
1. Business field 
(1) Japan Airlines 
Japan Airlines shall operate on the domestic trunk routes (all flights from Sapporo, 
Tokyo, Osaka, Fukuoka and Naha) and the international flights. The focus shall be 
on international routes. Moreover, effective measures and procedures shall be  
 
considered and proposed in order to satisfy the rapidly growing air cargo transport 
demand. 
(2) All Nippon Airways 
All Nippon Airways shall invest all its business capital in domestic trunk and local 
routes (all routes except the trunk routes) and try to improve short-haul 
international charter flights in line with the business expansion. The destination of 
the international charter flights shall be approved only after international 
diplomatic affairs are considered.  
(3) Toa Domestic Airlines 
a. Toa Domestic Airlines shall operate only on the local routes. Jet aircraft 
operation shall be approved only when its safety is assured. 
b. After sufficient safe operational experience on jet aircraft on local routes, jet 
operation on trunk routes shall be offered. The operation of three aircraft on 
trunk routes shall be planned for 1974. 
c. Regarding the jet operation, technical support shall be needed for Toa 
Domestic Airlines for a while. However, they shall try to reduce their 
dependence on other airlines and establish the operation system independently 
as soon as possible. 
2. Adjustment of transport supply 
(1) The expansion of supply by airlines shall be approved as long as certain 
demand on the route is confirmed. The present standard shall be the total 
average load factor (about 65% on trunk routes and 70% on local routes). 
(2)  The market share of each airline on domestic trunk routes shall be 
discussed and decided by airlines according to the principle policy of 
coexistence and co-prosperity considering the development of airlines that 
started later. 
(3)  Between 1973 and 1976, the double designation on domestic local routes 
shall only be allowed on two routes in any one year. An airline which 
started earlier shall cooperate to encourage the development of another 
airline, which started later according to the principle of coexistence and co-
prosperity. 
(4) Wide body jet aircraft operation on domestic trunk routes shall be approved 
after 1974. Exceptionally, only for the Okinawa routes shall be approved 
from 1972 as long as the airport capacity is available. The timing and 
frequencies shall be decided after discussion among airlines.  
3. Cooperative relationship 
4. Others 
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(6) The discussion of the management structure of the airline industry in the 
future” (The transport policy meeting report of June, 1986 
Article 4 The competition promotion policy in the domestic market in Japan 
(1) In the domestic market, the discrimination between trunk routes and local 
routes shall be eliminated in order to promote double or triple designations 
according to the demand scale and airport condition on those routes. 
The high-demand routes are considered as the main target routes, in order to 
improve the consumer’s benefit. Besides, the main airports are regarded as the 
strategic key factors, which may function as hub airports in the domestic network, 
the centres of economic activities and the major gateways for international flights. 
Hence, the routes between these main hub airports shall be the double and triple 
designations routes to promote the air transport service network as long as 
sufficient demand is ensured.  
(2) The route evaluation standards such as the demand size, etc shall be examined 
considering in a fair and transparent way so as to promote competition 
(3) The appropriate competition among airlines shall be expected considering the 
differentiations between the companies scale. Especially Japan airlines needs to 
be treated differently because the company scale and route structures are large 
compare to other airlines. 
(4) It is expected that airlines shall review their business planning in order to 
promote competitive policy. However, it is not appropriate for airlines to expand 
their scale beyond the airline’s ability with regards to the safety operation and 
sustainable supply of high-quality air transport service. Hence, each airline shall 
attempt to develop using reasonable business planning assumptions. In this 
respect, it shall be considered to review its business plan according to the 
company policy. 
(5) The small or medium scale airlines shall mainly operate on non- profitable 
routes such as the remote island routes. As air transport performs an important 
role to local citizens, those routes shall be maintained. 
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Appendix D: Transition of liberalisation process in Japan and the EU 
 
1956 ECAC multilalteral agreement on non-scheduled operations
1957 Europian Community consisting of six member States established by the Treaty of Rome
1961 EC Council of Ministers exempted sea and air transport from competition rules of the Rome Treaty until a policy could be developed
1967 ECAC multialteral agreement on scheduled service tariffs
1970 45.47 system
1973 UK, Denmark & Ireland join EC
1979 EC Civil Aviation Memorandum No.1 published, which set out general objectives regarding air transport policy
1980 EC introduce proposal to Council regarding inter-regional services
1981 EC report on scheduled air fares within the Community published
1982 US/ECAC Memorandum of Understanding introducing a multilateral agreement on non-intervention zones for North Atlantic tariffs. ECAC COMPAS Report on Competition in European Air Services published.
1983 EC Inter-Regional Air Services Directive issued by Council
1984
EC Civil Aviation Memorandum No.2 published, which adovocated the harmonisation and liberalisation of intra-
European bilaterals, and the introduction of competition rules with certain exemptions. UK/ Netherlands liberal 
bilateral agreement signed
Japan Europe
 
 
(table continues on next page) 
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1985 45.47 system repealed
1986 the double & triple desigination rules 1986
Nouvelles Frontieres case at European Court of Justice established that rules governing competition in the Rome 
Treaty applied to air transport. EC introduce proposal to amend 1983 directive on inter-regional services. ECAC 
Memorandum of Understanding, involving representatives of several States, on capacity share and tariffs but not 
market entry.
1987 EC Single European Act implemented, which makes unanimous approval of Council decisions no longer necessary, only a qualified majority. Stage 1. of liberalisation approved by Council.
1988 Sorensen Plan discussed, which envisages the Commission gradually taking over responsibility for the Air Services Agreements of the 12 member States.
1989 Court of Justice decision in Ahmed Saheed case, declaring null and void ipso jure agreements on tariffs applicable to scheduled routes. Stage 2 of liberalisation proposals by Commission.
1990 Second aviation package approved by Council of Ministers.
1991 Commission publishes its third package of liberalisation proposals
1992 first relaxation of the double & triple designation rules 1992 Council of Ministers approves third stage measures
1994 the fare setting range rules
1996 2nd relaxation of the double & triple designation rules
1997 the double & triple designation rules repealed
1998
April transport policy council report
Sep Skymark Airlines operation started
Dec Air Do's operation started
1999 revision of the air law 's agreement
2000 revision of the air law 's enforcement
Japan Europe
 
Source: The Airline Industry and the Impact of Deregulation (Williams, 1994, p. 76-77) and Author. 
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A 3,000 X 60 02/07/1988
B 2,500 X 60 23/03/2002
C 3,000 X 60 27/03/1997
A 4000  X 60 20/05/1978
B ( 2500 X 60)
B' (2,180 X 60) 18/04/2002
C (3,200 X 60)
A 1,828  X 60 18/03/1958
B  3,000  X 60 05/02/1970
A 3,500  X 60 04/09/1996
B 4,000  X 60 01/10/2007
3,500 X 60 07/02/2005
A 3,000 X 60 20/07/1988
B 3,000 X 60 26/04/1996
7 2 Asahikawa MLIT Asahikawa AKJ 2,500 X 60 01/02/1997 8:00-21:00
8 2 Wakkanai MLIT MLIT WKJ 2,000 X 45 01/10/1988 8:30-20:00
9 2 Kushiro MLIT MLIT KUH 2,500 X 45 30/11/2000 8:00-21:00
10 2 Obihiro MLIT Obihiro OBO 2,500 X 45 21/11/1985 8:00-21:00
11 2 Hakodate MLIT MLIT HKD 3,000 X 45 25/03/1999 7:30-20:30
A 1,200 X 45 01/12/1970
B 3,000 X 45 26/03/1998
13 2 Akita MLIT Akita AXT 2,500 X 60 26/06/1982 7:30-21:30
14 2 Yamagata MLIT Yamagata GAJ 2,000 X 45 01/04/1982 8:00-19:30
A 1,314 X 45 01/10/1963
B 2,500 X 45 28/03/1996
16 2 Hiroshima MLIT MLIT HIJ 3,000 X 60 25/01/2003 7:00-21:30
17 2 Yamaguchi- Ube MLIT Yamaguchi UBJ 2,500 X 45 22/03/2001 7:30-20:30
18 2 Takamatsu MLIT MLIT TAK 2,500 X 60 16/12/1989 7:30-20:30
19 2 Matsuyama MLIT MLIT MYJ 2,500 X 45 12/12/1991 7:30-20:30
2,000 X 45 14/12/1983
(2,500 X 45) 01/03/2005
21 2 Fukuoka MLIT MLIT FUK 2,800 X 60 01/04/1972 (7:00-22:00)
A 1,200 X 30 01/04/1960 7:30-21:30
B 3,000 X 60 01/04/1980
24 2 Kumamoto MLIT MLIT KMJ 3,000 X 45 01/04/1980 7:30-21:30
25 2 Oita MLIT MLIT OIT 3,000 X 45 31/10/1988 7:30-21:30
26 2 Miyazaki MLIT MLIT KMI 2,500 X 45 24/03/1990 7:30-21:30
27 2 Kagoshima MLIT MLIT KOJ 3,000 X 45 02/10/1980 7:30-21:30
28 2 Naha MLIT MLIT OKA 3,000 X 45 1972 24
Operation hours Code Runway Open date
Narita International Airport 
corporation
MLIT
Class Name Owner Management
MLIT
HND
NRT
1 1
2 1
Tokyo International MLIT
New Tokyo International
MLIT ITM
4 1 Kansai International Kansai International Airport corporation KIX
3 1 Osaka International
24
6 2 New Chitose(Sapporo) MLIT MLIT CTS 24
5
2 Sendai MLIT
NGO1 Chubu Centrea International
Central Japan International 
Airport company
MLIT
MLIT SDJ
15 2 Niigata MLIT MLIT KIJ
12
MLIT KCZ
22 2 New Kitakyushu MLIT MLIT KKJ
20 2
23 2
2,500 X 60 16/03/2006
MLIT NGSNagasaki MLIT
Kochi
24
6:00-23:00
7:00-22:00
24
7:30-21:30
7:30-8:30
7:30-20:30
05:00-02:00
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2,500 X 60 24/03/1990
(3,000 X 60 ) 01/04/2005
2,000 X 45 01/03/1983
(2,500 X 45 ) 18/03/2005
31 3 Oodate- Noshiro Akita Akita ONJ 2,000 X 45 18/07/1998 8:00-19:30
32 3 Shonai Yamagata Yamagata SHJ 2,000 X 45 01/10/1991 8:00-19:30
33 3 Fukushima Fukushima Fukushima FKS 2,000 X 60 03/12/1998 8:30-20:00
34 3 Toyama Toyama Toyama TOY 2,000 X 45 18/03/1984 7:30-20:30
35 3 Noto Ishikawa Ishikawa NTQ 2,000 X 45 07/07/2003 08:00-19:30
36 3 Matsumoto Nagano Nagano MMJ 2,000 X 45 26/07/1994 9:00-17:00
37 3 Shizuoka Shizuoka Shizuoka (2,500 X 60 ) 2009 Under construction
38 3 Kobe Kobe Kobe UKB 2,500 X 60 16/02/2006 07:00-22:00
39 3 Nanki-Shirahama Wakayama Wakayama SHM 2,000 X 45 07/09/2000 8:30-20:00
40 3 Tottori Tottori Tottori TTJ 2,000 X 45 09/07/1990 7:00-21:30
41 3 Izumo Shimane Shimane IZO 2,000 X 45 07/03/1991 7:30-20:30
42 3 Iwami Shimane Shimane IWJ 2,000 X 45 02/07/1993 8:00-19:30
43 3 Okayama Okayama Okayama OKJ 3,000 X 45 04/10/2001 7:30-20:30
06:30-2100
00:30-04:30
45 3 Hachijyojima Tokyo Tokyo HAC 2,000X 45 1962 08:00-18:00
46 3 Oshima Tokyo Tokyo OIM 1,800 X 45 1964 08:30-16:30
47 3 Ishigaki Okinawa Okinawa ISG 1,500X 45 1973 08:00-21:00
48 3 Amamioshima Kagoshima Kagoshima ASJ 2,000 X 45 1988 08:00-19:30
49 3 Miyakejima Tokyo Tokyo MYE 1,200 X30 1966 09:00-17:00
50 3 Miyakojima Okinawa Okinawa MMY 2,000 X 45 1973 08:00-21:00
51 3 Kumejima Okinawa Okinawa UEO 2,000 X 45 1973 08:00-19:30
52 3 Fukui Fukui Fukui FKJ 1,200 X 30 1988 9:00-17:00
53 3 Hiroshima-nishi Hiroshima Hiroshima HIW 1,800 X 45 1993 7:30-21:30
54 Others Nagoya airfield Aichi Aichi NKM 2,750 X 45 2005 7:00-21:00
55 Others Misawa US Air force US Air force MSJ 3,050 X 45 1977 8:30-20:00
56 Others Miho(Yonago) Defence force Defence force YGJ 2,000 X 45 1969 07:00-22:00
57 Others Tokushima Defence force Defence force TKS 2,000 X 45 24/04/1987 7:30-20:30
Management  Code Runway Open dateClass Name Owner
30 3
29 3 Aomori Aomori Aomori AOJ
Saga
Iwate HNA
HSG44
Hanamaki Iwate
3 Saga Saga 2,000X 45 1998
8:00-19:30
7:30-21:30
Operation hours
 
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2006) 
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Appendix F: Main airports in Japan (map) 
200miles 
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Note: Airport names corresponding to the numbers shown on the map can be found in Appendix D.
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Appendix G: Market segmentation of the Tokyo routes and key 
characteristics in 2000 
airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
airlines
number of 
new 
entrants
number of 
departure(thousa
nd) per year
number of 
pasengers(thousa
nds) per year
number of supplied 
seats(thousands) 
per year
load factor
number of 
departure 
per day
number of 
passenger per 
day(thousands)
JL/NH/JS/AD 2000 spk sapporo 1 894 4 1 31.812 8982.063 13797.692 65.1 87.2 24.608
JL/NH/JS/BC 2000 fuk fukuoka 1 1041 4 1 28.816 7989.491 12528.628 63.8 78.9 21.889
JL/NH/JS 2000 osa osaka 1 514 3 0 13.009 4359.858 6168.515 70.7 35.6 11.945
JL/NH/JS 2000 oka okinawa 1 1687 3 0 13.062 3745.444 5172.126 72.4 35.8 10.261
Average 1034 4 0.5 21.675 6269.214 9416.740 68.0 59.4 17.176
JL/NH/JS 2000 kix kansai 2 687 3 0 10.522 2325.985 3622.516 64.2 28.8 6.373
JL/NH/JS 2000 hij hiroshima 2 790 3 0 9.916 2231.196 3421.100 65.2 27.2 6.113
JL/NH/JS 2000 koj kagoshima 2 1111 3 0 9.134 2025.747 3298.450 61.4 25.0 5.550
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmq komatsu 2 528 3 0 7.609 2021.863 2901.855 69.7 20.8 5.539
Average 779 3 0 9.295 2151.198 3310.980 65.1 25.5 5.894
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmj kumamoto 3 1056 3 0 7.591 1550.937 2391.240 64.9 20.8 4.249
JL/NH 2000 hkd hakodate 3 786 2 0 5.308 1398.429 2282.289 61.3 14.5 3.831
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmi miyazaki 3 1023 3 0 7.633 1327.765 2397.259 55.4 20.9 3.638
JL/NH/JS 2000 ngs nagasaki 3 1143 3 0 7.090 1507.474 2482.450 60.7 19.4 4.130
NH 2000 okj okayama 3 685 1 0 3.272 514.014 742.381 69.2 9.0 1.408
NH/JS 2000 tak takamatsu 3 711 2 0 5.805 1173.382 1696.476 69.2 15.9 3.215
JL/NH 2000 myj matsuyama 3 859 2 0 6.374 1293.186 2022.223 63.9 17.5 3.543
JL/NH/JS 2000 oit oita 3 928 3 0 7.260 1287.451 2048.200 62.9 19.9 3.527
Average 899 2 0 6.292 1256.580 2007.815 63.4 17.2 3.443
JL/NH 2000 axt akita 4 555 2 0 4.727 882.392 1459.012 60.5 13.0 2.418
NH 2000 toy toyama 4 570 1 0 4.205 872.164 1251.090 69.7 11.5 2.389
NH 2000 ubj yamaguchiube 4 935 1 0 3.637 670.223 999.340 67.1 10.0 1.836
NH/JS 2000 tks tokushima 4 703 2 0 5.093 807.927 1333.834 60.6 14.0 2.213
JL/NH/JS 2000 kcz kochi 4 824 3 0 5.637 861.112 1393.842 61.8 15.4 2.359
NH/JS 2000 akj asahikawa 4 1052 2 0 4.783 735.004 1286.226 57.1 13.1 2.014
NH/JS 2000 aoj aomori 4 690 2 0 5.783 978.419 1502.019 65.1 15.8 2.681
NH/JS 2000 kuh kushiro 4 1032 2 0 3.758 530.830 923.922 57.5 10.3 1.454
Average 795 2 0 4.703 792.259 1268.661 62.4 12.9 2.171
NH 2000 ygj yonago 5 776 1 0 2.867 364.843 600.258 60.8 7.9 1.000
JS 2000 izo izumo 5 801 1 0 3.078 498.303 731.433 68.1 8.4 1.365
JL/NH/JS 2000 mmb memanbetsu 5 1156 3 0 3.078 498.760 875.741 57.0 8.4 1.366
JL/JS 2000 obo obihiro 5 999 2 0 2.895 525.311 853.287 61.6 7.9 1.439
NH 2000 syo shonai 5 489 1 0 2.163 366.093 536.988 68.2 5.9 1.003
NH 2000 ttj tottori 5 667 1 0 2.188 331.490 516.600 64.2 6.0 0.908
JS 2000 kkj kitakyushu 5 958 1 0 1.946 158.818 260.764 60.9 5.3 0.435
JS 2000 msj misawa 5 685 1 0 2.836 430.397 763.552 56.4 7.8 1.179
JS 2000 shm nankishirahama 5 634 1 0 1.856 142.962 256.802 55.7 5.1 0.392
ANK 2000 onj odatenoshiro 5 628 1 0 1.248 106.702 187.650 56.9 3.4 0.292
NH 2000 hsg saga 5 1130 1 0 1.458 166.030 280.600 59.2 4.0 0.455
NH 2000 wkj wakkanai 5 1195 1 0 1.014 155.327 262.035 59.3 2.8 0.426
ANK 2000 shb nakashibetsu 5 1118 1 0 1.437 109.672 219.537 50.0 3.9 0.300
NH 2000 gaj yamagata 5 441 1 0 0.728 72.258 125.396 57.6 2.0 0.198
ANK 2000 iwj iwami 5 907 1 0 1.447 102.083 240.107 42.5 4.0 0.280
Average 839 1 0 2.016 268.603 447.383 58.6 5.5 0.736
ANK 2000 hac hachijyojima 6 353 1 0 2.859 236.040 436.762 54.0 7.8 0.647
ANK 2000 oim oshima 6 162 1 0 2.030 90.275 129.872 69.5 5.6 0.247
JTA 2000 isg ishigaki 6 2171 1 0 0.954 116.232 143.117 71.7 2.6 0.318
JS 2000 asj amamioshima 6 1436 1 0 0.718 72.840 116.985 62.3 2.0 0.200
JTA 2000 mmy miyakojima 6 2020 1 0 0.724 84.004 120.038 70.0 2.0 0.230
JTA 2000 ueo kumejima 6 1888 1 0 0.237 25.402 35.550 71.5 0.6 0.070
Average 1338 1 0 1.254 104.132 163.721 66.5 3.4 0.285
Average of the whole Tokyo routes 920 2 0 6 1216 1885 63 15 3  
 
Source: Author based on data from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation Statistics in 2000 
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Appendix H: High speed rail and fares in several regions 
 
Train From To Distance (km) Time (min) Speed km/h Cheapest fare Standard fare Cheapest fare Standard fare
local curency local curency USD USD
France
TGV 6171 Lyon-St Exupery Aix-en- Provence 289.6 66 263.3 19 39.5 23.0 47.8
TGV 5102 Valence TGV Avignon TGV 129.7 30 259.4 16 19 19.4 23.0
TGV 9802 Massy TGV St-Pierre-des- Corps 206.9 49 253.3 18 37.5 21.8 45.4
6 TGV Paris Lyon Avignon TGV 657 156 252.7 44 68 53.2 82.3
TGV 6109 Paris Lyon Aix-en- Provence 730.7 176 249.1 47.5 68 57.5 82.3
7 TGV Avignon TGV Valence TGV 129.7 31 251.0 16 19 19.4 23.0
Japan
Nozomi Nagoya Tokyo 366 104 211.2 10780 10780 91.8 91.8
Nozomi 501 Hiroshima Kokura 192 47 245.1 7730 7730 65.8 65.8
Nozomi 1 Shin-Kobe Okayama 143.4 38 226.4 6060 6060 51.6 51.6
8 Nozomi Okayama Hiroshima 161.3 42 230.4 6260 6260 53.3 53.3
17 Hayate Sendai Morioka 183.5 44 250.2 6490 6490 55.3 55.3
11 Hayate Omiya Sendai 321.5 74 260.7 5460 5460 46.5 46.5
Nozomi 1 Shin-Yokohama Nagoya 337.2 83 243.8 10150 10150 86.5 86.5
Nozomi Shin-Kobe Tokyo 589.5 174 203.3 14670 14670 125.0 125.0
European
Thalys Soleil Brussels Midi Valence TGV 831.7 206 242.2 75 91 90.8 110.1
Thalys 9995 Marne-la-Valtee Brussels Midi 315.8 81 233.9 31 43 37.5 52.0
Thalys 9884 Brussels Midi Roissy- CdG 291.7 75 233.4 31 43 37.5 52.0
51 Thalys trains Brussels Midi Paris Nord 313.6 85 221.4 55 55 66.6 66.6
Eurostar 9053 Marne-la-Valtee Ashford international 403.4 114 212.3 125 125 151.3 151.3
4 Eurostar Ashford international Paris Nord 401.5 114 211.3 149 149 180.3 180.3  
 
(table continues on next page) 
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Train From To Distance (km) Time (min) Speed km/h Cheapest fare Standard fare Cheapest fare Standard fare
local curency local curency USD USD
Germany
17 ICE trains Frankfurt Flughafen Siegburg/ Bonn 144 37 233.5 47 47 56.9 56.9
ICE 829 Siegburg/ Bonn Montabaur 63 18 210.0 10 37 12.1 44.8
11 ICE trains Frankfurt Flughafen Limburg Sud 59 17 208.2 25 25 30.3 30.3
ICE 277 Berlin Spandau Wolfsburg 168.9 50 202.7 39 39 47.2 47.2
ICE 11 Koln Hbf Frankfurt Flughafen 169.3 52 195.3 53 53 64.1 64.1
ICE 924 Mondabaur Frankfurt Flughafen 81 25 194.4 30 30 36.3 36.3
Korea
5 KTX trains Seoul Daejeon 155 49 189.8 19500 19500 20.0 20.0
KTX 109 Seoul Daegou 292 93 188.4 34900 34900 35.8 35.8
3 KTX trains Daejeon Daegou 137 47 174.9 15400 15400 15.8 15.8
4 KTX trains Seol Busan 410 154 159.7 44800 44800 45.9 45.9
United Kingdom
1 IC 225 Stevenage Grantham 125.3 41.5 181.2 22 29 38.1 50.3
1 IC 225 London King’s Cross Retford 222.9 75.5 177.1 34 56.5 59.0 98.0
4 trains Doncaster Peterborough 128.2 43.5 176.8 11 30.5 19.1 52.9
1 Pioneer London King’s Cross Grantham 169.5 58 175.3 25 41 43.4 71.1
1 IC 225 London King’s Cross Doncaster 250.6 86 174.8 16.5 40 28.6 69.4
USA
13 Acela Express Wilmington Baltimore 110.1 40 165.2 43 70 43.0 70.0
15 Acela Express Philadelphia Wilmington 50.6 20 151.8 23 45 23.0 45.0  
 
Source: Author based on the European rail time table and company information 
Notes: Fares are acuired from company websites in April 2006. The exchange rates adopted were the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, as reported in the exchange rate 
archives of the International Monetary Fund. 
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Appendix I: Modal share in the total domestic transportation in 2000, 
2003 and 2004 
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Modal share in Total domestic transportation (2004)
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Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Aviation statistics (2001, 2003 and 2004) and Japan Railway 
Central annual report (2004) 
Notes: The distance is the train distance between Tokyo station and the main station of each local city. The three- 
letter codes are the names of airports located at each local city. 
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Appendix J: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 1997 
airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(000) per 
year
number of 
pasengers 
(000) per 
year
number of 
supplied 
seats (000) 
per year
load factor
number of 
departure 
per day
number of 
passenger 
per day 
(000)
number of 
airlines
number of 
passenger 
per flight
number of 
seats per 
flight
JL/NH/JS 1997 spk sapporo 1 894 25.638 8127.341 11926.35 68.1 70.2 22.267 3 317.0 465.2
JL/NH/JS 1997 fuk fukuoka 1 1041 22.750 6748.564 10090.3 66.9 62.3 18.489 3 296.6 443.5
JL/NH/JS 1997 osa osaka 1 514 7.275 2585.034 3574.982 72.3 19.9 7.082 3 355.3 491.4
JL/NH/JS/JTA 1997 oka okinawa 1 1687 9.414 3011.463 4209.597 71.5 25.8 8.251 4 319.9 447.2
Average 1034 16.269 5118.101 7450.307 69.7 44.6 14.022 3.25 322.2 457.9
JL/NH/JS 1997 kix kansai 2 687 7.126 1675.813 2529.066 66.3 19.5 4.591 3 235.2 354.9
JL/NH/JS 1997 hij hiroshima 2 790 7.466 1738.906 2507.096 69.4 20.5 4.764 3 232.9 335.8
JL/NH/JS 1997 koj kagoshima 2 1111 7.850 1904.503 3162.585 60.2 21.5 5.218 3 242.6 402.9
JL/NH/JS 1997 kmq komatsu 2 528 6.308 1768.561 2692.984 65.7 17.3 4.845 3 280.4 426.9
Average 779 7.188 1771.946 2722.933 65.4 19.7 4.855 3 247.8 378.8
JL/NH/JS 1997 kmj kumamoto 3 1056 6.494 1460.076 2230.313 65.5 17.8 4.000 3 224.8 343.4
JL/NH 1997 hkd hakodate 3 786 5.547 1146.330 2311.535 62.6 15.2 3.141 2 206.7 416.7
JL/NH/JS 1997 kmi miyazaki 3 1023 7.021 1248.306 2089.876 59.7 19.2 3.420 3 177.8 297.7
JL/NH/JS 1997 ngs nagasaki 3 1143 6.505 1542.253 2437.218 63.3 17.8 4.225 3 237.1 374.7
NH 1997 okj okayama 3 685 2.889 359.017 617.904 58.1 7.9 0.984 2 124.3 213.9
NH/JS 1997 tak takamatsu 3 711 5.398 1094.735 1646.61 66.5 14.8 2.999 2 202.8 305.0
JL/NH 1997 myj matsuyama 3 859 5.787 1228.202 1705.271 72.0 15.9 3.365 2 212.2 294.7
JL/NH/JS 1997 oit oita 3 928 6.554 1197.224 2010.246 59.6 18.0 3.280 3 182.7 306.7
Average 899 5.774 1159.518 1881.122 63.4 15.8 3.177 2.5 196.0 325.8  
 
(table continues on next page) 
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airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(000) per 
year
number of 
pasengers 
(000) per 
year
number of 
supplied 
seats (000) 
per year
load factor
number of 
departure 
per day
number of 
passenger 
per day 
(000)
number of 
airlines
number of 
passenger 
per flight
number of 
seats per 
flight
JL/NH 1997 axt akita 4 555 4.338 865.260 1485.392 58.3 11.9 2.371 2 199.5 342.4
NH 1997 toy toyama 4 570 4.303 817.219 1153.858 70.8 11.8 2.239 1 189.9 268.2
NH 1997 ubj yamaguchiube 4 935 3.606 626.005 889.072 70.4 9.9 1.715 1 173.6 246.6
NH/JS 1997 tks tokushima 4 703 4.609 775.408 1200.855 64.6 12.6 2.124 2 168.2 260.5
JL/NH/JS 1997 kcz kochi 4 824 4.170 756.114 1138.074 66.4 11.4 2.072 3 181.3 272.9
NH/JS 1997 akj asahikawa 4 1052 4.985 791.321 1315.474 60.2 13.7 2.168 2 158.7 263.9
NH/JS 1997 aoj aomori 4 690 3.886 804.919 1118.503 72.0 10.6 2.205 2 207.1 287.8
NH/JS 1997 kuh kushiro 4 1032 3.618 524.213 938.446 55.9 9.9 1.436 2 144.9 259.4
Average 795 4.189 745.057 1154.959 64.8 11.5 2.041 1.9 177.9 275.7
ANC 1997 ygj yonago 5 776 2.895 323.897 468.53 69.1 7.9 0.887 1 111.9 161.8
JS 1997 izo izumo 5 801 2.880 434.911 712.801 61.1 7.9 1.192 1 151.0 247.5
JL/NH/JS 1997 mmb memanbetsu 5 1156 3.724 488.912 903.65 54.1 10.2 1.339 3 131.3 242.7
JL/JS 1997 obo obihiro 5 999 3.430 488.743 838.144 58.3 9.4 1.339 2 142.5 244.4
NH 1997 syo shonai 5 489 1.993 314.006 489.112 64.2 5.5 0.860 1 157.6 245.4
NH 1997 ttj tottori 5 667 2.166 298.542 457.636 65.2 5.9 0.818 1 137.8 211.3
JS 1997 kkj kitakyushu 5 958 1.421 141.049 190.414 76.1 3.9 0.386 1 99.3 134.0
JS 1997 msj misawa 5 685 2.876 419.017 734.953 57.0 7.9 1.148 1 145.7 255.5
JS 1997 shm nankishirahama 5 634 1.437 118.383 192.418 61.5 3.9 0.324 1 82.4 133.9
NH 1997 wkj wakkanai 5 1195 0.903 143.766 222.052 64.7 2.5 0.394 1 159.2 245.9
ANK 1997 shb nakashibetsu 5 1118 1.261 110.780 185.926 59.6 3.5 0.304 1 87.9 147.4
NH 1997 gaj yamagata 5 441 1.935 252.225 393.086 64.2 5.3 0.691 1 130.3 203.1
ANK 1997 iwj iwami 5 907 1.262 120.585 209.252 57.6 3.5 0.330 1 95.6 165.8
Average 833 2.168 281.140 461.3826 62.5 5.9 0.770 1.2 125.6 212.8
ANK 1997 hac hachijyojima 6 353 3.503 284.660 412.672 69.0 9.6 0.780 1 81.3 117.8
ANK 1997 oim oshima 6 162 2.017 102.669 129.088 79.5 5.5 0.281 1 50.9 64.0
JTA 1997 isg ishigaki 6 2171 0.996 91.940 136.508 57.2 2.7 0.252 1 92.3 137.1
JS 1997 asj amamioshima 6 1436 0.718 68.656 116.918 58.7 2.0 0.188 1 95.6 162.8
JTA 1997 mmy miyakojima 6 2020 0.719 78.655 107.922 72.9 2.0 0.215 1 109.4 150.1
ANK 1997 mye miyakejima 6 227 1.222 50.816 78.208 65.0 3.3 0.139 1 41.6 64.0
JTA 1997 ueo kumejima 6 1888 0.145 15.483 20.16 76.8 0.4 0.042 1 106.8 139.0
Average 1180 1.331 98.983 143.068 68.4 3.6 0.271 1 82.6 107.5
907 5 1071 1636 65 13 3 2 170 264Average of the whole Tokyo routes  
Source: Author based on the data of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (1997 
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Airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(000) per year
% of 
increased 
number of 
departure 
(000)
number of 
pasengers 
(000) per year
% of 
increased 
number of 
pasengers 
(000)
number of 
supplied 
seats/yr (000)
% of 
increased 
number of 
supplied 
seats
load factor
% of 
increased 
load factor
number of 
departure per 
day
passenger 
per day (000)
JL/NH/JS/AD 2000 spk sapporo 1 894 31.812 9.37 8982.063 3.75 13797.69 5.63 65.1 -1.81 87.2 24.608
JL/NH/JS/BC 2000 fuk fukuoka 1 1041 28.816 6.79 7989.491 5.26 12528.63 5.47 63.8 -0.16 78.9 21.889
JL/NH/JS 2000 osa osaka 1 514 13.009 18.66 4359.858 16.45 6168.515 18.22 70.7 -1.53 35.6 11.945
JL/NH/JS 2000 oka okinawa 1 1687 13.062 3.05 3745.444 1.82 5172.126 3.31 72.4 -1.50 35.8 10.261
Average 1034 21.675 9.47 6269.214 6.82 9416.74 8.16 68.0 -1.25 59.4 17.176
JL/NH/JS 2000 kix kansai 2 687 10.522 21.42 2325.985 16.87 3622.516 27.99 64.2 -8.68 28.8 6.373
JL/NH/JS 2000 hij hiroshima 2 790 9.916 21.86 2231.196 7.30 3421.1 13.90 65.2 -5.78 27.2 6.113
JL/NH/JS 2000 koj kagoshima 2 1111 9.134 10.00 2025.747 3.03 3298.45 4.95 61.4 -1.76 25.0 5.550
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmq komatsu 2 528 7.609 16.08 2021.863 6.55 2901.855 10.94 69.7 -3.86 20.8 5.539
Average 779 9.295 17.34 2151.198 8.44 3310.98 14.44 65.1 -5.02 25.5 5.894
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmj kumamoto 3 1056 7.591 3.55 1550.937 4.45 2391.24 -3.80 64.9 7.27 20.8 4.249
JL/NH 2000 hkd hakodate 3 786 5.308 -1.92 1398.429 -5.27 2282.289 1.71 61.3 -6.84 14.5 3.831
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmi miyazaki 3 1023 7.633 14.61 1327.765 5.02 2397.259 15.27 55.4 -8.88 20.9 3.638
JL/NH/JS 2000 ngs nagasaki 3 1143 7.090 7.78 1507.474 0.99 2482.45 4.43 60.7 -3.34 19.4 4.130
NH 2000 okj okayama 3 685 3.272 19.99 514.014 19.88 742.381 14.49 69.2 4.69 9.0 1.408
NH/JS 2000 tak takamatsu 3 711 5.805 -0.55 1173.382 1.81 1696.476 -0.20 69.2 2.06 15.9 3.215
JL/NH 2000 myj matsuyama 3 859 6.374 13.86 1293.186 4.85 2022.223 2.42 63.9 2.24 17.5 3.543
JL/NH/JS 2000 oit oita 3 928 7.260 -0.47 1287.451 2.43 2048.2 -2.39 62.9 5.01 19.9 3.527
Average 899 6.292 7.11 1256.58 4.27 2007.815 3.99 63.4 0.28 17.2 3.443  
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Airlines year routes name number of airlines
number of 
new entrants max fare discount max lowest fare
% diff. of max 
& low fare
JL/NH/JS/AD 2000 spk sapporo 4 1 28000 22000 13000 0.54
JL/NH/JS/BC 2000 fuk fukuoka 4 1 31000 24000 11000 0.65
JL/NH/JS 2000 osa osaka 3 0 18500 12000 10000 0.46
JL/NH/JS 2000 oka okinawa 3 0 34500 27000 17000 0.51
Average 3.5 0.5 28000 21250 12750 0.54
JL/NH/JS 2000 kix kansai 3 0 18500 12000 10000 0.46
JL/NH/JS 2000 hij hiroshima 3 0 26000 17000 17000 0.35
JL/NH/JS 2000 koj kagoshima 3 0 33000 17000 17000 0.48
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmq komatsu 3 0 18500 15000 13000 0.30
Average 3 0 24000 15250 14250 0.40
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmj kumamoto 3 0 31000 25000 13500 0.56
JL/NH 2000 hkd hakodate 2 0 26500 18000 9200 0.65
JL/NH/JS 2000 kmi miyazaki 3 0 31000 19250 16000 0.48
JL/NH/JS 2000 ngs nagasaki 3 0 33000 21850 17450 0.47
NH 2000 okj okayama 1 0 25500 15000 12000 0.53
NH/JS 2000 tak takamatsu 2 0 25000 16650 17000 0.32
JL/NH 2000 myj matsuyama 2 0 27000 17000 17000 0.37
JL/NH/JS 2000 oit oita 3 0 30000 18900 12500 0.58
Average 2.375 0 28625 18956 14331 0.50  
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Airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(000) per year
% of 
increased 
number of 
departure 
(000)
number of 
pasengers 
(000) per year
% of 
increased 
number of 
pasengers 
(000)
number of 
supplied 
seats/yr (000)
% of 
increased 
number of 
supplied 
seats
load factor
% of 
increased 
load factor
number of 
departure per 
day
passenger 
per day (000)
JL/NH 2000 axt akita 4 555 4.727 29.47 882.392 8.29 1459.012 17.53 60.5 -7.77 13.0 2.418
NH 2000 toy toyama 4 570 4.205 14.58 872.164 6.78 1251.09 14.54 69.7 -6.82 11.5 2.389
NH 2000 ubj yamaguchiub 4 935 3.637 -1.99 670.223 9.86 999.34 0.70 67.1 9.11 10.0 1.836
NH/JS 2000 tks tokushima 4 703 5.093 2.13 807.927 2.54 1333.834 -0.41 60.6 3.06 14.0 2.213
JL/NH/JS 2000 kcz kochi 4 824 5.637 10.57 861.112 4.49 1393.842 -1.75 61.8 6.37 15.4 2.359
NH/JS 2000 akj asahikawa 4 1052 4.783 -2.96 735.004 -3.75 1286.226 -2.88 57.1 -1.04 13.1 2.014
NH/JS 2000 aoj aomori 4 690 5.783 1.12 978.419 -1.21 1502.019 -3.45 65.1 1.88 15.8 2.681
NH/JS 2000 kuh kushiro 4 1032 3.758 0.13 530.83 -3.24 923.922 -0.09 57.5 -3.04 10.3 1.454
Average 795 4.703 6.63 792.2589 2.97 1268.661 3.03 62.4 0.22 12.9 2.171
NH 2000 ygj yonago 5 776 2.867 -1.34 364.843 4.44 600.258 4.61 60.8 -0.16 7.9 1.000
JS 2000 izo izumo 5 801 3.078 -0.19 498.303 4.26 731.433 -1.90 68.1 6.24 8.4 1.365
JL/NH/JS 2000 mmb memanbetsu 5 1156 3.078 -4.08 498.76 -2.66 875.741 -0.82 57.0 -1.72 8.4 1.366
JL/JS 2000 obo obihiro 5 999 2.895 -0.86 525.311 -2.14 853.287 1.57 61.6 -3.60 7.9 1.439
NH 2000 syo shonai 5 489 2.163 -0.83 366.093 5.19 536.988 -4.81 68.2 10.53 5.9 1.003
NH 2000 ttj tottori 5 667 2.188 1.25 331.49 4.59 516.6 6.89 64.2 -2.13 6.0 0.908
JS 2000 kkj kitakyushu 5 958 1.946 36.27 158.818 30.22 260.764 36.27 60.9 -4.40 5.3 0.435
JS 2000 msj misawa 5 685 2.836 -2.17 430.397 -0.81 763.552 3.83 56.4 -4.41 7.8 1.179
JS 2000 shm nankishiraham 5 634 1.856 27.21 142.962 15.98 256.802 31.35 55.7 -11.73 5.1 0.392
ANK 2000 onj odatenoshiro 5 628 1.248 23.08 106.702 13.26 187.65 11.91 56.9 1.25 3.4 0.292
NH 2000 hsg saga 5 1130 1.458 0.41 166.03 -7.66 280.6 -13.93 59.2 7.25 4.0 0.455
NH 2000 wkj wakkanai 5 1195 1.014 -1.07 155.327 -11.15 262.035 0.31 59.3 -11.49 2.8 0.426
ANK 2000 shb nakashibetsu 5 1118 1.437 8.70 109.672 -12.02 219.537 -3.00 50.0 -9.26 3.9 0.300
NH 2000 gaj yamagata 5 441 0.728 -14.75 72.258 -37.37 125.396 -26.64 57.6 -40.98 2.0 0.198
ANK 2000 iwj iwami 5 907 1.447 12.78 102.083 -7.43 240.107 13.12 42.5 -18.27 4.0 0.280
Average 839 2.016 5.63 268.6033 -0.22 447.3833 3.92 58.6 -5.53 5.5 0.736
ANK 2000 hac hachijyojima 6 353 2.859 -20.27 236.04 -10.48 436.762 6.67 54.0 -16.15 7.8 0.647
ANK 2000 oim oshima 6 162 2.030 -2.64 90.275 -10.02 129.872 -2.61 69.5 -7.58 5.6 0.247
JTA 2000 isg ishigaki 6 2171 0.954 -1.55 116.232 1.23 143.117 -0.52 71.7 1.85 2.6 0.318
JS 2000 asj amamioshima 6 1436 0.718 -1.91 72.84 11.60 116.985 -1.91 62.3 13.89 2.0 0.200
JTA 2000 mmy miyakojima 6 2020 0.724 0.56 84.004 4.19 120.038 0.46 70.0 3.70 2.0 0.230
JTA 2000 ueo kumejima 6 1888 0.237 -0.42 25.402 5.76 35.55 -1.77 71.5 7.68 0.6 0.070
Average 1338 1.254 -4.37 104.1322 0.38 163.7207 0.05 66.5 0.57 3.4 0.285  
(table continues on next page) 
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Airlines year routes name number of airlines
number of 
new entrants max fare discount max lowest fare
% diff. of max 
& low fare
JL/NH 2000 axt akita 2 0 20500 15000 12000 0.41
NH 2000 toy toyama 1 0 18500 15000 10000 0.46
NH 2000 ubj yamaguchiub 1 0 29000 23500 16000 0.45
NH/JS 2000 tks tokushima 2 0 25000 20000 16000 0.36
JL/NH/JS 2000 kcz kochi 3 0 26500 17600 17600 0.34
NH/JS 2000 akj asahikawa 2 0 34000 26500 11700 0.66
NH/JS 2000 aoj aomori 2 0 25500 20000 8750 0.66
NH/JS 2000 kuh kushiro 2 0 33000 26000 11200 0.66
Average 1.875 0 26500 20450 12906 0.50
NH 2000 ygj yonago 1 0 26500 21500 20000 0.25
JS 2000 izo izumo 1 0 26500 21500 9100 0.66
JL/NH/JS 2000 mmb memanbetsu 3 0 35000 24500 12300 0.65
JL/JS 2000 obo obihiro 2 0 32500 22500 11200 0.66
NH 2000 syo shonai 1 0 17000 14000 12500 0.26
NH 2000 ttj tottori 1 0 25500 21000 19000 0.25
JS 2000 kkj kitakyushu 1 0 31000 10720 10720 0.65
JS 2000 msj misawa 1 0 25000 20000 8700 0.65
JS 2000 shm nankishiraham 1 0 24500 24500 24500 0.00
ANK 2000 onj odatenoshiro 1 0 23500 19000 19000 0.19
NH 2000 hsg saga 1 0 31000 23000 21500 0.31
NH 2000 wkj wakkanai 1 0 36500 30000 19000 0.48
ANK 2000 shb nakashibetsu 1 0 35000 27500 27500 0.21
NH 2000 gaj yamagata 1 0 15000 13000 12500 0.17
ANK 2000 iwj iwami 1 0 30500 25000 17500 0.43
Average 1.2 0 27667 21181 16335 0.39
ANK 2000 hac hachijyojima 1 0 16500 13000 13000 0.21
ANK 2000 oim oshima 1 0 10500 8400 8400 0.20
JTA 2000 isg ishigaki 1 0 53500 26900 17950 0.66
JS 2000 asj amamioshima 1 0 39500 13700 13700 0.65
JTA 2000 mmy miyakojima 1 0 49000 33400 16700 0.66
JTA 2000 ueo kumejima 1 0 44000 28800 24200 0.45
Average 1 0 35500 20700 15658 0.47  
Source: Author based on the data of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2000) 
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Appendix L: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2001 
airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(thousands)
% of increased 
number of 
departure(thou
sands)
number of 
pasengers(t
housands)
% of 
increased 
number of 
pasengers(t
housands)
number of 
supplied 
seats 
(thousands)
%of 
increased 
number of 
supplied 
seats
load factor
% of 
increased 
load factor
JL/NH/JS/AD 2001 spk sapporo 1 894 32.338 1.65 9367.334 4.29 13843.83 0.33 67.7 3.99
JL/NH/JS/BC 2001 fuk fukuoka 1 1041 30.998 7.57 8274.732 3.57 12996.56 3.73 63.7 -0.16
JL/NH/JS 2001 osa osaka 1 514 14.612 12.32 4964.395 13.87 6848.926 11.03 72.5 2.55
JL/NH/JS/JTA 2001 oka okinawa 1 1687 14.408 10.30 3913.802 4.50 5719.925 10.59 68.4 -5.52
Average 1034 23.089 7.96 6630.066 6.56 9852.31 6.42 68.1 0.21
JL/NH/ANK 2001 kix kansai 2 687 11.316 7.55 2382.913 2.45 3401.707 -6.10 70.1 9.19
JL/NH/JS 2001 hij hiroshima 2 790 10.901 9.93 2317.884 3.89 3568.778 4.32 64.9 -0.46
JL/NH/JS 2001 koj kagoshima 2 1111 9.532 4.36 2111.348 4.23 3356.718 1.77 62.9 2.44
JL/NH/JS 2001 kmq komatsu 2 528 8.006 5.22 2042.866 1.04 2969.222 2.32 68.8 -1.29
Average 779 9.939 6.76 2213.753 2.90 3324.106 0.58 66.7 2.47
JL/NH/JS 2001 kmj kumamoto 3 1056 8.315 9.54 1616.606 4.23 2532.692 5.92 63.8 -1.69
JL/NH 2001 hkd hakodate 3 786 5.087 -4.16 1496.33 7.00 2310.009 1.21 64.8 5.71
JL/NH/JS 2001 kmi miyazaki 3 1023 8.098 6.09 1356.121 2.14 2591.532 8.10 52.3 -5.60
JL/NH/JS 2001 ngs nagasaki 3 1143 7.272 2.57 1479.618 -1.85 2464.041 -0.74 60.0 -1.15
NH 2001 okj okayama 3 685 3.645 11.40 604.887 17.68 863.696 16.34 70.0 1.16
NH/JS 2001 tak takamatsu 3 711 5.806 0.02 1181.903 0.73 1775.604 4.66 66.6 -3.76
JL/NH 2001 myj matsuyama 3 859 6.538 2.57 1341.727 3.75 2186.04 8.10 61.4 -3.91
JL/NH/JS 2001 oit oita 3 928 7.279 0.26 1247.256 -3.12 1930.758 -5.73 64.6 2.70
Average 899 6.505 3.54 1290.556 3.82 2081.797 4.73 62.9 -0.82  
 
(table continues on next page) 
Appendix L: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2001 
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airlines year routes name number of airlines
number of 
new 
entrants
max fare discount max lowest fare
increased 
% of the 
highest fare 
per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of 
discount 
max per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of the 
lowest fare  
per 
previous 
year
different%of 
max and 
lowfare
HHI
JL/NH/JS/AD 2001 spk sapporo 4.0 1 28000 22000 12000 0.00 0.00 -7.69 0.57 0.30
JL/NH/JS/BC 2001 fuk fukuoka 4.0 1 31000 24000 9900 0.00 0.00 -10.00 0.68 0.30
JL/NH/JS 2001 osa osaka 3.0 0 18500 14000 10000 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.46 0.35
JL/NH/JS/JTA 2001 oka okinawa 4.0 0 34500 27000 18000 0.00 0.00 5.88 0.48 0.37
Average 3.8 0.5 28000 21750 12475 0.00 4.17 -2.95 0.55 0.33
JL/NH/ANK 2001 kix kansai 3.0 0 18500 12000 9000 0.00 0.00 -10.00 0.51 0.49
JL/NH/JS 2001 hij hiroshima 3.0 0 26000 18000 11000 0.00 5.88 -35.29 0.58 0.40
JL/NH/JS 2001 koj kagoshima 3.0 0 33000 20500 20500 0.00 20.59 20.59 0.38 0.37
JL/NH/JS 2001 kmq komatsu 3.0 0 18500 15000 13000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.35
Average 3.0 0 24000 16375 13375 0.00 6.62 -6.18 0.44 0.40
JL/NH/JS 2001 kmj kumamoto 3.0 0 31000 25000 19000 0.00 0.00 40.74 0.39 0.35
JL/NH 2001 hkd hakodate 2.0 0 26500 18000 9400 0.00 0.00 2.17 0.65 0.50
JL/NH/JS 2001 kmi miyazaki 3.0 0 31000 24000 14000 0.00 24.68 -12.50 0.55 0.41
JL/NH/JS 2001 ngs nagasaki 3.0 0 33000 25500 23900 0.00 16.70 36.96 0.28 0.36
NH 2001 okj okayama 1.0 0 25500 16000 14000 0.00 6.67 16.67 0.45 1.00
NH/JS 2001 tak takamatsu 2.0 0 25000 19000 17000 0.00 14.11 0.00 0.32 0.50
JL/NH 2001 myj matsuyama 2.0 0 27000 21500 21500 0.00 26.47 26.47 0.20 0.60
JL/NH/JS 2001 oit oita 3.0 0 30000 23500 21500 0.00 24.34 72.00 0.28 0.34
Average 2.4 0 28625 21563 17538 0.00 14.12 22.81 0.39 0.51  
 
(table continues on next page) 
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airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(thousands)
% of increased 
number of 
departure(thou
sands)
number of 
pasengers(t
housands)
% of 
increased 
number of 
pasengers(t
housands)
number of 
supplied 
seats 
(thousands)
%of 
increased 
number of 
supplied 
seats
load factor
% of 
increased 
load factor
JL/NH 2001 axt akita 4 555 5.086 7.59 962.645 9.09 1477.11 1.24 65.2 7.77
NH 2001 toy toyama 4 570 4.349 3.42 860.314 -1.36 1240.548 -0.84 69.3 -0.57
NH 2001 ubj yamaguchiube 4 935 3.643 0.16 701.656 4.69 1025.734 2.64 68.4 1.94
NH/JS 2001 tks tokushima 4 703 5.094 0.02 809.412 0.18 1345.683 0.89 60.1 -0.83
JL/NH/JS 2001 kcz kochi 4 824 5.827 3.37 877.276 1.88 1348.362 -3.26 65.1 5.34
NH/JS 2001 akj asahikawa 4 1052 4.742 -0.86 769.605 4.71 1236.837 -3.84 62.2 8.93
NH/JS 2001 aoj aomori 4 690 5.772 -0.19 960.146 -1.87 1546.288 2.95 62.1 -4.61
NH/JS 2001 kuh kushiro 4 1032 3.759 0.03 552.078 4.00 899.046 -2.69 61.4 6.78
Average 795 4.784 1.69 811.642 2.67 1264.951 -0.37 64.2 3.09
NH 2001 ygj yonago 5 776 2.916 1.71 371.877 1.93 579.95 -3.38 64.1 5.43
JS 2001 izo izumo 5 801 3.033 -1.46 490.808 -1.50 693.895 -5.13 70.7 3.82
JL/JS 2001 mmb memanbetsu 5 1156 2.9 -5.78 512.488 2.75 802.649 -8.35 63.8 11.93
JL/JS 2001 obo obihiro 5 999 2.909 0.48 558.245 6.27 842.582 -1.25 66.3 7.63
NH 2001 syo shonai 5 489 2.187 1.11 348.408 -4.83 498.946 -7.08 69.8 2.35
NH 2001 ttj tottori 5 667 2.17 -0.82 321.688 -2.96 468.583 -9.29 68.7 7.01
JS 2001 kkj kitakyushu 5 958 2.077 6.73 183.557 15.58 278.318 6.73 66.0 8.37
JS 2001 msj misawa 5 685 2.852 0.56 441.373 2.55 753.585 -1.31 58.6 3.90
JS 2001 shm nankishirahama 5 634 1.798 -3.13 140.421 -1.78 245.259 -4.49 57.3 2.87
ANK 2001 onj odatenoshiro 5 628 1.447 15.95 120.803 13.22 208.458 11.09 58.0 1.93
NH 2001 hsg saga 5 1130 1.458 0.00 169.513 2.10 256.07 -8.74 66.2 11.82
NH 2001 wkj wakkanai 5 1195 1.023 0.89 168.293 8.35 262.741 0.27 64.1 8.09
ANK 2001 shb nakashibetsu 5 1118 1.441 0.28 119.886 9.31 216.839 -1.23 55.3 10.60
ANK 2001 mbe monbetsu 5 1233 0.723 33.39 52.201 33.27 91.076 30.59 57.3 1.96
NH 2001 gaj yamagata 5 441 0.726 -0.27 55.892 -22.65 121.824 -2.85 45.9 -20.31
NH 2001 iwj iwami 5 907 1.455 0.55 112.692 10.39 217.459 -9.43 51.8 21.88
Average 864 1.945 3.14 260.509 4.50 408.640 -0.87 61.5 5.58
ANK 2001 hac hachijyojima 6 353 2.712 -5.14 252.525 6.98 455.109 4.20 55.5 2.78
ANK 2001 oim oshima 6 162 2.049 0.94 87.914 -2.62 120.275 -7.39 73.1 5.18
JTA 2001 isg ishigaki 6 2171 0.964 1.05 118.173 1.67 144.3 0.83 74.1 3.35
JS 2001 asj amamioshima 6 1436 0.727 1.25 88.281 21.20 118.513 1.31 74.5 19.58
JTA 2001 mmy miyakojima 6 2020 0.725 0.14 86.498 2.97 120.784 0.62 71.6 2.29
JTA 2001 ueo kumejima 6 1888 0.236 -0.42 23.102 -9.05 36.383 2.34 63.5 -11.19
Average 1338 1.236 -0.36 109.416 3.53 165.894 0.32 68.7 3.66  
(table continues on next page) 
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airlines year routes name number of airlines
number of 
new 
entrants
max fare discount max lowest fare
increased 
% of the 
highest fare 
per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of 
discount 
max per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of the 
lowest fare  
per 
previous 
year
different%of 
max and 
lowfare
HHI
JL/NH 2001 axt akita 2.0 0 20500 15000 10500 0.00 0.00 -12.50 0.49 0.52
NH 2001 toy toyama 1.0 0 18500 15000 10000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 1.00
NH 2001 ubj yamaguchiube 1.0 0 29000 18000 17000 0.00 -23.40 6.25 0.41 1.00
NH/JS 2001 tks tokushima 2.0 0 25000 20000 16000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.54
JL/NH/JS 2001 kcz kochi 3.0 0 26500 21000 19800 0.00 19.32 12.50 0.25 0.35
NH/JS 2001 akj asahikawa 2.0 0 34000 28000 10000 0.00 5.66 -14.53 0.71 0.61
NH/JS 2001 aoj aomori 2.0 0 25500 20500 20000 0.00 2.50 128.57 0.22 0.57
NH/JS 2001 kuh kushiro 2.0 0 33000 27000 10000 0.00 3.85 -10.71 0.70 0.53
Average 1.9 0 26500 20563 14163 0.00 0.99 13.70 0.45 0.64
NH 2001 ygj yonago 1.0 0 26500 21500 20000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00
JS 2001 izo izumo 1.0 0 26500 21500 9000 0.00 0.00 -1.10 0.66 1.00
JL/JS 2001 mmb memanbetsu 2.0 0 35000 24500 12500 0.00 0.00 1.63 0.64 0.68
JL/JS 2001 obo obihiro 2.0 0 32500 22750 10000 0.00 1.11 -10.71 0.69 0.64
NH 2001 syo shonai 1.0 0 17000 14000 12500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.00
NH 2001 ttj tottori 1.0 0 25500 21000 19000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00
JS 2001 kkj kitakyushu 1.0 0 31000 24000 9000 0.00 123.88 -16.04 0.71 1.00
JS 2001 msj misawa 1.0 0 25000 20500 9000 0.00 2.50 3.45 0.64 1.00
JS 2001 shm nankishirahama 1.0 0 24500 17000 9000 0.00 -30.61 -63.27 0.63 1.00
ANK 2001 onj odatenoshiro 1.0 0 23500 19000 18500 0.00 0.00 -2.63 0.21 1.00
NH 2001 hsg saga 1.0 0 31000 21000 21000 0.00 -8.70 -2.33 0.32 1.00
NH 2001 wkj wakkanai 1.0 0 36500 30000 25500 0.00 0.00 34.21 0.30 1.00
ANK 2001 shb nakashibetsu 1.0 0 35000 26500 24500 0.00 -3.64 -10.91 0.30 1.00
ANK 2001 mbe monbetsu 1.0 0 36000 26500 25000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 1.00
NH 2001 gaj yamagata 1.0 0 15000 13000 12500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00
NH 2001 iwj iwami 1.0 0 30500 24000 19000 0.00 -4.00 8.57 0.38 1.00
Average 1.1 0 28188 21672 16000 0.00 5.03 -3.70 0.42 0.96
ANK 2001 hac hachijyojima 1.0 0 16500 13500 12000 0.00 3.85 -7.69 0.27 1.00
ANK 2001 oim oshima 1.0 0 10500 8500 8000 0.00 1.19 -4.76 0.24 1.00
JTA 2001 isg ishigaki 1.0 0 53500 28000 19050 0.00 4.09 6.13 0.64 1.00
JS 2001 asj amamioshima 1.0 0 39500 10000 10000 0.00 -27.01 -27.01 0.75 1.00
JTA 2001 mmy miyakojima 1.0 0 49000 29500 17700 0.00 -11.68 5.99 0.64 1.00
JTA 2001 ueo kumejima 1.0 0 44000 27500 23000 0.00 -4.51 -4.96 0.48 1.00
Average 1.0 0 35500 19500 14958 0.00 -5.68 -5.38 0.50 1.00  
Source: Author based on the data of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2001) 
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Appendix M: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2003 
airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(thousands)
% of 
increased 
number of 
departure(tho
usands)
number of 
pasengers(tho
usands)
% of 
increased 
number of 
pasengers(t
housands)
number of 
supplied 
seats 
(thousands)
%of 
increased 
number of 
supplied 
seats
load factor
% of 
increased 
load factor
number of 
departure 
per day
JL/NH/JS/AD 2003 spk sapporo 1 894 32.150 -4.62 9254.968 -3.70 14400.944 -0.54 64.3 -3.16 88.1
JL/NH/BC 2003 fuk fukuoka 1 1041 32.751 1.27 8260.565 -1.88 13908.385 0.85 59.4 -2.62 89.7
JL/NH 2003 osa osaka 1 514 20.058 28.11 6013.526 12.93 9078.784 23.22 66.2 -8.44 55.0
JL/NH 2003 oka okinawa 1 1687 15.022 2.66 4593.750 4.51 6365.790 8.28 72.2 -3.48 41.2
Average 1034 24.995 6.85 7030.702 2.96 10938.476 7.96 65.5 -4.42 68.5
JL/NH 2003 kix kansai 2 687 10.265 -10.05 1760.423 -18.46 2629.958 -21.24 66.9 3.40 28.1
JL/NH 2003 hij hiroshima 2 790 13.042 6.41 2528.320 1.98 4497.444 12.84 56.2 -9.65 35.7
NH/JS/BC 2003 koj kagoshima 2 1111 12.062 0.90 2283.938 -1.78 3888.571 0.96 58.7 -2.81 33.0
JL/NH 2003 kmq komatsu 2 528 8.005 0.39 2022.766 -1.19 3159.515 5.87 64.0 -6.71 21.9
Average 779 10.844 -0.59 2148.862 -4.86 3543.872 -0.39 61.5 -3.94 29.7
NH/JS/SNET 2003 kmj kumamoto 3 1056 11.443 29.30 1762.104 7.62 2985.868 12.07 59.0 -4.07 31.4
JL/NH 2003 hkd hakodate 3 786 6.332 11.19 1493.042 -6.51 2507.370 -3.23 59.5 -3.41 17.3
NH/JS/SNET 2003 kmi miyazaki 3 1023 10.703 12.04 1399.695 0.78 2224.856 -8.71 62.9 10.35 29.3
NH/JS 2003 ngs nagasaki 3 1143 8.124 -0.49 1471.583 -4.05 2613.985 -0.02 56.3 -4.09 22.3
JL/NH 2003 okj okayama 3 685 7.287 18.03 1119.884 14.39 1766.095 21.30 63.4 -5.65 20.0
NH/JS 2003 tak takamatsu 3 711 7.268 0.92 1301.197 2.26 1967.997 -4.22 66.1 6.79 19.9
JL/NH 2003 myj matsuyama 3 859 7.290 11.42 1410.597 -0.73 2474.397 6.17 57.0 -6.56 20.0
NH/JS 2003 oit oita 3 928 7.294 0.22 1245.622 -1.87 2069.754 1.59 60.2 -3.37 20.0
Average 899 8.218 10.33 1400.466 1.49 2326.290 3.12 60.6 -1.25 22.5  
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airlines year routes name nr of airlines
nr of new 
entrant max fare
discount 
max lowest fare
increased 
% of the 
highest fare 
per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of 
discount 
max per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of the 
lowest fare  
per 
previous 
year
different%of 
max and 
lowfare
HHI
JL/NH/JS/AD 2003 spk sapporo 4 1 25200 22000 9000 -10.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.42
JL/NH/BC 2003 fuk fukuoka 3 1 27900 21000 9800 -10.00 5.00 10.11 0.65 0.41
JL/NH 2003 osa osaka 2 0 16700 14000 10000 -9.73 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.50
JL/NH 2003 oka okinawa 2 0 31100 29000 18000 -9.86 7.41 0.00 0.42 0.48
Average 3 0.5 25225 21500 11700 -9.90 3.10 2.53 0.53 0.45
JL/NH 2003 kix kansai 2 0 16700 12000 9000 -9.73 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.52
JL/NH 2003 hij hiroshima 2 0 23400 16000 13000 -10.00 -11.11 8.33 0.44 0.52
NH/JS/BC 2003 koj kagoshima 3 1 29700 19500 9800 -10.00 -4.88 10.11 0.67 0.38
JL/NH 2003 kmq komatsu 2 0 16700 15000 12500 -9.73 0.00 -3.85 0.25 0.50
Average 2 0.25 21625 15625 11075 -9.86 -4.00 3.65 0.46 0.48
NH/JS/SNET 2003 kmj kumamoto 4 1 27900 23500 8500 -10.00 -6.00 -55.26 0.70 0.40
JL/NH 2003 hkd hakodate 2 0 23900 21000 18000 -9.81 2.44 69.81 0.25 0.51
NH/JS/SNET 2003 kmi miyazaki 4 1 27900 22000 8500 -10.00 -10.20 0.00 0.70 0.34
NH/JS 2003 ngs nagasaki 3 0 29700 25000 20000 -10.00 -3.85 -16.67 0.33 0.50
JL/NH 2003 okj okayama 2 0 23000 13000 10000 -9.80 -23.53 -9.09 0.57 0.60
NH/JS 2003 tak takamatsu 2 0 22500 18000 17000 -10.00 -5.26 0.00 0.24 0.50
JL/NH 2003 myj matsuyama 2 0 27000 21500 21500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.59
NH/JS 2003 oit oita 2 0 27000 22500 20000 -10.00 -6.25 -6.98 0.26 0.53
Average 3 0.25 26113 20813 15438 -8.70 -6.58 -2.27 0.40 0.50  
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airlines year routes name category stage length
number of 
departure 
(thousands)
% of 
increased 
number of 
departure(tho
usands)
number of 
pasengers(tho
usands)
% of 
increased 
number of 
pasengers(t
housands)
number of 
supplied 
seats 
(thousands)
%of 
increased 
number of 
supplied 
seats
load factor
% of 
increased 
load factor
number of 
departure 
per day
NH/JS(JL) 2003 axt akita 4 555 5.863 14.94 932.520 -0.33 1615.589 16.09 57.7 -14.14 16.1
JL/NH 2003 toy toyama 4 570 5.777 7.32 1067.825 2.60 1649.629 6.20 64.7 -3.43 15.8
NH/JL 2003 ubj yamaguchi 4 935 5.842 15.07 928.494 3.22 1563.845 7.84 59.4 -4.19 16.0
NH/JS/BC 2003 tks tokushima 4 703 4.891 2.02 796.204 0.33 1313.477 3.08 60.6 -2.73 13.4
JL/NH/JS 2003 kcz kochi 4 824 6.183 5.37 907.341 2.54 1653.662 21.01 54.9 -15.28 16.9
NH/JS/AD 2003 akj asahikawa 4 1052 4.896 7.04 817.050 1.54 1325.623 5.72 61.6 -4.05 13.4
(NH)/JS/BC 2003 aoj aomori 4 690 5.301 -10.94 845.688 -12.89 1450.903 -6.45 58.3 -6.87 14.5
NH/JS 2003 kuh kushiro 4 1032 3.644 -2.90 558.281 -4.34 889.647 -4.82 62.8 0.64 10.0
Average 795 5.300 4.74 856.675 -0.92 1432.797 6.08 60.0 -6.26 14.5
NH 2003 ygj yonago 5 776 3.432 18.43 369.201 1.85 630.346 12.53 58.6 -9.43 0.0
JS 2003 izo izumo 5 801 3.626 5.16 517.710 0.93 903.293 19.51 57.3 -15.61 9.9
JS 2003 mmb memanbets 5 1156 2.995 -0.99 503.609 -4.64 852.870 1.02 59.0 -5.75 8.2
JS 2003 obo obihiro 5 999 2.927 0.55 517.457 -6.72 843.812 -0.17 61.3 -6.55 8.0
NH 2003 ttj tottori 5 667 2.658 23.23 310.650 0.72 488.900 13.00 63.5 -10.94 7.3
JS 2003 kkj kitakyushu 5 958 2.742 2.20 259.662 4.80 367.428 2.20 70.7 2.61 7.5
JS 2003 msj misawa 5 685 2.121 -17.82 239.355 -34.13 400.982 -27.51 59.7 -9.13 5.8
JS 2003 shm nankishirah 5 634 1.839 1.21 135.134 -4.12 265.825 5.26 50.8 -8.96 5.0
ANK 2003 onj odatenoshi 5 628 1.441 -0.14 116.521 -2.24 183.613 -7.18 63.5 5.31 3.9
NH 2003 hsg saga 5 1130 1.460 0.41 162.605 0.52 244.818 -3.35 66.4 3.91 4.0
NH 2003 wkj wakkanai 5 1195 1.016 0.30 146.637 -16.50 224.026 -13.08 65.5 -3.82 2.8
ANK 2003 shb nakashibet 5 1118 0.715 -40.47 90.681 -11.98 143.181 -17.40 63.3 6.57 2.0
ANK 2003 mbe monbetsu 5 1233 0.726 0.28 49.540 -12.77 91.811 -6.04 54.0 -7.06 2.0
JS 2003 gaj yamagata 5 441 0.722 71.09 59.633 98.19 103.388 46.09 57.7 35.76 2.0
ANK 2003 iwj iwami 5 907 0.731 -39.64 59.986 -37.21 94.184 -38.64 63.7 2.41 2.0
Average 889 1.943 1.59 235.892 -1.55 389.232 -0.92 61.0 -1.38 4.7
ANK 2003 hac hachijyojim 6 353 2.770 2.29 221.894 -9.36 450.776 0.80 49.2 -10.05 7.6
ANK/ANET 2003 oim oshima 6 162 1.547 -24.61 59.381 -18.90 139.047 2.93 42.7 -21.22 4.2
JTA/ANK 2003 isg ishigaki 6 2171 1.336 19.82 160.109 24.49 186.555 16.95 78.7 5.78 3.7
JS 2003 asj amamioshi 6 1436 0.880 21.72 93.766 6.90 143.776 22.02 65.2 -12.37 2.4
JTA 2003 mmy miyakojima 6 2020 0.727 1.39 93.536 10.55 120.032 1.58 77.9 8.80 2.0
JTA 2003 ueo kumejima 6 1888 0.239 2.58 25.130 12.99 36.564 2.52 58.6 -6.09 0.7
Average 1338 1.250 3.86 108.969 4.45 179.458 7.80 62.1 -5.86 3.4  
(table continues on next page) 
Appendix M: Matrix of factors on the Tokyo routes by category in 2003 
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airlines year routes name nr of airlines
nr of new 
entrant max fare
discount 
max lowest fare
increased 
% of the 
highest fare 
per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of 
discount 
max per 
previous 
year
increased 
% of the 
lowest fare  
per 
previous 
year
different%of 
max and 
lowfare
HHI
NH/JS(JL) 2003 axt akita 2 0 20500 16000 11000 0.00 6.67 15.79 0.46 0.50
JL/NH 2003 toy toyama 2 0 18500 14000 10000 0.00 -6.67 -9.09 0.46 0.64
NH/JL 2003 ubj yamaguchi 2 0 26100 21000 15000 -10.00 0.00 -6.25 0.43 0.53
NH/JS/BC 2003 tks tokushima 3 1 22500 20000 9800 -10.00 0.00 -42.35 0.56 0.54
JL/NH/JS 2003 kcz kochi 3 0 23900 20000 17500 -9.81 -6.98 -12.50 0.27 0.50
NH/JS/AD 2003 akj asahikawa 3 1 30200 25000 9000 -9.85 -9.09 -10.00 0.70 0.57
(NH)/JS/BC 2003 aoj aomori 2 1 25500 19500 9800 0.00 -4.88 -51.00 0.62 0.74
NH/JS 2003 kuh kushiro 2 0 29700 26000 23500 -10.00 -3.70 135.00 0.21 0.55
Average 2 0.4 24613 20188 13200 -6.21 -3.08 2.45 0.46 0.57
NH 2003 ygj yonago 1 0 26500 21500 20000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00
JS 2003 izo izumo 1 0 23900 23000 20500 -9.81 6.98 127.78 0.14 1.00
JS 2003 mmb memanbets 1 0 31500 27500 25000 -10.00 12.24 78.57 0.21 1.00
JS 2003 obo obihiro 2 0 29300 25500 23000 -9.85 12.09 130.00 0.22 1.00
NH 2003 ttj tottori 1 0 25500 21000 19000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00
JS 2003 kkj kitakyushu 1 0 27900 20500 19000 -10.00 -14.58 111.11 0.32 1.00
JS 2003 msj misawa 1 0 22500 15300 15300 -10.00 -25.37 -23.50 0.32 1.00
JS 2003 shm nankishirah 1 0 22100 22100 22100 -9.80 22.78 145.56 0.00 0.54
ANK 2003 onj odatenoshi 1 0 21200 19500 10600 -9.79 2.63 -42.70 0.50 1.00
NH 2003 hsg saga 1 0 31000 21000 21000 0.00 16.67 16.67 0.32 1.00
NH 2003 wkj wakkanai 1 0 36500 30000 29500 0.00 0.00 15.69 0.19 1.00
ANK 2003 shb nakashibet 1 0 31500 28000 16000 -10.00 7.69 -34.69 0.49 1.00
ANK 2003 mbe monbetsu 1 0 32400 31600 28700 -10.00 10.88 73.94 0.11 1.00
JS 2003 gaj yamagata 1 0 15000 13000 7500 0.00 0.00 -40.00 0.50 1.00
ANK 2003 iwj iwami 1 0 27500 21000 13800 -9.84 -12.50 -27.37 0.50 1.00
Average 1 0 26953 22700 19400 -6.61 2.63 35.40 0.29 0.97
ANK 2003 hac hachijyojim 1 0 16500 16500 16500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
ANK/ANET 2003 oim oshima 2 0 10500 7500 7500 0.00 -2.60 -2.60 0.29 0.56
JTA/ANK 2003 isg ishigaki 2 0 50200 31000 19000 -6.17 10.71 -5.47 0.62 0.66
JS 2003 asj amamioshi 1 0 35600 35600 35600 -9.87 256.00 256.00 0.00 1.00
JTA 2003 mmy miyakojima 1 0 45600 29500 18700 -6.94 0.00 0.00 0.59 1.00
JTA 2003 ueo kumejima 1 0 42900 36650 19000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 1.00
Average 1 0 33550 26125 19383 -3.83 44.02 41.32 0.34 0.87  
Source: Author based on the data of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport (2003) 
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Appendix N: List of socio-economic indices by prefecture 
Data: Statistics Bureau in Japan “Figures of the Tokyo, Hokkaido and all the other prefectures in Japan by statistics in 2005”  
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/ssds/5a.htm 
 
Population 
1. Population in 2003 (thousands) 
2. Non-Japanese population per one hundred thousands 
3. Old people population over 65 years old per total population 
4. Production population per Total population ( 15-64 years old) 
5. Population increasing ratio  
6. Social increasing ratio 
 
Economic activities 
7. Income per a capita (prefecture) JYE(000) 
8. GDP(prefecture) increasing ratio per previous year 
9. Total income( actual) increasing ratio per a previous year 
10. Number of the bankruptcy companies in the prefecture 
11. CPI increasing ratio per as previous year 
12. CPI increasing ratio ( transport and communication) per a previous year 
13. Standard land price per a previous year 
 
Local government  
14. Budget index 
Budget index (financial index) shows the financial strength of the local government. It is computed by the average for past three years. 
15. Actual profit and loss ratio (%) 
It is one of the indexes, which shows the financial management condition of the local government. 
16. Current balance ratio 
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It is the one of the indexes, which interprets the elasticity of the financial structure of the local government. 
17. Resident tax per a capita 
 
Labour 
18. Perfect unemployment 
 Number of unemployment / labour population 
House holding 
19. Monthly actual income per a family 
   Employment family 
20. Monthly consumption expenditure per a family 
    For whole family 
21. Average consumption tendency 
   The ratio of consumption expenditure per a disposable income 
   Disposable income= income- (tax+ social insurances) 
   It shows the psychological tendency to the consumption 
22. PC penetration 
     Per 1000 family 
23. Mobile phone penetration 
 
Education 
24. Number of university 
25. Number of junior college 
26. Number of technical college 
27 Number of other professional school 
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Appendix O: The tertiary industry labour force proportion by 
prefecture 
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Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (2005) 
Note: Number refers to category which each prefecture belongs to. 
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Appendix P: The primary industry labour force proportion by 
prefecture 
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Appendix Q: The secondary industry labour force proportion by 
prefecture 
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Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan (2005) 
Note: Number refers to category. 
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Appendix R: Types of fares and prices on selected Tokyo routes in June 2005 
Destination 
from Tokyo Code
Categor
y Name of fares Type of fares Reservation restrictions
Sapporo SPK 1 Schedule JAL ANA ADO
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 28,300 28,300 23,000
Return fare 25,700 25,700 20,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 24,300 24,300 16,000-20,000
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 16,300-20,300 16300-20300 13,000-18,000
day time 20,300 20300, 21300 18,000
evening 16,300-21,300 16300-21300 14,000-19,000
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 18,500, 19,800 18500, 19800 15,000, 16,000
Fukuoka FUK 1 reservation restrictions JAL ANA SKY
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 31,300 31,300 24,000
Maeuri 1 19,000
Maeuri 7 17,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 15,800-23,300 15800-23300 15,000-18,000
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 15,300-19,300 15300-19300
day time 19,300 19,300
evening 153,00-20,300 15,300-20,300
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 18,800 18,800
Stand by fare no reservation and only available on departure day 22,000
Destination 
from Tokyo Code
Categor
y Name of fares Type of fares Reservation restrictions
Kansai KIX 2 reservation restrictions JAL ANA SKY
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 18,800 18,800 16,500
Maeuri 1 1days before departures 13,000
Shuttle fare Fully flexible fare return ticket 14,000 14,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 9,300-13,300 9,300-14,300 8,500-12,500
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 11,800 11,800
Stand by fare no reservation and only available on departure day 14,500
Kagoshima KOJ 2 reservation restrictions JAL ANA SKY
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 33,300 33,300 25,500
Maeuri 1 1days before departures 20,000
Maeuri 7 7days before departures 19,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 26,800 26,800 17,000
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 22,300 15300-19300
day time 20,800, 22,300 22,300
evening 19,800, 22,300 19,800, 22,300
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 21,800 21,800
Stand by fare no reservation and only available on departure day 23,000
Airlines and fare prices(JYE)
Airlines and fare prices(JYE)
 
(table continues on next page) 
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Destination 
from Tokyo Code
Categor
y Name of fares Type of fares Reservation restrictions
Kumamoto KMJ 3 reservation restrictions JAL ANA SNA
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 31,300 31,300 22,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 23,300 23,300
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 18,300, 19,800 18,300, 19,800
day time 19,800 19,800
evening 19,800 19,800
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 19,300 19,300
Skynet discount 6days before departures 18,000
SNA bargain 15days - 2months before departures 9,500
Hakodate HKD 3 reservation restrictions JAL ANA ADO
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 26,800 26,800 21,500
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 17,300-23,100 17,300-23,100 15,000, 18,500
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 14,300 14300, 18300 13,000, 17,000
day time 18,300, 21,800 21,800, 22,800 17,000
evening 21,800
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 20,300, 21,300 20,300, 21,300 16,500
Miyazaki KMI 3 reservation restrictions JAL ANA SNA
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 31,000 31,000 22,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 23,300 23,300
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 18,800 18,800
day time 19,800 19,800
evening 19,800 19,800
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 19,300 19,300
Skynet discount 6days before departures 18,000
SNA bargain 15days - 2months before departures 9,500
Asahikawa AKJ 4 reservation restrictions JAL ANA ADO
Normal fare Fully flexible fare 33,800 33,800 28,000
Restricted fare 1 Only for limited flights 1days before departures 27,800 27,800 22,000
Restricted fare 7 Only for limited flights 7days before departures morning 22,800 22,800 20,000
day time 22,800 22,800 20,000
evening 22,800 22,800 20,000
Advanced purchased fare 21days before departures 22,300 22,300 18,000
Airlines and fare prices(JYE)
 
Source: Author based on the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastracture and Transport, Aviation statistics in 2005 ( see  http://www.mlit.go.jp/kisha/kisha05/12/121201/10.pdf) 
Notes: All fares are excluding special fuel charge (JYE300), special security charge (JYE300) and Haneda airport charge (JYE100) 
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Appendix S: Fares and percentage changes of discount fares versus normal fares on Tokyo routes by 
category in June 2005 
Airport 
code Airport name Category
Normal 
fare
Discount 
fare(highest)
Discount 
fare(lowest)
% of discount 
fare(high)
% of discount 
fare (low)
FUK Hakata 1 37000 23600 16600 0.64 0.45
OSA Shinosaka 1 19100 14600 9600 0.76 0.50
SPK Sapporo 1 28600 24600 16300 0.86 0.57
FUK Fukuoka 1 31300 23600 11000 0.75 0.35
OKA Okinawa 1 35100 30800 17600 0.88 0.50
Average 30220 23440 14220 0.78 0.47
HIJ Hiroshima 2 26600 16600 13100 0.62 0.49
KIX kansai 2 19100 14600 8500 0.76 0.45
KMQ Komatsu 2 19000 16100 12100 0.85 0.64
KOJ Kagoshima 2 33600 27100 11000 0.81 0.33
Average 24575 18600 11175 0.76 0.48
KMJ Kumamoto 3 31600 23600 9500 0.75 0.30
NGS Nagasaki 3 33600 28100 24100 0.84 0.72
TAK Takamatsu 3 25600 21600 18100 0.84 0.71
HKD Hakodate 3 27100 23400 14600 0.86 0.54
MYJ Matsuyama 3 27600 22600 17600 0.82 0.64
OIT Oita 3 30600 26100 23600 0.85 0.77
KMI Miyazaki 3 31600 23600 9500 0.75 0.30
AKJ Asahikawa 3 33800 28100 20300 0.83 0.60
Average 30188 24638 17163 0.82 0.57
Airport 
code Airport name Category
Normal 
fare
Discount 
fare(highest)
Discount 
fare(lowest)
% of discount 
fare(high)
% of discount 
fare (low)
AXT Akita 4 21100 20600 19600 0.98 0.93
AOJ Aomori 4 27800 21800 18600 0.78 0.67
OKA Okayama 4 26100 13600 10600 0.52 0.41
UBJ Yamaguchiube 4 29600 20300 15600 0.69 0.53
TKS Tokushima 4 25600 21600 10000 0.84 0.39
TOY Toyama 4 19000 12600 10600 0.66 0.56
KCZ Kochi 4 27100 23900 21600 0.88 0.80
AKJ Asahikawa 4 33600 28100 21600 0.84 0.64
KUH Kushiro 4 33600 29100 27100 0.87 0.81
Average 27056 21289 17256 0.78 0.64  
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GAJ Yamagata 5 15600 14100 13600 0.90 0.87
MMB Memanbetsu 5 36600 32200 29800 0.88 0.81
KKJ Kitakyushu 5 31600 24100 18600 0.76 0.59
OBO Obihiro 5 33100 29200 26600 0.88 0.80
IWJ Iwami 5 31100 22100 22100 0.71 0.71
IZO Izumo 5 27100 23300 20600 0.86 0.76
YGJ Yonago 5 27100 23200 21900 0.86 0.81
TTJ Tottori 5 26100 22450 21400 0.86 0.82
MSJ Misawa 5 25600 15900 15900 0.62 0.62
ONJ Odatenoshiro 5 24100 20600 19600 0.85 0.81
HSG Saga 5 31600 23600 18600 0.75 0.59
SHB Nakashibetsu 5 35600 31000 29400 0.87 0.83
SYO Shonai 5 17600 15500 14100 0.88 0.80
GAJ Yamagata 5 17000 15000 7500 0.88 0.44
SHM anki-shiraham 5 25100 25100 25100 1.00 1.00
WKJ Wakkanai 5 37100 32500 31100 0.88 0.84
MBE Monbetsu 5 36600 32200 29800 0.88 0.81
NTQ Noto 5 19000 16600 15100 0.87 0.79
Average 27644 23258 21156 0.84 0.76
HAC Hachijyo 6 17000 17000 17000 1.00 1.00
OIM Oshima 6 11000 8000 8000 0.73 0.73
ASJ Amamioshima 6 41000 28600 27600 0.70 0.67
UEO Kumejima 6 44600 21700 20400 0.49 0.46
MMY Miyako 6 48600 35500 26500 0.73 0.55
MYE Miyakejima 6 13500 13500 13500 1.00 1.00
ISG Ishigaki 6 52100 38600 28950 0.74 0.56
Average 32543 23271 20279 0.77 0.71
Total average 28624 22781 18258 0.81 0.65  
Source: Author based of the data from Ministry of Land, Infrastracture and Transport, Aviation statistics in 2005 ( see  http://www.mlit.go.jp/kisha/kisha05/12/121201/10.pdf) 
Notes: 
All fares are excluding special fuel charge(JYE300), special security charge(JYE300) and Haneda airport charge(JYE100). 
Normal fare means the highest fully flexible fares among operating airlines on each route. 
Discount fare(Highest) means the higest discount fares among opearting airlines on each route. 
Discount  fare(lowest) means the most cheap discount fares among operating airlines on each route. 
Shaded rows denote routes entered by new entrants. 
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Appendix T: List of exchange rate used in this study 
 
The exchange rate adopted in the Representative Rates for Selected Currencies, which was reported in the exchange rate archives by month 
of the International Monetary Fund. Citing internet resources, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx 
 
 
 £1 1 Euro JYE 
2000 USD 1.592 USD 0.956 1 USD = JYE 105 
2003 USD 1.576 USD 1.089 1 USD = JYE 118 
2004 USD 1.85 USD 1.232 1 USD = JYE 104 
2005 USD 1.887 USD 1.295 1 USD = JYE 107 
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